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Cooper: The Return to Corporate Tax Evasion

THE RETURN TO CORPORATE TAX EVASION IN THE PRESENCE OF
AN INCOME TAX ON SHAREHOLDERS
by
GRAEME S. COOPER*

I. INTRODUCTION

This paper is an extension of work in the field of tax compliance examining the problem of income tax evasion.' Existing economic work on this
topic contains both empirical and theoretical literature analyzing the sources
of and incentives for income tax noncompliance and concentrates on compliance issues regarding individuals with the personal income tax.2 Another
study considers the incentives for publicly-held corporations and their managers to avoid compliance with their corporate income tax obligations and
analyze the effects on the reporting behavior of the corporation's managers
by such variables as the formal penalty structures, the revenue authority's audit strategies, market interest rates, the corporation's debt policy, and other
factors. 3 There is also sociological literature analyzing the behavior of corporate managers, 4 but compared to the analysis of personal income tax eva* This paper was written in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor
of the Science of Law in the Faculty of Law, Columbia University.
l. Reviews of the literature can be found in FRANK A. COWELL, CHEATING THE
GOVERNMENT: THE ECONOMICS OF EVASION 17-27 (1990); Ann D. Witte & Diane F.

Woodbury, The Effect of Tax Laws and Tax Administration on Tax Compliance: The Case of
the U.S. Individual Income Tax, 38 NAT'L TAX J. 1 (1985); AMERICAN BAR ASS'N COMMISSION
ON TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE, Report and Recommendations on Taxpayer Compliance (1987),
reprintedin 41 TAX LAW. 329, 338 (1983); 1 TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE 21 (Jeffrey A. Roth &
John T. Scholz eds., 1989); STEPHEN SMITH, BRITAIN'S SHADOW ECONOMY ch. 4 (1986);
DAVID J. PYLE, TAX EVASION AND THE BLACK ECONOMY ch. 5 (1989); Susan B. Long &
Judyth A. Swingen, Taxpayer Compliance: Setting New Agendas for Research, 25 LAW &
Soc'Y REV. 637 (1991); Frank A. Cowell, The Economic Analysis of Tax Evasion, in SURVEYS
IN THE ECONOMICS OF UNCERTAINTY 173 (John D. Hey & Peter J. Lambert eds., 1987).
2. See, e.g., INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, INCOME TAX COMPLIANCE RESEARCH: GROSS
TAX GAP ESTIMATES AND PROJECTIONS FOR 1973-1992 (Publication 7285, 1988); COWELL,
supranote 1, at 19-24; Michael J. Graetz & Louis L. Wilde, The Economics of Tax Compliance:
Factand Fantasy, 38 NAT'L TAX J. 355, 356 (1985); DAVID BURNHAM, A LAW UNTO ITSELF:
THE I.R.S. AND THE ABUSE OF POWER xvii-xx (Vintage ed. 1989); Michael O'Higgins,
Aggregate Measures of Tax Evasion: An Assessment, 1981 BRIT. TAX REV. 286; THE
ECONOMICS OF THE SHADOW ECONOMY (Wulf Gaertner & Alois Wenig eds., 1985); M. Marelli,
The Economic Analysis of Tax Evasion: EmpiricalAspects, in SURVEYS IN THE ECONOMICS

OF UNCERTAINTY 204 (John D. Hey & Peter J. Lambert eds., 1987). The empirical literature
is reviewed in James S. Henry, Noncompliance With U.S. Tax Law-Evidence on Size, Growth
and Composition, 37 TAX LAW. 1 (1983); SMITH, supra note 1, at chs. 9-12; PYLE, supra note
1, at chs. 2-4.
3. Graeme S. Cooper, Analyzing Corporate Tax Evasion, 50 TAX L. REV. 33 (1994).

4. Roman Toiasic & Brendan Pentony, Tax Complianceand the Rule of Law: From Legalism
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sion, corporate tax evasion has not been widely explored.
This paper elaborates on an existing model of tax evasion by publiclyheld corporations by adding another complicating factor-examining the
effect of the personal income tax and the variety of interaction mechanisms5
between the corporate tax and personal income tax systems. In particular, this
paper considers whether the presence of the personal income tax, operating as
an additional tax on income derived through companies, and the design of its
interaction (if any) with the corporate tax, is likely to induce the corporation's
managers to increase or decrease the level of evasion of the corporate tax.6 In
other words, under what circumstances will the existence and operation of the
personal income tax lead to greater or less evasion by corporations of their
liability under the corporate income tax; and to what extent does the result
depend upon the design of the interaction mechanism between the two tax
regimes?
The possibility that the interaction of the corporate tax and personal
income tax may enhance income tax compliance has been doubted on some
occasions, 7 and on others, assumed without much analysis. 8 The effects have
to Administrative Procedure?, 8 AUST. TAX F. 85 (1991); ROMAN TOMASIC & BRENDAN
PENTONY, DEFINING ACCEPTABLE TAX CONDUCT: THE ROLE OF PROFESSIONAL ADVISERS IN

TAX COMPLIANCE

(Centre for National Corporate Law Research Discussion Paper No. 2/

1990 1990).

5. The discussion in this paper will use the term "interaction mechanism" rather than
"integration" system, dividend relief, or some other term to refer to adjustments made at
either the corporate or shareholder level to accommodate the operation of the other tax.
Unfortunately, the terminology used in this field is not uniform and confusion may arise as
"integration" or "full integration" is often used (and will be used in this paper) to refer to a
specific system which attributes corporate profits to shareholders, rather than taxing
distributions or sales of corporate profits. McLure notes, "'integration' has so many meanings
that most groups can find a version they like." CHARLES E. MCLURE JR., MUST CORPORATE
INCOME BE TAXED TWICE? 28 n.23 (1979). Hence this paper will use the nebulous term
"interaction mechanism" to avoid possible confusion with existing definitions.
6. In this paper, the evasion being studied occurs only in the reporting of the corporation's
taxable income. It is of course quite possible that the shareholder is also contemplating
evading by not reporting all of the dividends or, more commonly, capital gains received from
this investment. See James M. Poterba, Tax Evasion and Capital Gains Taxation, 77 AM.

ECON. REV. 234 (1987). It may be that the shareholder prefers personal evasion because
evasion by the corporation is somehow easier for the revenue authority to detect or more
likely to be detected because of the deployment of enforcement resources by revenue
authorities. But the additional layer of evasion by shareholders will not be pursued further as
this paper is concerned principally with evasion of the corporate tax and the behaviour of
corporate managers.
7. See, e.g., MARTIN NORR, THE TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 73-75,
146-147 (1982). Norr was addressing the effects of particular interaction mechanisms on the
compliance behaviour of shareholders rather than the behaviour of corporate managers.
8. See, e.g., Andre Buelinckx, Belgium, in IMPUTATION SYSTEMS-OBJECTIVES AND
CONSEQUENCES 12 (Hugh J. Ault ed., 1983); Sijbren Cnossen, The Imputation System in the
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been conceived as occurring in both taxes: that the structure and design of the
personal income tax regime may increase compliance by shareholders with
the personal income tax, 9 and that it may increase compliance by corporate
managers with the corporate tax. This paper suggests that there are some
circumstances where the personal income tax discourages corporate tax evasion, but that there are others where it may encourage evasion. This produces
situations where managers may be expected to undertake more or less tax
evasion when the impact of the personal income tax is added, changing the
level of evasion that managers and shareholders might consider desirable
apart from the personal income tax. From the perspective of the revenue
authority, it will be seen that this result can be influenced significantly by the
design of the interaction between the corporate tax and personal income tax
systems.
One solution to the problem of corporate tax evasion would simply be to
abolish the corporate tax and concentrate on collecting tax on income derived
through corporations from the shareholders."° But revenue authorities clearly
desire to retain the corporate tax despite its acknowledged drawbacks, and it
EEC, in COMPARATIVE TAX STUDIES 85, 92 (Sijbren Cnossen ed., 1983) (most European
countries retain their corporate tax primarily as a withholding procedure because it "works as
an anti-avoidance device"). See also Hugh J. Ault, Introduction, in IMPUTATION SYSTEMSOBJECTIVES AND CONSEQUENCES 9 (Hugh J. Ault ed., 1983).

9. The possibility that the existence of the personal income tax and particular kinds of
interaction mechanism may enhance compliance by shareholders with the personal income
tax will not be pursued further in this paper. It is discussed in the literature concerning the
compliance behaviour of individuals. See generally supra note 1 and accompanying text.
10. The suggestion that the corporate tax ought simply to be removed is not made entirely
in jest. It is regularly suggested by many commentators. See e.g. William Vickrey, The
Corporate Income Tax and How to Get Rid of It, in RETROSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC FINANCE

118 (Lorraine Eden ed., 1991); Cnossen, supra note 8, at 87 ("in an equitable tax system ...
the case for a separate corporation tax is uneasy. Ideally, corporate profits, whether distributed
or retained, should be subject to personal income tax only."). Cf. Richard M. Bird, CorporatePersonal Tax Integration, in TAX COORDINATION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 227, 244

(Sijbren Cnossen ed., 1987) [hereinafter Corporate-PersonalTax Integration] ("whether the
personal income tax is based on income or consumption, there is a strong case for a continued
corporate tax-not just to act as a withholding tax on personal income but to tap economic
rents, to reach the income of non-residents, and to provide an appropriate division of revenues
between source and residence countries"). Elsewhere, Bird argues that the corporate tax is a
necessary element of the tax system and would have to be invented if it did not already exist.
RICHARD M. BIRD, TAXING CORPORATIONS 17 (1980). See also Peggy B. Musgrave,
Interjurisdictional Coordination of Taxes on Capital Income, in TAX COORDINATION IN THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 197 (Sijbren Cnossen ed., 1987); Robin W. Broadway, Neil Bruce &
Jack M. Mintz, Corporate Taxation in Canada: Toward an Efficient System, in TAX POLICY

OPTIONS IN THE 1980s 171 (Wayne R. Thirsk & John Whalley eds., 1982) (arguing that the
corporate tax is necessary to tax at some point the income derived by foreign corporations
and their non-resident shareholders from sources in the country).
All commentators go on to observe, however, that abolishing the corporate tax would create
other problems. See infra note 13.
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is this desire that ensures both the problem of evasion and the variety of interaction mechanisms which will be described in Section IV. From an economic perspective, the corporate income tax is a tax imposed upon and collected from the corporation but borne (probably, and in varying degrees) by
owners of equity investments in corporations."I While a corporate tax without a personal income tax is a tax intended to fall upon the owners of specific
forms of capital, collected by withholding from the corporation, the corporate
income tax with a further personal income tax on distributions or retentions
of previously taxed corporate income is much more ambiguous. The historical justification for the corporate income tax was usually the simple need for
revenue. However, with the introduction of a personal income tax (often subsequent to the corporate tax), the corporate tax survives largely to protect the
personal income tax12 and, perhaps, because its elimination would now prove
too difficult. 3
Ideally, the corporate tax would operate as a collection point for the tax
liability of the individual shareholders who own the corporation's income,
unless the view is taken that the corporation itself has taxable capacity
11. The ultimate incidence of the corporate tax is one of the enduring mysteries of public
economics and corporate finance. Depending upon the elasticities of supply and demand in
various markets, the corporate tax may be borne by the corporation's equity investors, the
consumers of its products or its workforce. The voluminous literature on this topic is
summarised in JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR 564-71 (2d ed. 1988);
ANTHONY B. ATKINSON & JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, LECTURES ON PUBLIC ECONOMICS 173-78
(1980); JOSEPH A. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY 135-41 (4th ed. 1983); Corporate-

Personal Tax Integration, supra note 10, at 242 ("the question of precisely whose income is
reduced by taxes on corporations is far from simple and perhaps ultimately unanswerable").
Indeed, one of Bird's reasons for retaining the corporate tax is precisely the point that its
incidence may well not lie with the shareholders who will receive the benefit of its elimination
or reduction through an interaction mechanism. Id. at 242-46.
12. See NORR, supra note 7, at 15-18; Cnossen, supra note 8, at 86-87; Corporate-Personal
Tax Integration,supra note 10, at 244; PECHMAN, supra note 11, at 181 ("without a corporation

tax, a substantial part of the individual income tax would be permanently lost from the tax
base through retention of earnings by corporations").
13. All commentators observe, however, that the effect of abolishing the corporate tax
would be a windfall gain to existing shareholders at substantial revenue cost and with no
desirable incentive effects. See Alan J.Auerbach, Debt, Equity, and the Taxation of Corporate
Cash Flows, in DEBT, TAXES, AND CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING 91, 114-15, 125-26 (John B.

Shoven & Joel Waldfogel eds., 1990) [hereinafter Corporate Cash Flows]. Further, Bird
notes that if the tax is borne by shareholders, its effect will have been capitalised into the
price of shares, and so remitting or abolishing the tax will not benefit the correct shareholders.
Corporate-PersonalTax Integration, supra note 10, at 244. See also TAXING CORPORATIONS,
supra note 10, at ch. 3; Alan R. Prest, CorporateTaxation in Latin America, in READINGS ON
TAXATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 211, at 212 (Richard M. Bird & Oliver Oldman eds.,
3d ed. 1975) (who notes "the inequity of allowing some individuals to make windfall gains as
a consequence of removing the tax"); Cnossen, supra note 8, at 87 ("removal of the tax would
result in unwarranted windfall gains to existing shareholders"); Vickrey, supra note 10, at
132 ("it is an additional item on the bill of indictment against the tax that getting rid of it is so
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(whether or not it is able to shift part or all of its liability to others). 14 But the
double taxation of corporate income under the classical system confounds this
5
goal and, as an alleged consequence, causes both inefficiency and inequity.1
difficult"); John G. Head & Richard M. Bird, Tax Policy Options in the 1980s, in COMPARATIVE
TAX STUDIES 3, 16 (Sijbren Cnossen ed. 1983) ("the abolition of ... [the corporate] tax
would therefore generate windfall gains for owners of equity shares").
14. J.A. Kay & M. A. KING, THE BRITISH TAX SYSTEM 152-554 (4th ed. 1986). This view
of the function of the corporate tax is not, it must be admitted, universally acknowledged.
Surrey was a notable recent critic of the conduit theory for taxing corporate income claiming
that the preference for full integration of the corporate and personal income tax was a matter
of "tax theology". See Stanley S. Surrey, Reflections on 'Integration' of Corporation and
Individual Income Taxes, 28 NAT.L TAX J.335 (1975). See also MCLURE, supra note 5, at
28-38.
15. These claims are almost universally made in the literature. See, e.g., STIGLITZ, supra
note 11, at ch. 23; U.S. DEP'T. OF THE TREASURY, REPORT OF THE DEP'T OF THE TREASURY
ON INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE TAX SYSTEMS-TAXING BUSINESS
INCOME ONCE 1-14 (1992) [hereinafter INTEGRATION]; MCLURE, supra note 5, at 25-27; KAY
& KING, supra note 14, at ch. 10; Corporate Cash Flows, supra note 13, at 91; Cnossen,
supra note 8, at 88-89; Vickrey, supra note 10; PECHMAN, supra note 11, at 141-49; RICHARD
GOODE, THE CORPORATION INCOME TAX (1951); O.E.C.D., COMPANY TAX SYSTEMS IN
O.E.C.D. MEMBER COUNTRIES 13-21 (1973) [hereinafter COMPANY TAX SYSTEMS]; RICHARD
J.VANN, ELIMINATING THE DOUBLE TAX ON DIVIDENDS: LEGAL AND PRACTICAL ISSUES ch.
2(1986).
But both of these two propositions have also been contested. It has been suggested, for
example, that the corporate tax is more equitable as a means of taxing owners of capital more
heavily than those who derive labour income. See, e.g., Prest, supra note 13, at 213 ("corporate
taxation is a means of taxing unearned income more heavily than earned"); Corporate-Personal
Tax Integration, supra note 10, at 242-46; PECHMAN, supra note 11, at 174 ("since corporate
ownership is heavily concentrated in the high income classes ... moderation or reduction of
the additional tax burden on dividends alone would reduce progressivity, unless the change
were accompanied by fundamental revisions in the individual income tax base"). Although it
has also been suggested that views of this kind are mistaken. See KAY & KING, supra note
14, at 154. A more refined objection is that some of the partial solutions to the problem are
more inequitable than the problem to be solved. Head & Bird, supra note 13, at 16; Cnossen,
supra note 8, at 97; Prest, supra note 13, at 212; Julian Alworth, Piecemeal Corporation Tax
Reform: A Survey, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TAXATION 63, 73 (Alan Peacock &
Francisco Forte eds., 1981).
Similarly, it has been suggested that the corporate tax may not be quite so inefficient after
all. Several new interpretations of the efficiency consequences of the corporate tax have
recently developed. For example, Stiglitz suggests that the corporate tax might be a tax on
entrepreneurship, having little effect on existing firms. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Taxation,
CorporateFinancialPolicy, and the Cost of Capital, 2 J. PUB. ECON. 1, 33 (1973) ("from an
efficiency point of view, the whole corporate profits tax structure is just like a lump sum tax
on corporations"); KAY & KING, supra note 14, at 157-58. On another view, the corporate
tax is an excess profits tax imposed principally on economic rents and consequently has no
distortionary effects. Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Corporation Tax, 5 J. PUB. ECON. 303 (1976);
O.E.C.D., TAXING PROFITS IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY-DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL ISSUES
22 (199 1) [hereinafter TAXING PROFITS] ("the economic justification for imposing a separate
tax on corporate profits is that under ideal conditions it is a non-distorting source of revenue,
at least insofar as the practical difficulties in identifying pure profits can be overcome").
According to another view, the corporate tax does not discourage distribution of profits. See
TAXING PROFITS, supra, at 25-30; Alan J. Auerbach, The Economic Effects of the Corporate
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The inefficiencies caused by the corporate tax arise from several sources: the
encouragement of inappropriate and costly non-corporate trading forms; 6 the
incentive for the retention rather than distribution of corporate profits;' 7 the
encouragement of financing corporate investment by debt rather than equity;"
and the incentive to structure returns to investors in ways that avoid the corporate tax. 19 The inequity of the unintegrated corporate tax arises from the
interaction of the corporate tax rate, the distribution practices of the
corporation's managers, and personal tax rate on shareholders. 0
Income Tax: Changing Revenues and Changing Views, in FINANCING CORPORATE CAPITAL

FORMATION 107 (Benjamin M. Friedman ed., 1986); Robin W. Broadway & David D. Wildasin,
PUBLIC SECTOR ECONOMICS (2d ed. 1984). Others have suggested that the removal of the

bias toward retention of profits and encouraging greater distribution will cause an undesirable
decline in the total level of savings. PECHMAN, supra note 11, at 180 ("the retained earnings
of corporations are a large source of savings in the United States; many would regard it as
unwise to encourage a reduction in this source of saving"); VANN, supra, at 25.
16. The incentive is not to invest in corporate form because of the effects of "double tax"
on distributions. But there are other (and contradictory) biases also operating. There is a
further bias toward closely-held corporations which permit greater flexibility in making
distributions that avoid the corporate tax. DAVID BRADFORD & U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY,
BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM 61 (Rev. ed. 1984) [hereinafter BLUEPRINTS]. Auerbach

has remarked upon the ability to avoid the corporate tax by using debt and upon other effects
of the corporate tax, such as the ability for high bracket taxpayers to defer tax by retention of
profits and the problems of disincorporation of enterprises already conducted in corporate
form. See Corporate Cash Flows, supra note 13, at 93.
17. INTEGRATION, supra note 15. Cf KAY & KING, supra note
Cash Flows, supra note 13, at 95, 98.

14, at 157-58; Corporate

18. In fact, investing by way of debt rather than equity is recognised as a method of turning
the tax system for corporations into the type of tax system appropriate for partnerships. See,
e.g., MYRON S. SCHOLES & MARK A. WOLFSON, TAXES AND BUSINESS STRATEGY ch. 18
(1992); Myron S. Scholes & Mark A. Wolfson, Converting Corporations to Partnerships
Through Leverage, in DEBT, TAXES, AND CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING 173 (John B. Shoven

& Joel Waldfogel eds., 1990); CorporateCash Flows, supra note 13, at 99 ("the use of debt
rather than equity by corporations has been viewed as "do-it-yourself integration", since it
causes corporate cash flow to be taxed as it would be in an unincorporated business").
19. See INTEGRATION, supra note 15, at ch. 1.
20. It is interesting to observe that the Treasury did not regard the inequity associated with
the separate corporate tax as significant, although the opinion was expressed in the context of
a system where corporate rates exceed the top personal marginal rate. Nevertheless, the
Treasury report clearly treats neutral taxation of corporate capital as a more important goal
than equitable treatment of capital income derived by individual investors. For example, the
report says:
A traditional goal of integration proposals has been to tax corporate income only once
at the tax rate of the shareholder to whom the income is attributed or distributed. ...
Assuring that corporate income is taxed once, but only once, does not require that
corporate income be taxed at individual rates, however.
Neutral taxation of capital income will reduce the distortions under the current
system. Economic efficiency suggests that all capital income should be taxed at the
same rate. Accordingly, we place less emphasis than some advocates of integration on
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These difficulties of the classical system have usually generated calls for
reforms to remove them, often with the implicit consequence of reducing the
total tax collected on corporate income. Where those calls have been successful, they have led to a variety of idiosyncratic interaction mechanisms between the corporate and personal income tax with differing effects upon
shareholders. 21 Sections III and IV of this paper are taken up with the way in
which these mechanisms can influence the decision of the corporation's
managers whether, and how much, to evade the corporate income tax.
The paper will proceed in the following stages: Section II will describe
a theoretical model of the incentive structure surrounding corporate tax evasion and the implications that the model suggests for the behavior of corporate managers. Section III will analyze how the personal income tax might
change the returns to evasion and how this effect could be expected to influence the behaviour of the corporation's managers. Section IV will describe
the principal interaction mechanisms between the corporate tax and personal
income tax employed in practice. Section V will analyze the effects of each
of the interaction mechanisms described. Section VI will consider how the
either trying to tax corporate income at shareholder tax rates or on simply trying to
eliminate one level of tax on distributed corporate income.
INTEGRATION, supra note

15, at 12-13.
21. This issue tends to generate idiosyncratic solutions combining differing degrees of
theoretical purity, administrative susceptibility and national priorities. For example, the
American Law Institute Reporter principally concentrated on the transitional problems of
eliminating the double tax on corporate earnings and suggested for the United States a dividend
deduction system for new capital; an additional excise tax on non-dividend distributions and
the elimination of the dividend-received deduction system for intercorporate portfolio
dividends. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT SUBCHAPTER C,
PROPOSALS ON CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS AND DISPOSITITIONS 327 (1982). These proposals
were elaborated and modified in a Supplemental Study. The additional tax on non-dividend
distributions became an alternate tax; it elaborated the dividend deduction for new equity by
limiting the deduction to a specific rate; it substituted for the proposal to abolish the dividendreceived deduction for inter-corporate portfolio dividends, a complete exemption of intercorporate dividends. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT, REPORTER'S
STUDY DRAFT, SUBCHAPTER C (Supplemental Study) (1989). Another solution proposed by
the Institute of Fiscal Studies suggested offering the same benefit to equity investment currently
offered to debt by granting a corporate deduction representing a notional interest amount for
the value of shareholder equity employed by the corporation. INSTITUTE FOR FISCAL STUDIES,
EQUITY FOR COMPANIES: A CORPORATION TAX FOR THE 1990S (1991). Most radical of all
are proposals to replace the corporate income tax with a cash-flow corporate tax with the
effect of excluding distributions from the corporation's tax base. BLUEPRINTS, supra note
16, at 120-21; INSTITUTE FOR FISCAL STUDIES, THE STRUCTURE AND REFORM OF DIRECT
TAXATION (1978). Most recently, the U.S. Treasury preferred a dividend exemption system
but also expressed interest in a Comprehensive Business Income Tax ("CBIT") system which
would equalise the return to debt and equity by denying a deduction for debt, eliminate the
investor's tax on debt and equity and impose the same tax burden on corporate and noncorporate enterprises. See INTEGRATION, supra note 15, at ch. 4.
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personal tax and interaction mechanisms might be constructed or improved to
deter evasion more effectively.
By the time the analysis is complete, the paper will argue that it is possible in theory at least, to construct the interaction mechanism between the
corporate tax and personal income tax so as to eliminate many of the benefits
of successful evasion and probably far more effectively and at less cost than
the strategies usually suggested. In practice, however, it will be seen that few
of the interaction mechanisms currently employed deliver this result. Consequently, in so far as the revenue authority relies on the interaction mechanism
to assist in reducing corporate tax evasion, the full benefits of the interaction
mechanism have yet to be exploited.
II. MODELLING CORPORATE TAX EVASION
A. Introduction
This section of the paper briefly summarizes a model of corporate tax
evasion describing the variables believed to influence corporate managers in
regard to corporate tax compliance. At first glance, the incentives for the
managers of publicly-held corporations not to comply with the corporate tax
appear obscure. Where, as in the case of privately-held corporations, the
corporation's managers are also its principal shareholders, they may suffer
personally from the criminal penalties imposed upon directors for detected
evasion. But also, they may benefit directly from successful evasion where
their alter ego, the corporation, is able to reduce the claim of the government
on the corporation's cash flow.
Where, however, the corporation is managed by salaried staff, there is
a divergence between those who will derive the benefits of the higher aftertax profits (the shareholders alone) and those who may suffer the costs of
failure (the corporation's shareholders and managers). Managers (and, on
occasions, shareholders) can suffer personal losses (such as being held personally liable for the tax liability of the corporation) which might discourage
corporate evasion that seemed profitable where only the costs and benefits for
the corporation were considered. Corporate managers might be implicated in
such offenses as attempting to evade the corporate tax,22 aiding or abetting tax
evasion by the corporation, 23 conspiring to defraud the government through

22. I.R.C. § 7201 (1994). The provision has been interpreted so that there does not need to
be identity between the person attempting to avoid tax and the person who is subject the tax
liability. Hence a corporate officer can be convicted of an offence under this section where

the officer attempts to evade the corporate income tax.
23. 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
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tax evasion,24 failing to file tax returns,25 or making false statements to the
26
revenue authority in tax returns.

Possible explanations for the existence of corporate tax evasion in the
face of these potential criminal penalties were sought in other incentives
confronting managers, both institutionalized within the corporation and generated externally. It was suggested that managers may believe there are sufficient benefits. for themselves to persist in corporate tax evasion. Incentives
for evasion would follow from devices commonly used by shareholders to
align the interest of managers with their own. The most obvious of these
devices would include remunerating managers by share allotment or linking
their salary to the corporation's profitability. Even in the absence of such
arrangements, there exist other incentives which could lead managers to contemplate evasion. For example, successful evasion might assist to establish
the manager's reputation in the market for corporate managers as a person
capable of producing above-average returns to shareholders." In addition,
corporate managers may perceive the expected cost of detected evasion to be
minute. This perception might arise from the manager's belief that the imposition of personal liability is so unlikely that he may treat the prospect of
punishment as negligible.2 8 What may be more damaging for corporate managers is to face the loss of employment,' reputation in the market for managers, and the ability to find subsequent employment. 29 Devices and incentives
24. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1994).
25. I.R.C..§ 7203 (1994); AUSTL. ACTS P., Taxation Administration Act 1953 §§ 8B-8H
[hereinafter TAA].
26. I.R.C. § 7206 provides a series of offences involving making false statements, all
punishable by a fine of up to $500,000 and 3 years imprisonment. A further perjury provision

is created by 18 U.S.C. § 1001. TAA §§ 8J-8W.
27. Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J.POL. ECON. 288
(1980).
28. See, e.g., PETER GRABOKSY & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, OF MANNERS GENTLE:
ENFORCEMENT STRATEGIES OF AUSTRALIAN BUSINESS REGULATORY AGENCIES 156, 161-65
(1986); Arie Freiberg, Enforcement Discretion and Taxation Offences, 3 AUST. TAX F. 55,
89, 90 (1986), stating:
The adoption of a compliance rather than a deterrence orientation, with the concomitant
emphasis upon negotiation and low visibility bargaining, though it conserved resources,
perpetuated, if it did not create, a moral ambivalence about tax offending. It has been
confined to the ranks of the illegal but not criminal ....
[T]he sparing use of criminal and quasi-criminal sanctions against evasion
contributed in large measure to the excesses of the 1970s. Because the only perceived
risk was a possible civil assessment at some future time, taxpayers and their advisers
were 'prepared to "chance their arms."'
Freiberg, supra, at 89-90.
29. While the discussion refers to the penalties as imposed upon the corporation's managers,
they can also be imposed upon shareholders who may face additional disincentives to evasion
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such as these encourage the corporation's managers to pursue the shareholders' goal of maximizing the market value of the shareholders' interests in the
corporation.3 ° Even pursuing such goals as maximizing cash flow, sales, or
corporate size, might be assisted by evasion. 1
B. The Model

The model begins with a corporation financed entirely by equity, and
asks whether corporate tax evasion can be expected to enhance the market
value of the corporation's shares-that is, whether the risks and returns to
evasion make it a profitable investment, given that it must be financed in a
particular way.3 2 Expressed in this way, corporate tax evasion is constructed
as both an investment decision and as raising issues about the capital structure of the corporation. The investment issue is whether investing in the liability created by corporate tax evasion promises a positive net present value
to the corporation. The capital structure question is whether the corporation's
value is enhanced or diminished by issuing a new debt with particular attributes in order to make the investment. It is thus implied that corporate tax
evasion as a systematic practice is appropriately modelled as a financial decision-that is, that corporate tax evasion has benefits and costs which can be
such as the potential loss of their assets after detection.
30. This proposition is usually attributed to Irving Fisher as elaborated by Hirschleifer.
See IRVING FISHER, THE THEORY OF INTEREST (1930); J. Hirshleifer, On the Theory of Optimal
Investment Decision, 66 J. POL. EcON. 329 (1958). See also Stewart C. Myers, Introduction:
The Issues, in MODERN DEVELOPMENTS IN FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 5-6 (Stewart C. Myers

ed., 1976).
31. There are other possible goals that the corporation's managers might pursue. Corporate
objectives, alleged to be "non-economic", are sometimes suggested such as maintaining the
corporation's reputation for honesty, concern for the community, or patriotism. These latter
objectives do not express comprehensive goals for the corporation, although they may operate
as constraints upon the ability of the corporation's managers to pursue particular projects.
Oliver E. Williamson, ManagerialDiscretion and Business Behavior, 53 AM. ECON. REV.
1032 (1963); John C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholdersversus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate
Web, in KNIGHTS, RAIDERS AND TARGETS: THE IMPACT OF THE HOSTILE TAKEOVER 77, 82-

92 (John C. Coffee Jr., et al., eds., 1988); Michael C. Jensen, The Takeover Controversy:
Analysis and Evidence, in KNIGHTS, RAIDERS, AND TARGETS: THE IMPACT OF THE HOSTILE
TAKEOVER 314, 317-323 (John C. Coffee Jr., et al., eds., 1988); GORDON DONALDSON,
MANAGING CORPORATE WEALTH: THE OPERATION OF A COMPREHENSIVE FINANCIAL GOALS
SYSTEM (1984); O.E.C.D., THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ASPECTS OF CORPORATE TAXATION
36-37 (1973); G. PEIRSON ET AL., BUSINESS FINANCE 23-30 (4th ed. 1989).

32. This goal also implies that, for corporations which are not managed by owners, the
corporation's managers are able somehow to signal to the market the higher after-tax profits
which evasion will produce without also signalling evasion to the revenue authority. It is
suggested that this can occur simply by announcing higher profits since the relation between
taxable and financial profit invariably diverge significantly due to innocuous circumstances
such as deliberate corporate tax preferences, different tax and financial accounting procedures,
differences between the tax concept of income and corporate law notions of profit and so on.
This divergence may be sufficient to permit the corporation's managers convincingly to
represent profitability and higher retained profits.
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meaningfully quantified and that the process of tax evasion by corporate
managers is susceptible of cost-benefit analysis.
The model begins by tracing expected cash flows.33 If the corporation
derives profit in the current year [P] and pays tax on its profits at the corporate tax rate [Tc], the incremental effect of the year's profits on the value of
the corporation is to increase the value by:34
(1 - Tc)P

where:
P = the taxable profits of the corporation, and
Tc = the corporate tax rate.
If, instead, the corporation reports to the revenue authority and pays tax
on another amount [D] (which is less than its full taxable profits) the evasion
initially reduces the cash outflow by the amount of the unpaid tax:
Tc (P - D)
where:
Tc = the corporate tax rate,
P = the taxable profits of the corporation, and
D = the amount of taxable profit declared to the revenue authority.
This amount [Tc(P-D)] is the gross gain from evasion in the absence of a
personal income tax and is available for the corporation's managers to distribute to shareholders, or retain as a source of funds for further investment.
The manager's failure to pay the corporation's full tax liability also
affects the market value of the corporation by the addition of a new contingent
liability for the unpaid tax and other penalties-the cost of failure. 35 The first
33. While some elements of the corporate tax system do undoubtedly involve accrual
taxation without reliance upon cash flow, these are in most instances, unusual aspects of the
system. Some of the more common are the rules for valuation of trading stock, depreciation
of capital equipment, and the treatment of some financial instruments.
34. It is also assumed that the corporation makes no distributions during the period.
35. The discussion refers to the contingent liability as a liability and cost to the corporation
although it is more accurately described as a cost to the shareholders deferring their residual
claim to a further claimant, the revenue authority. Where bondholders are included, evasion
is also a cost to them, either diluting or deferring their residual claim to the claim of the
revenue authority, a claim which is often given priority in the bankruptcy or liquidation of a
taxpayer above that of unsecured (and often even some secured) creditors. This priority may
exist prior to liquidation through a lien for unpaid tax and in bankruptcy. I.R.C. §§ 63216323 (1994). In Australia the revenue authority does not have the benefit of a special security
for tax debts and the priority of the revenue authority in corporate liquidation has been
abolished except for tax withheld from others and. not paid by the bankrupt to the revenue
authority. AUSTL. ACTS P., Income Tax Assessment Act 1936-1973 § 221P [hereinafter
ITAA].
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step in estimating the expected net present value to the corporation of evading tax is to subtract from the potential tax saving [(Tc(P-D)] the amount of
the penalty which the revenue authority can claim from the corporation if its
evasion is detected. The penalty imposed for unsuccessful evasion is typically
expressed as a multiple of the amount of tax evaded [Tc(P-D)], payable in
addition to the evaded tax. The penalty for evasion is thus [fTc(P-D)], not
including the obligation to pay the unpaid tax. 36 The penalty cost must also
be adjusted to reflect the increase in the amount payable upon detection in
each year that the contingent liability for evaded tax survives. In order to
eliminate the advantage to the taxpayer from the deferral of its tax payment,
the administrative procedures of the revenue authority increase the amount of
any unpaid tax by an annual interest rate which is set higher than current
market rates to discourage the corporation's managers from using the revenue
authority as a source of cheap capital. 37 But because the penalty and interest
may not have to be paid until a future period, it is also discounted at another
rate to express its present value.
Finally, the amounts payable under each outcome-both detection and
success-must be adjusted to reflect potential detection in each of the subsequent years until the revenue authority's search for evasion will be abandoned. When the present value of the penalty is discounted by the probability of detection [p], the expected net present value of tax evasion to the corporation is the sum of the expected tax saving less the present value of the
expected penalty:
NPV = (1 - p)t Tc (P- D)n=t
1
D) f(l+r*)n- + r*n'l
(P
Tc
(-p)n-l
pI
(1 + r) n - l
n=1
where:
t = the number of years until the search for evasion will be
abandoned,
p = the probability of detection of evasion,
Tc= the corporate tax rate,
P = the corporation's taxable profits,
D = the amount of taxable profits reported,
f = the penalty rate imposed on unpaid tax (f > 1),
r = the corporation's discount rate, and
r* = the penal interest rate charged on unpaid tax.
36. I.R.C. § 6663(a) sets the civil penalty rate for evasion at 75% of the underpayment
attributable to fraud. In Australia the penalty is 75%. ITAA § 226J.

37. I.R.C. § 6601(a),(e) (1994); ITAA §§ 170AA, 214A.
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The discounted cash flow method reaches a net present value for tax
evasion by aggregating and discounting expected cash outflows at appropriate interest and discount rates and subtracting them from the expected tax
saving. Two further variables are then introduced which bear upon the benefit of evasion. The first is the effect upon the value of the corporation's
assets. Where a corporation has few assets available to unsecured creditors,
the value of the additional liability for evaded tax might not substantially
reduce the market value of the corporation and, if the revenue authority's
enforcement costs are large relative to the size of the tax to be collected, the
reduction in the corporation's market value may be negligible. Reliance upon
discounted cash flows gives a misleading impression of the cost of corporate
tax evasion because the identified cash flows are unlikely to occur, and, if they
do, they are not likely to be at full value. Given the shield of limited liability, the ability of the shareholders to abandon the assets of the corporation in
satisfaction of the tax debt is treated as placing an alternative lower value on
the contingent liability for corporate tax which is the value of the net corporate assets available to the revenue authority at the time of audit.
A further complication is introduced to reflect the fact that the corporation has protection against possible, adverse fluctuations to the costs of evasion after the corporation has evaded, but before the evasion is detected. The
protection against adverse fluctuations in the cost of evasion is included in the
model by introducing the corporation's option to abandon its evasion strategy.
The model also considers other costs to the corporation. Transaction
costs incurred in setting up the evasion, recasting transactions in forms that
are less open to scrutiny, and preventing detection would all reduce the net
return even to successful evasion. Also, detected evasion may cause reputation costs, such as the loss of valuable licenses or rights if the corporation is
convicted of a crime.3 8 Increased compliance costs would increase the return
to evasion.
The model is based upon the assumption that the corporation's managers might evade tax where it showed a positive expected return. Such return
is determined by the variables just discussed, some representing policy instruments open to the revenue authority and others representing the operation of
market forces. Analysis of the model suggests that changes to the corporate
tax rate would be ambiguous except where the value of the outstanding corporate tax liability is determined by the value of the corporation's assets.
Higher corporate tax rates provide a greater incentive for evasion for a cor38. There may also be the special cost for corporations which are not managed by owners
that the shareholders may need to offer higher reward to the corporate managers in some form
in order to induce them to accept the risk of the personal liability that would often accompany
detection of the corporation's evasion.
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poration that does not expect to pay the full amount of the accumulated tax and
penalty. But increases in the probability of detection [p], level of penalty [f],
and decreases in market interest rates would all increase compliance. The
effect of changes to the level of the corporation's income and value of its net
assets are also ambiguous.
The effect of corporate debt is also said to be ambiguous. On the one
hand, issuing new corporate debt in the form of corporate tax evasion will
enhance the market value of the corporation for the existing shareholders if
the value of the liability created by evasion is less than the price raised on
issue. Further, retiring outstanding corporate tax debt (whether current or
accumulated) will enhance market value if the redemption price is less than
the value of the debt, and, again, it is the shareholders who are entitled to the
difference. On the other, the benefit of adding the further tax liability to the
capital structure of the corporation can be offset by the cost of financial distress if the additional liability increases the prospect of the corporation entering bankruptcy. In addition, existing bondholders may object to evasion if the
corporation does not have sufficient assets to meet all of its liabilities as they
come due, for at this point, the shareholders are gambling with the bondholders' money. But bondholders, aware of risks such as evasion, may take precautions to protect their interests prior to purchasing the bond which may
operate as impediments to evasion by the corporation's managers, especially
if the corporation will need to re-enter capital markets to repay existing debt.39
It may be argued that substituting corporate tax evasion for the existing debt
might be profitable depending upon the costs involved.
In summary, the model suggests that corporate tax evasion is a curious
puzzle that is not easily explicable. Where it exists, it is a complex phenomenon dependent upon many influences. It is ultimately based, however, upon
the simple proposition that the corporation's managers can enhance the market value of the corporation by tax evasion if the circumstances are such that
the value of the tax evaded is greater than any penalty that the corporation is
likely to pay. This proposition presupposes that the corporation's managers
can change their minds in the event that circumstances change drastically. It
also assumes that corporate managers can be encouraged to undertake the
evasion for the shareholders and that bondholders do not present an insuperable impediment to evasion.
But the model does not consider the effects of the personal income tax
upon the holders of equity interests in the corporation and whether this additional layer of tax might lead the corporation's managers into further evasion
39. Bondholders might not be concerned, however, if they could insist on further injection
of capital from the shareholders, or if the subsequent liability were deferred to theirs. In
either case, they will be the first beneficiaries of the gamble made using the money of others.
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or might, instead, have the effect of increasing compliance with the corporate
tax. That is the task of this paper.
III. THE EFFECTS OF THE PERSONAL INCOME TAX

Before proceeding to describe and analyze the various interaction
mechanisms-a task which will form the majority of this paper-it is appropriate to explore why and how the existence of the personal income tax and
the structure of its interaction with the corporate tax might change the decision of the corporation's managers whether to comply with or evade the corporate tax.
The observation that the corporate tax compliance decision is one for the
corporation's managers accords with formal legal rules and assumptions
usually made about the allocation of responsibilities for activities conducted
in corporate form.4" But the interaction mechanism between the corporate tax
and personal income tax can only influence the behavior of the corporation's
managers if it is accepted that the corporation's managers are influenced in
making their decisions by the desires and directions of the shareholders.4 In
particular, it is necessary to assume, as was done in the model described in
Section II, that the corporation's managers can be influenced or constrained
by the expressed (or more probably implied) wishes of shareholders to engage
in evasion" and that they are concerned with maximizing the effective aftertax return received by shareholders on their investment in the corporation.
40. There is also the further possibility that the evasion decision will be significantly
influenced, although perhaps not ultimately made, by professional tax advisers. The role of
advisers will not be pursued in this model partly because, it is suggested, advisers are unlikely
to be involved in evasion decisions. Indeed, the corporation's managers may even try to
conceal evasion from professional advisers. Advisers are much more likely to play an active

part in corporate tax avoidance where their knowledge and opinions may be indispensable for
successful avoidance.
41. In another context, Cnossen notes that the effects of the personal income tax on the
behaviour of corporate managers depends upon an assumption that its effects are taken into
account in managerial decisions. He observes,
Most studies assume implicitly that a firm takes the total tax burden on corporate
source income into account. This appears realistic in the case of closed companies, in
which directors and shareholders sit, so to speak, in the same chair. In the case of
open companies, however, it is possible that firms only take the corporate tax into
consideration.

Cnossen, supra note 8, at 101-02. In this discussion, it is assumed that corporate
managers are aware of the implications of the operation of the personal income tax or, that if
they are not, they will be made aware of its consequences by shareholders if shareholders are
made worse off by its effects consequent upon evasion.
42. The influence of shareholders on corporate managers can come about directly when,
for example, the shareholders are able to appoint managers who accept their directions. But
more importantly in this context, the influence of shareholders can also be brought to bear on
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The model of corporate tax evasion described in Section II concentrated
on the effects of evasion as an investment decision and as one affecting the
capital structure of the corporation. In contrast, the effect of the personal
income tax will not be seen most obviously in the capital structure of the
corporation, at least in so far as the analysis of corporate tax evasion is concerned.4 3 Rather, the effects of the personal income tax will be seen primarily
in the after-tax returns received by shareholders on both retentions and distributions of corporate profits, since this is the sphere of operation of the personal income tax and the interaction mechanisms. Thus, this analysis will
concentrate on analyzing how the personal income tax alters the return that the
shareholder can expect to receive if the corporation's managers decide to
evade corporate tax from the return they would receive if the managers reported honestly.
Corporate managers seeking to enhance the market value of the corporation will be aware that the market will look to at least two aspects of the
return promised by the corporation on an investment in the corporation: the
rate of the promised return and the risk attaching to the promised return."
Assuming that corporate managers engage in corporate tax evasion, at least in
part, because it permits higher after-tax profits to be available for shareholders, whether as dividend or capital appreciation, it nevertheless undoubtedly
raises the risk attaching to the shareholder's return when compared to honesty.
Presumably, where the corporation's managers embark upon evasion, it is
because they estimate that the detriment of higher risk is more than offset by
the promise of an increased return. But the price at which the market resolves
this trade-off between increased risk for promised higher return may be difficult for managers to predict a priori, and the implications of some of the
45
outcomes will be discussed below.
managers indirectly when managers are constrained by institutionalised incentives to pursue
the goals shareholders wish them to pursue and it is not necessary to assume that any single
group of shareholders can directly control managers.
43. Of course, the operation of the personal income tax will affect the design of the capital
structure of the corporation in a global sense, influencing decisions about financing investments
by debt rather than equity, by retained earnings rather than new equity, the type of equity that
is issued, and so on.
44. See generally WILLIAM F. SHARPE, INVESTMENTS chs. 5 & 7 (3d ed. 1985); PEIRSON,
BIRD & BROWN, supra note 31, at ch. 3; IVAN WOODS, MEASURES OF INVESTMENT YIELD ch.

4 (2d ed. 1989).
45. Attempting to explain how price, risk and return functions are related is the task of
such models as the Capital Asset Pricing Model or Arbitrage Pricing Theory which try to
relate the price of particular capital assets to levels of risk and expected return in the presence

of other assets. It is not necessary here to use these models which involve very general
abstractions from reality. In the case of evasion, the source of risk arises from only one cause
which, while it may not be easy to predict with accuracy, can be separated from other sources
of uncertainty associated with the return for this security. See SHARPE, supra note 44, at ch.
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The remainder of this paper will contrast the return offered where the
corporation's managers report honestly with the expected (but more risky)
return offered if the managers evade. This section will mention some of the
ways in which the personal income tax will bear upon the return. The fundamental inquiry is to determine how corporate tax evasion changes the expected return from the position where the corporation's managers report
honestly. Unless the effect of corporate tax evasion is to enhance the potential return, it is suggested that there is no gain to be derived from evasion and
managers will not pursue it. This analysis will also be compared to the predictions of the model described in Section II to see if the addition of the personal income tax substantially alters expected behavior. It will be seen in
Section V that adding the personal income tax does change the costs and
benefits of evasion from the position that would apply if the corporation's
managers focused only on the value of corporate tax evasion as an investment
undertaken by the corporation.
The personal income tax on income derived through corporations is a
cost to shareholders reducing the after-corporate tax return on their investment and, as a result, the value that they would be able to realize for their
investment in the corporation in the absence of a shareholder tax. The size of
the cost that the personal income tax represents, and the consequent reduction
in the market value of the shareholders' interest, is a function of many variables in the institutional framework of the tax system; most obviously, the tax
rates for holders of the corporation's shares. 6 But the cost of the personal
income tax is also affected by some elements under the control of the
corporation's managers, such as the pattern of retention and distribution of
corporate profits 47 and the legal form in which the shareholder's return on the
investment is offered. 48 On most occasions, the size of the shareholder's
7; PEIRSON,
A.

BIRD

& BROWN, supra note 31, ch. 3;

WOODS, supra note

44, at 49-54;

BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE

RICHARD

169-73 (4th ed.

1991).
46. See SHARPE, supra note 44, at ch. 9; PEIRSON, BIRD & BROWN, supra note 31, at ch.

18. There will almost always be different personal income tax rates applied to the various
shareholder: for example, progressive for individual shareholders; constant (or only slightly
progressive) rates for corporations; some institutional shareholders will be tax exempt; nonresident rates will be different and so on.
47. This arises from a trade-off made at the corporate level between the retention of profits
to be taxed as capital gain and the distribution of profit to be taxed as dividends, although it is
still an unsolved question whether the corporation's managers could actually enhance the
market value of the corporation by changing their distribution and retention patterns. The
literature on the effect of retention patterns and so-called clientele effects is enormous. See
generally BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 45, at ch. 16; SHARPE, supra note 44, at ch. 14;
PEIRSON, BIRD & BROWN, supra note 31, at ch. 3.

48. The effect of the legal form of the distribution is not a question of whether the investment
is treated as debt or equity. There may be different consequences attaching to cash distribution
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personal income tax liability is also influenced by the amount of tax paid by
the corporation. In some cases, it will be seen that the effect of corporate tax
evasion will be a direct increase in the shareholder's personal income tax
rate.4 9
The potential for the amount of the shareholder's personal income tax
liability to fluctuate with the amount of corporate tax paid has implications
for the costs and benefits of corporate tax evasion. Consider, for example, a
regime under which the corporate tax on distributions operates purely as an
intermediate withholding procedure, collecting from the corporation's profits
amounts of tax which are accurately credited against the shareholder's personal income tax liability on those profits. Under a regime of this type, the
gain, even from successful corporate tax evasion, may be reduced to nil or a
slight deferral - tax unpaid by the corporation may simply be collected from
the shareholder on receipt of the distribution. 0 A similar regime for retained
corporate profits which collected unpaid corporate tax on the sale of the
shareholder's interest in the corporation would again offer only the benefit of
deferral, although perhaps for a longer time at the shareholder's discretion.
In other words, the apparent benefit of the tax saved by the corporation from
successful evasion may be almost completely offset by a corresponding increase in the tax liability of the shareholder where the corporate tax is constructed as a withholding tax. 5
At the other extreme, if the corporate tax is the final tax on income derived through corporations whether retained or distributed, successful corporate tax evasion will eliminate all tax from income derived through corporations. In this case, corporate tax evasion would have no effect on the personal
income tax liability of the shareholder and the analysis of the incentives for
or asset distribution, the issue of fully paid up shares, payments which are treated as the
partial return of the investors capital, the full redemption of the shareholder's interest, and so
on.
49. This consequence will be seen to follow whether the shareholder's return is taken in
the form of dividends or capital appreciation, provided that the shareholder is not tax exempt.
50. Of course, deferral of tax for a sufficient time is equal to an exemption of the tax, or a
reduction in the effective tax rate.
51. In another context, Stiglitz has expressed this same idea thus:
Many transactions, while they seem to reduce the tax liabilities to some parties to the
transaction, increase those of others. Because "prices" (the terms of the transaction)
adjust to reflect these changed tax liabilities, it is often difficult to ascertain who really
benefits from many tax avoidance schemes. Moreover, the aggregate loss to the Treasury
may be much less than the seeming gain to the alleged beneficiaries (when those
calculations fail to take account of the general equilibrium effects of tax avoidance
schemes).
Joseph E. Stiglitz, The General Theory of Tax Avoidance, 38 NAT.L TAX J. 325, 325 (1985).
In this context, the "parties" to the transaction are the corporation and its shareholders treated
by' tax law as separate entities.
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corporate tax evasion need not include any reference to the personal income
tax. In practice, the net benefit of successful corporate tax evasion, after
payment of shareholder taxes, will lie between these two results, as the corporate and personal income tax structures resemble one or other extreme in
their treatment of both retained and distributed profits.
Even where there is no formal interaction between the corporate tax and
personal income tax, as in the so-called classical system described below,
savings of corporate tax will mean that the size of either (or both) the retained
and distributed after-tax profits will be greater. Assuming honest reporting
by the shareholder, higher profits after corporate tax will mean higher personal tax payments by the shareholder on dividends and on capital gains,
again reducing the apparent net benefits from successful evasion. In this case,
corporate tax evasion may simply represent "tax arbitrage across income
streams facing different tax treatment" 5 2-a preference for paying tax on
dividends or capital gains tax, rather than corporate tax. To anticipate what
is to follow, at the extreme where the corporate tax most closely approximates
a pure withholding tax, the reduction in corporate tax may equal almost exactly the increase in the shareholder's personal income tax liability, generating little real gain even from successful evasion.
So, depending on the structure of the interaction between the corporate
and personal income tax, corporate tax evasion will cause an increase in the
total amount of the shareholder's personal income tax of greater or less size.53
Holding the other determinants of the personal income tax liability constant,
the extent of any increase in the personal income tax liability will depend upon
the operation of the interaction mechanism between the two taxes. As the
increase in the amount of tax collected from the shareholder approaches the
amount of corporate tax saved through evasion, the gain from successful
evasion of the corporate tax approaches zero.
If the corporation's managers have correctly assessed that corporate tax
evasion has a positive net present value to the corporation (ignoring for the
moment the effect of the personal income tax), it has been argued that the
market value of the shareholders' interest in the corporation can be expected
to rise. The market can be expected to increase the price of the shares to reflect the corporation's higher value (probably represented by retained earnings) after corporate tax is paid on the declared profits. But, when the further
complication of the personal income tax is added, the extent of the increase
in market value will depend upon how much of the evaded corporate tax is
52. Id.
53. It will be observed that corporate tax evasion can also, in some circumstances, cause a
decrease in the personal income tax liability of the shareholder, both in the short and long
term.
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recovered from the shareholder and how quickly. If almost all of the evaded
tax will be offset by higher taxes on shareholders, the gain from successful
corporate tax evasion may be almost nil, and the return offered by the investment may not substantially change. In this situation, while corporate tax
evasion may offer a positive net present value to the corporation, when the
effect of higher personal income taxes is added, the return to the shareholder
net of all taxes may not have changed. Corporate tax evasion would offer a
small but positive gain, and any increase in market value due to evasion may
likewise be expected to be small.
In addition to the reduced size of the gain from successful evasion, the
corporation's managers also need to consider the potential cost should the
corporation's evasion be detected. If evasion is detected, the corporation's
liability to pay unpaid tax, fines and interest will leave the shareholder worse
54
off than if the corporation's managers had complied with the corporate tax.
This must be so if the penalty for evasion is capable of deterring it. While the
shareholders will not (usually) suffer any additional penalty because of the
evasion of the corporation's managers, the return to shareholders will decline
by the amount collected from the corporation. 5 Detected evasion would reduce the market value of the shareholders' interests in the corporation by
reinstating the claim of the revenue authority over the corporation's remain56
ing assets, and at a higher amount than if the managers had reported honestly.
There are two other consequences which can be expected to arise from
failed evasion. First, there may be a significant loss to shareholders which will
arise if the corporation's evasion is detected, but only after the corporation's
managers have distributed some proportion of the corporation's profits as
dividends. The corporation's managers may have distributed more profit than
the corporation possessed, since dividends were distributed from a pool unreduced by corporate tax which was collected after a subsequent audit. The
shareholder would, assuming honesty on his or her part, have reported and
paid tax on more than would have been available for distribution (and taxed
54. There may be reasons why the shareholder will not actually be worse off after failed
evasion. For example, the corporation may become insolvent in the intervening period, or
the original shareholders may sell their shares and reap the benefits of evasion -before the
corporation's evasion was detected.
55. In the case of failure, the shareholders will not, except perhaps in the case of an
integration system or the CFC regime, suffer a further penalty beyond that imposed upon the
corporation, unless they have participated in some way in the corporation's managers actions.
The reason to suggest an exception for these two systems is discussed infra note 144 and
accompanying text.
56. It may also be possible, depending upon the practice enacted in each jurisdiction and
the facts that have led to the circumstance, for the revenue authority to pursue funds distributed
as dividends by the corporation's managers if the corporation is insolvent when its evasion is
detected. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1994), I.R.C. § 6901 (1994).
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at the shareholder level) had the corporation's managers reported honestly.
While there will be a compensating adjustment to the shareholder's capital
gains tax liability, it is possible that distributing untaxed corporate profits will
create a higher total of tax payments if the evasion is detected than if the
corporation's managers had retained the profits.57 This effect is a penalty for
early distribution and plays a part in determining the size of the shareholder's
return.
Secondly, the nominal value of the fine and interest which will be assessed upon detection must be adjusted to take into account the capital gains
tax on the shareholder. The interest and fine do not reduce the value of retained earnings to the shareholder by their face value. Rather, the interest and
fine reduce both the value of the retained earnings and the tax liability on
retained earnings. This comes about because costs such as corporate tax are
effectively treated as a deduction for capital gains tax purposes in most tax
systems, so that, when the shareholder comes to realize the value of retained
earnings by sale, their value will be less by the amount of fine and interest, and
consequently, the capital gains tax liability on sale will be less. This reduction will compensate to some extent for the extra tax generated by distributing untaxed profits.
The cost of failure, the benefits of success, and the likelihood of each
establish the expected returns to evasion. Together, they imply that the increase in shareholder tax need not be sufficiently large to recapture all of the
tax successfully evaded at the corporate level in order to reduce the expected
return to the shareholder on their investment after payment of all taxes. While
it is unlikely, in a case of successful evasion, that the increased shareholder
tax will ever be great enough to reduce the actual return to shareholders, a
reduction in the expected after tax return would come about where the gain
from corporate tax evasion is small after payment of the personal income tax
and the penalty for failure is large, even if unlikely. For example, successful
evasion of a pure withholding-style corporate tax offers only the small gain
from deferral because much of the evaded corporate tax may be collected from
the shareholder, while unsuccessful evasion will generate various penalties
collected from the corporation. If both detection and success are equally
likely, and the penalties for detected evasion are large, corporate tax evasion
may reduce the expected return to shareholders on their investment to a rate
lower than would be expected if the corporation's managers acted honestly.
57. It is assumed that the shareholder cannot claim a refund from the revenue authority in
the subsequent year when it becomes clear that the corporation distributed some monies
which did not represent distribution of after-tax profits. It is also assumed that there is no
"reverse" imputation system under which the excess tax paid by the shareholder in the prior
year could be credited to the corporation's tax liability.
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If corporate tax evasion reduces the expected return on an investment in
the corporation below the certain return arising where the corporation's
managers report truthfully, then it is to be expected that the corporation's
managers will not engage in evasion-a higher expected return could be
offered to shareholders without evasion. Sections IV and V will analyze the
circumstances under which the operation of the personal income tax, and its
interaction with the corporate tax, may reduce the expected return to shareholders.
The possibility that reduced corporate tax payments may (or may not) be
offset by higher personal income tax payments is not, however, the entire
story. It is possible for the corporation's managers to influence the expected
personal income tax rate by both their evasion and distribution decisions. The
influence of the distribution decision on the personal income tax rate occurs
because of the differing treatment under the personal income tax of dividends
and capital gains in the hands of different shareholders. If it is the case that,
by adjusting their distribution decisions, the corporation's managers are able
to offset the increased personal income tax liability created by a decision to
evade, other equilibria may occur. Section V will consider whether the
corporation's managers can, by adjusting distribution and retention ratios,
offset any decrease in the shareholder's expected return brought about by
corporate tax evasion.
Finally, it was mentioned previously that the market will place a value
on the corporation's shares according to both the level of expected return and
the riskiness of that return. So, even where the expected return to shareholders
on their investment remains higher after estimating the contingent penalties
and increased personal income tax cost, there is the potential further cost to
shareholders in the additional risk arising from evasion which does not arise
from honesty. 'The usual assumption of risk aversion suggests that individual
shareholders will require a premium above the certain rate that honesty offered to compensate them for this risk. If that premium is not offered, and the
expected return is the same as the expected return to honesty, this may be
another reason for the market value of the shares declining.58 Ultimately, the
market value of the shareholders' interests in the corporation will depend
upon how the competing effect of increased risk and the promised higher
59
return are resolved.
This paper will not pursue the effect of increased risk further. The rea58. It is implicitly assumed that the shareholder's investment is earning a normal return

where the corporation's managers behave honestly.,
59. The level of premium demanded will depend upon the degree of aversion to risk in the
market, a matter which will depend upon the profile of the investors, including intermediaries,
bidding for securities.
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son for ignoring its effects lies in the fact that it is unlikely that any information about the increased level of risk due to evasion will be communicated to
the market. Indeed, information about evasion is antithetical to the
corporation's success in the market, and the corporation's managers will
likely try to ensure that no such information is made public. Since the ability of the market to accurately assess risk depends upon the market being
aware of the source of the risk, it is unlikely that the price of the shares would
be discounted in any observable way for the risk that the corporation might
be evading tax.
So, the focus of attention will be on how the various interaction mechanisms will change the expected return to shareholders. The expected return
is the way that the corporation's managers will seek to signal to the market
what they wish to announce, namely that the corporation has achieved a given
level of profit after payment of the required corporate tax, without changing
the risk profile of the corporation. The market would then be expected to
adjust the price of the shares to treat the higher announced return as evidence
of greater underlying profitability.6" So, it is argued, the success of the strategy depends upon evasion being able to generate a higher expected return for
shareholders, and the effects of the risk of detection are analyzed only by the
corporation's managers in determining this expected return.
IV. MODELLING CORPORATE AND PERSONAL INCOME TAX SYSTEMS

This section describes in detail some of the principal interaction mechanisms between the corporate and personal income tax used in the taxation
systems of various countries or, in one case, proposed as a theoretical model
although not implemented. It will become obvious that, except for two cases,
the interaction mechanisms attempt only to deal with the double tax on distributions, and leave untouched the double tax on retained corporate profits.
Section V will examine whether and how the interaction of the systems here
described will affect the expected return to the corporation's shareholders and
consequently, it is argued, the tax evasion decision of.the corporation's man61
agers.
60. Another reason for concentrating on the effect of evasidn on returns is that the decisions
about compliance and evasion will be made by the corporation's managers who will have
(one would expect) good information about the treatment of distributed and retained corporate
profits at the shareholder level and would be much more likely to take this information into
account than they would in attempting to estimate the effects of increased risk, a risk which
they hope will never become apparent.
61. The after-tax return to the shareholder will depend significantly upon the form in which
profits are made available to shareholders: cash distribution, distribution of corporate assets
in lieu of cash, allotment of new shares paid for from profits, redemption of existing shares
paid for from profits, retention of profits, and so on. In the following discussion it is assumed
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There is a variety of possible interactions between corporate and individual tax systems to deal with distributed corporate earnings. 62 In a pure
classical system of taxation, there is no formal interaction between the corporate and individual income tax and each is levied without explicit regard for
the operation of the other. But even in a classical system, there may be implicit recognition of the dual operation of both taxes in the rate formally
imposed under either tax or in the definition of its base. For example, a lower
marginal rate formally imposed upon capital income derived by an individual,
or substantial investment concessions offered to industry may each be a
method of recognizing the existence of the two layers of tax. The first reduces
total tax by encouraging retention of profits by the corporation and extraction
while the second reduces the toof gain by the individual selling the shares,
63
tal tax collected from the corporation.
The pure classical system has become rare in developed tax systems in
Western nations, 64 and it is more common to see in practice a wide variety of
that the corporation's managers choose only the first and last alternatives, distributing some
fraction of the corporation's profits as cash and retaining 'any balance for reinvestment. It
will also be assumed that the cash distribution is not a liquidating distribution upon winding
up of the corporation (or that, if it is, the distribution is dealt with in an identical manner to a
cash distribution).
It is also assumed that all distributions made are taxable so as to avoid problems of managers
being permitted to re-characterise detected evasion as the return of capital to shareholders.
This assumption accords with the probable wish of the corporation's managers that shareholders
believe that the distribution is from profits, not a return of their investment.
62. There is a voluminous literature on this issue. For descriptions of various methods of
interaction and differing taxonomy, see generally 4 REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON
TAXATION (Carter Commission) ch. 19 (1967); DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINTS FOR
BASIC TAX REFORM (1977); COMPANY TAX SYSTEMS, supra note 15, at 9-11; Alvin Warren,
The Relation and Integrationof Individual and CorporateIncome Taxes, 94 HARV. L. REV.
719 (1981); George F. Break, Integration of the Corporate and Personal Income Taxes, 22
NAT.L TAX J. 39 (1969); Charles E. McLure, Jr., Integration of the Personal and Corporate
Income Taxes: The Missing Element in Recent Tax Reform Proposals, 88 HARV. L. REV. 532
(1975); Charles E. McLure, Jr., Integration of the Income Taxes: Why and How, 2 J. CORP.
TAX. 429 (1976); MCLURE, supra note 5; PECHMAN, supra note 11, at 179-89; TAXING
CORPORATIONS, supra note 10; NORR, supra note 7; O.E.C.D., THEORETICAL AND.EMPIRICAL
ASPECTS, supra note 33, at chs. 1, 2; MARTIN FELDSTEIN, CAPITAL TAXATION ch. 8 (1983);
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, REVISING THE CORPORATE INCOME TAX ch. 8 (Robert
Lucke ed., 1985); Alworth, supra note 15, at 72-73; KAY & KING, supra note 14, at 159-62;
Corporate Cash Flows, supra note 13, at 108-26; RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B.
MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 395-98 (4th ed. 1984); Vann, supra
note 15, at chs. 4, 5; Sijbren Cnossen, Alternative Forms of Corporation Tax, 1 AUST. TAX F.

253 (1980).
63. SCHOLES & WOLFSON, supra note 18, at 56-57.
64. The United States is the most obvious example of a country that still retains the classical
system for individual shareholders, although even the U.S. has had a fully integrated system
for small corporations in Subchapter S of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986. But in respect
of larger corporations with more than one class of shares, non-resident shareholders or passive
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idiosyncratic mechanisms for integrating the corporate and individual tax. 65
The design of these interaction systems involves many issues: the level at
which the relief is to be afforded (corporate or shareholder); the form that the
relief is to take (deduction, credit or exemption); whether the relief is to be
afforded to non-resident shareholders; whether differences are to exist for
different shareholders (corporate, individual, or holders of portfolio interests);
the treatment of corporate tax preferences; the treatment of tax exempt investors; and so on. For the moment, the analysis will concentrate on the position
of resident individual shareholders, with the position of non-resident shareholders considered later in passing. 66 It will also be assumed that different
rules do not apply if the corporation has one major shareholder or many portfolio interests.
While the idiosyncrasies of the particular mechanisms that countries
have adopted (not to mention the peculiarities of nomenclature) make it difficult to generalize, once the classical system is abandoned, the mechanisms
for recognizing the impact of both corporate and shareholder level income tax
67
can be combined into four illustrative groups.
First, there are split rate, or dividend-paid, deduction systems operating
at the corporate level which impose different rates on the corporation's distributed and undistributed profits. Split rate systems simply reduce the corporate tax payable on distributed profits or formally impose tax only on reincome, the United States moved clearly against the current trend toward interaction in 1986
by eliminating the $100 dividend-received deduction for individual shareholders. I.R.C. §
116 (repealed). The U.S. also reduced the size of the deduction for corporate shareholders in
some cases from 80% to 70% of dividends received depending upon the degree of affiliation
between the companies. For corporate shareholders, the U.S. still retains the dividend received
deduction system. I.R.C. § 243 (1994).
In Europe, only the Netherlands and Luxembourg retain the classical system and then only
for individual shareholders. See J-M TIRARD, CORPORATE TAXATION IN EC COUNTRIES 1213 (1991).
65. See generally COMPANY TAX SYSTEMS, supra note 15, at 9-41; McLURE, supra note 5,
at ch. 3. For'a discussion of current European practices see TIRARD, supra note 64.
66. The discussion will refer to individual shareholders but many of the mechanisms
described are applied to both individual investors and to intermediaries such as other
corporations or trusts. Many jurisdictions will employ a combination of systems using one
for individuals and another for corporations or other intermediaries and yet another for nonresident shareholders. For example, the U.S. employs a classical system for individual
shareholders and a partial dividend-received deduction system for corporations; Canada
employs an imputation system for individual shareholders and a full dividend-received
deduction system for corporations; Australia employs an imputation system for individual
shareholders and a tax credit system for corporate shareholders.
67. The first three are often referred to as systems for dividend relief-adjusting the
combined tax on rate on distributions-while the last, integration, is more ambitious-reducing
the combined tax rate on all corporate profits. Even the number of interaction mechanisms is
a matter for debate. See PECHMAN, supra note 11, at 175-81 (who says there are five groups
but lists six); COMPANY TAX SYSTEMS, supra note 15, at 10 (which lists three).
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tained earnings.6 8 The same effect can also be achieved by a tax surcharge on
undistributed corporate profits. 69 Dividend-paid deduction systems are designed to achieve the same result but do so by giving the corporation a tax
deduction for distributions and then imposing tax at the shareholder level.70
A tax deduction for distributed profits means that they incur no tax at the
corporate level and are effectively taxed as interest payments by the corporation.
Secondly, there are exemption or dividend-received deduction systems
operating at the shareholder level.7' These systems leave the corporation's tax
liability untouched, but adjust the shareholder's position by giving the individual a tax deduction for some or all of the distributions received, or exempting dividends from tax entirely.72
Thirdly, there are tax credit or tax imputation systems operating at the
shareholder level.73 An imputation or credit system retains both the separate
corporate tax and personal tax, but treats the payments of corporate tax by the
corporation on its own income as also satisfying the shareholder's tax liability on distributions from the same profits. This is achieved by giving a tax
68. For example, Germany and France apply different rates to distributed and undistributed
profits, Germany applying a higher rate on retentions and France a higher rate on distributions.
TIRARD, supra note 64, at 71-72, 87-88. This was also the first of many suggested interaction
mechanisms proposed for uniform adoption in Europe. TAX HARMONIZATION INTHE COMMON
MARKET (CCU ed. 1963). See Corporate-PersonalTax Integration, supra note 10, at 22728.
69. NORR, supra note 7, ch. 5/B. For example, a further tax was imposed on retained
profits in Australia. ITAA, Part III, Div. 7. This was not done apparently to formalise the
interaction of the corporate tax and personal income tax although it had the effect of reducing

one distortion from the lack of coordination-different rates applying to retained and
distributed earnings. The surcharge was imposed in order to encourage distribution so that
there was no gain from sheltering income within the corporation and the classical system
could collect the further tax from the shareholders.
70. NORR, supra note 7, at ch. 5/C. Greece, for example has a dividend-paid deduction
system. TIRARD, supra note 64, at 102-03. A dividend-paid deduction system was used in
the U.S. from 1936-37. PECHMAN, supra note 11, at 176-77.

71. A version of this system, allowing a deduction for 50 percent of dividends paid, was
proposed for the United States in 1984. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, TAX REFORM FOR
FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH (1984). It was later revised to a deduction
for 10 percent of the amount of dividends paid. THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSALS TO THE
SIMPLICITY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH (1985).
See CorporatePersonal Tax Integration, supra note 10, at 235-36; Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Treatment of
CorporatePreference Items Under an Integrated Tax System: A Comparative Analysis, 44
TAX LAW. 195 (1990); INTEGRATION, supra note 15, at ch. 12A.
CONGRESS FOR FAIRNESS,

72. NORR, supra note 7, at ch. 6/B. The United States and Belgium, for example, have a
dividend-received deduction system for inter-corporate dividend distributions; Denmark has
an exemption system. TIRARD, supra note 64, at 41-42, 57-58.
73. NORR, supra note 7, at ch. 6/C. These systems are used in Australia, England, Germany,

Canada, for example.
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credit of some amount to the shareholder for distributions received, reflecting more or less accurately the amount of tax'that the profits have already
borne.
Finally, there is the integration system for corporations.74 An integration
system operates at the shareholder level and attributes the corporation's income, whether distributed or not, to the shareholders who are taxable on all
of the corporation's profits. Where the partnership version of the integration
system is used, no tax is imposed on the corporation with respect to the profits, unlike the other systems discussed. Where the corporation remains taxable, the corporation's tax is also attributed to the shareholder as a credit
against their liability on the corporation's profits.
There are virtues and vices to each interaction system, explaining why,
in practice, countries do not consistently choose only one of these different
regimes. 75 For example, systems which reduce the corporation's primary tax
liability such as rate or base reductions will benefit both resident and non76
resident shareholders equally, a result which the source country may dislike,
74. See generally PECHMAN, supra note 11, at 178-81; McLURE, supra note 5, at 2-9;
BLUEPRINTS, supra note 16, at 63-69; Corporate-PersonalTax Integration, supra note 10, at
235. To add to the complexity, there are also "full" and "partial" integration systems. Under
a partial integration system, some (or all) of the corporation's profits are attributed to the
shareholders and some (or all) of the corporation's tax is credited to the shareholders. MCLURE,
supra note 5, at 15-18.
75. For example, the U.S. Treasury report on integration praised the imputation systems
and their "flexibility to respond to different policy judgments on the most important issues of
integration." INTEGRATION, supra note 15, at 93.
The systems may also be seeking objects beyond those described in Section I as the defects
of the classical system, and possibly also different from each other. For example, it is claimed
that imputation systems in Europe were introduced to encourage more people to hold shares,
to increase compliance with the corporate tax, to encourage capital-export and capital-import
neutrality within the European Community. See Corporate-PersonalTax Integration, supra
note 10, at 232-35; Harry G. Gourevitch, CorporateTax Integration:The European Experience,
31 TAX LAW. 65 (1977); Ault, supra note 8, at 10 ("it was generally hoped that a more
favorable treatment of dividend distributions would increase investment in corporate stock,
especially on the part of small investors"); Cnossen, supra note 8, at 105 ("it seems desirable
that shareholdings should be spread more widely than is the case at present [and] the imputation
system might promote that objective"). The different goals that various interaction mechanisms
may be pursuing are most apparent in the more unusual systems suggested such as the Institute
of Fiscal Studies' A.C.E. system which creates a notional deduction to the corporation for the
value of shareholder equity employed by the corporation, with the principal objective of
equalising the return to investors on debt and equity. See I.F.S., supra note 21. The U.S.
Treasury set out with explicit goals of retaining the implicit tax collected at the corporate
level on tax-exempt investors and coordinating taxing business income only once (rather than
in two instalments). INTEGRATION, supra note 15, at 13.
76. Cnossen, for example, notes that,
Under the imputation system the double tax is mitigated at the level of the shareholder.
It would also have been possible, of course, to provide relief at the corporate level by
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and would reduce the implied tax paid at the corporate level by tax exempt
investors." Dividend-received deduction systems, and some kinds of imputation systems do not ensure that the corporation has actually paid any tax on
the dividend received by the shareholder, although they do preserve the full
nominal value of corporate tax incentives for shareholders.7 1 Some imputation systems can result in over-taxation of the corporation where the tax collected on distributions exceeds the corporation's own tax liability, while others require elaborate record keeping. 79 Integration systems, which tax shareholders on the value of retentions, can cause solvency problems for individual
shareholders where distributions are small but profits are large. They are
generally considered impractical for large corporations in part because of the
administrative difficulties in administering them,80 and because the substantial international treaty network assumes that non-resident shareholders are
not taxed on a current basis on retentions.8
allowing a deduction for dividends paid in computing taxable profits. This avenue,
which should yield the same result as imputation, has not been followed, however,
because governments did not want foreign shareholders to share automatically in the
relief.
Cnossen, supra note 8, at 92. See also Corporate-PersonalTax Integration,supra note 10, at
232-35, 239; COMPANY TAX SYSTEMS, supra note 15, at 23-30; INTEGRATION, supra note 15,
at ch. 7.
77. This latter concern seems to have been a major factor influencing the decision of U.S.
Treasury to suggest a dividend exemption system, as it collects at least some tax from otherwise
exempt investors. INTEGRATION, supra note 15, at ch. 6.
78. Avi-Yonah, supra note 71; PECHMAN, supra note 11, at 180; INTEGRATION, supra note
15, at 93 ("an imputation credit can extend the benefits of integration to tax-exempt and
foreign shareholders by allowing refundability of imputation credits or it can deny such benefits
by denying refunds").
79. This is particularly true of the imputation systems in Australia, France and Germany.
See Avi-Yonah, supra note 71, at 214 ("as the German example shows, however, tracking of
income can lead to very complicated account-keeping requirements").
80. See PECHMAN, supra note 11, at 179 ("experts agree that it would not be practical to
extend the partnership method to large, publicly held corporations with complex capital
structures, frequent changes in ownership, and thousands or millions of stockholders");
CorporateCash Flows, supra note 13, at 105 (describing proposals for integration as "pure in
concept, ambitious in scope, and unadopted in practice"); 4 REPORT OF THE ROYAL
COMMISSION ON TAXATION (Carter Commission) ch. 19 (1967) (recommending an optional
profit attribution system because of the solvency and administrative problems); VANN, supra
note 15, at 30-34. Some others believe that these administrative difficulties have been
overstated. Head & Bird, supra note 13, at 16 ("although the difficulties are considerable,
there appear to be no insuperable problems"); Anthony P. Polito, A Proposalforan Integrated
Income Tax, 12 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL. 1009 (1989); Peter L. Swan, An Australian View on
Tax Integration, in TAXATION ISSUES OF THE 1980s 259 (John G. Head ed. 1983). It is
interesting to note that the U.S. Treasury report considered even an imputation system
unnecessarily difficult to administer. INTEGRATION, supra note 15, at 93.
81. See 4 REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON TAXATION (Carter Commission) ch. 19
(1967).
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This variety of eccentric interaction mechanisms suggests that the effects of each interaction system on the returns to shareholders will differ under
each system and that they will have different effects where the corporation
evades corporate tax. This section will analyze the classical system and most
systems of company and shareholder interaction. The models described below are stylized to capture the fundamental relationships of the systems discussed, rather than being entirely accurate reflections of the exact rules employed in any particular jurisdiction. It will be seen that the return to individual resident shareholders will depend upon the stipulated treatment of tax
payments voluntarily made by the corporation, and the treatment of enforced
tax payments, penalties and interest after detected evasion, as well as informal matters such as the distribution or retention patterns of the corporation's
managers. Because the actual treatment of these items when employed in the
assumptions
tax systems of representative countries may differ or be unclear,
82
treatment.
expected
the
about
places
various
at
will be made
A. ClassicalSystem of CorporateTax

Theifirst corporate tax system considered is the so-called classical system. Under the classical system, the corporation is expected to pay corporate
tax [Tc] on its taxable profits [P] and the individual who is a resident pays
income tax at marginal rates [Ti] on the proportion [d] of after-tax profits
distributed by the corporation as dividends. Retained profits [1-d], which
should be reflected in accretions to the value of the shares, are taxed as capital gain [Tg]. Typically, retained profits enjoy the advantage of being taxed
on a deferred basis when the shares are sold by the shareholder and sometimes
also with the benefit of a lower nominal rate. 83 The essence of the classical
system is that no deduction or tax credit is given to the shareholder for taxes
paid by the corporation, whether voluntarily or after enforcement efforts have
been undertaken by the revenue authority.
Given a corporate tax system bearing these features, the position of an
individual shareholder after payment of corporate tax on all profits and per84
sonal tax on distributions and retentions is:
I = dP(l-Tc)(l-Ti) + (1-d) P(l-Tc) (1-Tg)

(1)

82. See also notes to Tables Al to A24. In all the following discussions, it will be assumed
that the shareholder does not sell the shares before the corporation's evasion is detected and
so will bear the costs of evasion in the value of their own retentions if evasion is detected.
83. The effect of deferral is the same as formally imposing a lower rate, or as the revenue
authority making an interest free loan of the unpaid tax to the taxpayer. Hence the discussion
will treat [Tg] as being a rate less the [Ti] even though this may not appear formally to be the
case.
84. Robert R. Officer, The Australian Imputation System for Company Tax and Its Likely
Effect on Shareholders,Financing and Investment, 7 AUST. TAX F. 353, 376-77 (1990).
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where:
P = the taxable profits of the corporation available for distribution,
d = the proportion of profits distributed as dividends,
Tc= the corporate tax rate,
Ti= the individual tax rate, and
Tg = the individual tax rate on capital gain.
Where the corporation engages in evasion, the wealth of the corporation
and the return to the shareholder will differ, the size and direction of the
change varying ultimately according to the success of the operation. Assuming there are no transaction costs in implementing evasion, evasion of corporate tax by reporting a lower amount of taxable profit [D], if undetected, will
enhance the position of the company by the amount of corporate tax saved
[Tc(P-D)]. This saving may be either retained by the corporation or distributed to shareholders. But it is clear that, when the position of the shareholder
is added, evasion of corporate tax does not entirely exclude the undeclared
profits from tax. Assuming there is no further evasion by the shareholder, the
undeclared profits and also the amount of corporate tax saved, will bear some
tax in the hands of the shareholder. The amount of shareholder tax will depend upon whether the undeclared profits and tax saving are retained by the
corporation or are distributed. If distributed, they will be taxed to the shareholder as a dividend, but if retained, will be taxed as capital gain. 5
The corporation which evades tax by not reporting income has undisclosed profits which it can retain or distribute, and in greater or smaller proportions than the disclosed profits.16 There are several reasons for suspecting
85. A third possibility, where the untaxed profits are distributed but treated as not coming
from corporate profits, is not explored. See supra note 61. The reason for this assumption is
that the corporation's managers will wish to represent to shareholders that the corporation
has derived the higher amount distributed or retained as profits and is not simply returning
the shareholder's investment. If this were simply the return of the shareholder's investment,
the distribution would reduce the shareholder's basis in the shares and might generate (or
advance) a capital gain. All distributions are treated as dividends out of profits and hence
taxable as dividends, rather than under the capital gains tax.
86. The issue being discussed raises a question about the ordering of funds which represent
the corporation's profits. The corporation's accounts presumably show a pool of funds or
assets available for distribution and at another place that some amount of tax has been paid.
When the corporation's managers declare a dividend or retain some of those funds the drawing
may be treated as reducing the taxed funds, untaxed funds or both pools pro rata, although
these separate pools will not appear as such in any accounts. On most occasions, whether for
corporate or tax law, it is not necessary to decide which funds have been disbursed or retainedor even whether it is within the power of the corporation's managers to decide which funds
will be disbursed or retained. But for the purposes of this discussion, it is assumed either that
the corporation's managers can determine the order in which sums are debited and may "earmark" distributions in the manner described, or that the appropriate rules which would
determine this issue achieve the same result. See Cnossen, supra note 8, at 94; INTEGRATION,
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that the corporation is likely to retain at least some of the undeclared profits
and the corporate tax saving. 87 First, retained earnings are typically taxed at
lower rates because of the deferral of tax until sale of the shareholder's interest, and some shareholders will often prefer to reduce personal tax by this
method.18 Second, distribution of an amount of profit disproportionate to the
size of the declared profits may signal to the revenue authority that the corporation has engaged in evasion, making detection more likely.89 Third, the
corporation's managers may prefer to retain control over the untaxed profits
and unpaid tax in case the evasion is later detected and the corporation needs
to find money to pay the additional tax, interest, and penalties. Retained
profits are likely to be a cheaper source of finance for these costs than subsequent borrowing or share issue, especially if financial markets discover that
the further issue is simply to meet an expired liability. These arguments
would suggest that the corporation's managers would retain at least some of
the undeclared profits, and it will thus be assumed that the undeclared profits are distributed in the same proportion as the declared profits.
If the corporation's managers successfully engage in evasion, the position of the shareholder changes to:
I = dD(1-Tc)(1-Ti) + (1-d)D(l-Tc)(1-Tg) + d(P-D)(ITi) + (1-d)(P-D)(1-Tg) (2)
The terms in this equation identify the amount remaining for the shareholder
after payment of corporate and shareholder tax on declared profits, and after
shareholder tax on distributed and retained but undeclared profits.
If the corporation is unsuccessful and its evasion is detected, the corporation must pay to the revenue authority the evaded corporate tax, interest on
the tax, and a penalty. The undisclosed income [(P-D)] is now taxed at the
corporate level as corporate income [(1-Tc)]. It is assumed that the interest
on the unpaid tax and the fine do not affect the corporation's own tax liabilsupra note 15; Avi-Yonah, supra note 71.
87. This assumption is not, hovever, essential to the model.. It would be possible to model
other treatment of undeclared profits with only minor adjustments to equations.
88. This is the case in classical systems where the shareholder benefits by deferral, although
this common assumption can often be wrong where, for example, capital gains can be taxed
on accumulation, the shares are held by non-residents, or the taxpayer is highly levered. It
may or may not apply under imputation systems which typically offer lower formal rates on
distributions because of the tax credit attached to the distribution which is usually not available
for retentions. Even so, under an imputation system, the taxpayer may approach a 0 capital
gains tax rate if deferral is for a sufficiently long time.
89. This conclusion is not strongly proffered since the revenue authority could draw the
same inference from examining the corporation's own tax return and contrasting the declared
profits admitted to be subject to tax with the total disclosed profits reported to shareholders.
But the reason that distribution may increase the possibility of detection is that the revenue
authority may not audit the corporation's return until prompted to do so by the individual's
return-that is, the corporation's managers may be able to present the corporation's tax return
to avoid triggering a corporate audit, but cannot similarly influence the presentation of the
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ity, but will reduce the value of retained earnings to the shareholder.9" This
procedure causes the two changes to the position of the shareholder discussed
above. First, the value of the fine must be adjusted to take into account the
capital gains tax on the shareholder which will refund part of the amount of
the interest and fine. In addition, the shareholders will have received and paid
tax on dividends unreduced by the corporate tax which the revenue authority
will now collect from the corporation, increasing the total tax paid.
These two complications mean that undeclared but distributed profits
will be taxed to the shareholder in the year of evasion as if the evasion were
successful and all the fine is borne by retained profits, while the smaller
amount of retained earnings also reduces the size of the shareholder's capital gains tax liability. These two complications are significant elements in the
return to shareholders, although they tend to effect the return in opposing
ways.
The fine imposed for evasion increases the amount of unpaid tax by a
percentage [f] of the unpaid tax. In addition, the amount of both the unpaid
tax and penalty is increased by interest at a penal rate [r*] which is compounded annually. With the two complications mentioned above, and specifying the fine and interest functions more fully, where corporate tax evasion
is unsuccessful the position of the shareholder becomes:
I = dD(1-Tc)(1-Ti) + (l-d)D(1-Tc)(1-Tg) + d(P-D)(1-Ti) +
(1-d) (P-D) (1-Tc(l+f) (l+r*) t - d)(
(1-d)

1-

Tg)
(3)

where:
f = the rate of fine levied on unpaid corporate tax,
r*= the interest rate imposed by the revenue authority on unpaid corporate
tax,
d = the percentage of profits distributed, and
t = the number of years elapsed.
shareholder's return to prevent the revenue authority selecting the shareholder for audit and
possibly reconsidering an audit of the corporation.
The retention of untaxed profits may also provide another indirect source of information to
the revenue authority. An unexpected adjustment to the price of the corporation's shares to
reflect the higher retained profits may also signal to revenue authority that the corporation is
evading tax but it may be a more difficult signal for the revenue authority to detect and
interpret.
90. It is assumed that the interest component imposed on evaded tax is not deductible to
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These equations (1), (2) and (3) describe the after-tax return that the
shareholder would receive under a classical system in each of the three possible outcomes: no evasion, successful evasion, and unsuccessful evasion.
Viewed ex ante, the goal of the corporation's managers is to choose between
honesty or evasion, choosing the action which promises the higher expected
return, given that the result of the decision to evade is uncertain-that is,
whether the retained undeclared profits are taxed once at the capital gains tax
rate in the hands of the shareholder, or taxed once in the hands of the corporation at a penal rate (calculated on all unreported profits) and again in the
hands of the shareholder.
One variation on the classical system is a limited dividend-received
deduction system of the type that was in place in the United States for dividends received by individuals. 9' As under the classical system, the corporation still pays tax on its profits during the year, and the shareholder pays income tax at marginal rates on the proportion of after-corporate-tax profits
distributed by the corporation as dividends. A tax deduction is, however,
given to resident shareholders, the amount of which is limited for individual
shareholders to a maximum deductible amount. Retained corporate earnings
are taxed to the corporation and to the shareholder under the capital gains tax,
with no adjustment for the corporate tax already paid. Where the system
offers individuals a tax deduction available for dividends received limited to
a constant amount, the effect is the same as that produced under a pure classical system with the after-tax return to the shareholder shifted slightly: the
shareholder is better off by the product of the constant amount [K] and the
individual shareholder's marginal rate [Ti]. 92
The effect of corporate tax evasion under a classical system (and classical system with a limited dividend-received deduction adjustment) is not
obvious a priori. The size of the potential gain, even from successful evasion,
is clearly reduced by the second layer of shareholder tax and the unnecessary
tax payment on excess distributed profits, but there is also reduction of the
capital gains tax. How these two opposing tendencies are resolved is explored
in Section V.

the corporation as it is in the nature of a fine. In Australia, specific provisions exist to deny a
deduction for the fine component. ITAA § 51(4). In fact in the U.S., it is likely that interest
on back tax is deductible to a corporation under I.R.C. § 163(a). See MICHAEL I. SALTZMAN,
IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE T 6.01 (2d. ed. 1991).

91. Former I.R.C. § 116 permitted taxpayers to exclude $100 received as a dividend from
income. The effect of this exclusion can be understood as a deduction at least for taxpaying

individuals. See supra note 64.
92. This treatment assumes that the amount of the tax deduction is a constant amount
unaffected by whether the amount currently distributed is [dD] or [dD + d(P-D)]. So, if, as is
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B. Adjustment at CorporateLevel: Split Rate and Dividend-Paid
Deduction Systems
Split rate and dividend-paid deduction systems attempt to integrate the
corporate tax and personal income tax by removing tax at the level of the
corporation. Under a split rate system, the corporation pays tax on its profits but generally faces a lower rate of tax on the proportion of pre-tax profits
distributed by the corporation as dividends. 93 Under the dividend-paid deduction system, the corporation is able to reduce its taxable profits by the amount
of any distribution.94 The corporation, therefore, pays no corporate tax on
distributed profits, but pays tax at the corporate rate on retentions. This
system has the same effect as a split-rate system under which the rate on distributed profits is set at zero. Under each system, the shareholder pays income
tax at marginal rates on the proportion of profits distributed by the corporation as dividends. Retained profits, which have already been taxed to the
corporation, are taxed as capital gain on a deferred basis to the shareholder.
Focusing on the dividend-paid deduction system (that is, a split rate
system where the rate on distributions is zero), the position of an individual
shareholder after payment of corporate tax on all profits and personil tax on
distributions and retentions is:
I = dP(1-Ti) + (l-d)P(1-Tc)(l-Tg)

(4)

If the same assumption is made that the corporation will distribute some
proportion of unreported profits, successful evasion of corporate tax will
change the after-tax return to the shareholder to:
I = dD(l-Ti) + (-d)D(1-Tc)(1-Tg) + d(P-D)(1-Ti) + (I-d)(P-D)(I-Tg) (5)
If the corporation is unsuccessful and the evasion is detected, the corporation must pay the evaded tax, interest on the tax, and a penalty. Since, under
a dividend-paid deduction system, no tax is payable on distributed profits, it
is assumed that no further tax or penalty is payable on distributed profits even
where the corporation does not disclose their existence. Assuming that the
fine imposed by the revenue authority must take into account that a portion of
common, the amount of the deduction is expressed to be "[$K] or the amount of the dividend
received whichever is the lower" it is assumed that the size of [dD] is greater than [K] and
sufficient to exhaust the entire deduction available to the shareholder.
93. This is the system used in Germany and France, although in both cases in combination
with an imputation system. There is also a disparity in actual practice with Germany imposing
a lower rate on distributed profits while France imposes a lower rate on retained profits.
TIRARD, supra note 64.

94. This is the system used in Greece. TIRARD, supra note 64.
95. The effect of a dividend deduction system is to treat equity as debt, giving the corporation
a deduction for its dividend payments as it does for its interest payments. Cnossen, supra
note 8, at 92.
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the taxable profits was distributed, the penalty is only applicable to retained
undeclared profits.96 The undisclosed retained income [(P-D)] is now taxed
at the corporate level as corporate income [(1-Tc)], and at the shareholder
level as retained earnings [(1-Tg)]. Again, it is assumed that the interest and
fine do not affect the corporation's own tax liability, but reduce the value of
retained earnings to the shareholder. The after-tax return to the shareholder
is:
I = dD(1-Ti) + (1-d)D(l-Tc)(1-Tg) + d(P-D)(1-Ti) +
(1-d)(P-D)( 1-Tc(1+f)(1+r*) t ) (1-Tg)

(6)

The first two terms of equation (6) set out the return after payment of corporate and shareholder tax on declared profits; the third term represents the
rate on undeclared but distributed profits; and the final term shows the rate on
undeclared and undistributed earnings, imposed only on retained earnings,
where evasion is unsuccessful.
Under a dividend-paid system and a split rate system, it might be expected that corporate tax evasion would be less rewarding than under the
classical system-the only tax to be evaded is that levied on retained earnings. This would accord with the object of the mechanism, which is to impose
one layer of tax only on distributed earnings, and at the shareholder's tax rate.
But corporate tax evasion would also be less costly where unsuccessful, since
the fine is imposed only on the tax on retained earnings. How these contrary
tendencies might be resolved will be amplified later.
C. Adjustment at ShareholderLevel: Exemption and Dividend-Received
Deduction Systems
The next corporate and personal tax interaction mechanisms, unlike the
two just discussed, try to integrate the corporate tax and personal income tax
by removing the tax at the shareholder level. The dividend-received deduction system is still retained inmany countries as the means for adjusting the
total tax paid on dividends flowing through chains of corporations. 97 Exemption systems may operate for distributed earnings, either through explicit
exemptions or through imputation systems. The effect of both is to recover
only one amount of tax from corporate earnings, but this time at the corporate
tax rate. This observation, of course, suggests that this system will be the most
profitable for shareholders where corporate tax evasion is successfulsuccessful evasion of the corporate tax is the evasion of all tax on distributed
corporate earnings.
96. Again there is an ordering issue about the nature and source of the profits remaining.
See supra note 86.
97. This is the case in the U.S. and Canada. In Australia, the deduction of the dividend is
replaced by an automatic credit of the amount of tax payable on the dividend. The effect of
this credit system is the same as an automatic full dividend-received deduction.
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As under the classical system, the corporation still pays tax on it's profits
derived during the year. The shareholder pays income tax at marginal rates
on the portion of after-corporate-tax profits distributed by the corporation as
dividends. A tax deduction is, however, given to resident shareholders for
corporate distributions received. Retained corporate earnings are taxed to the
corporation and to the shareholder under the capital gains tax, with no adjustment for the corporate tax already paid. Assuming that the deduction available to the shareholder is for the entire amount of the dividend received, the
position of the shareholder after payment of corporate and personal income
tax on all profits is:
I = dP(1-Tc) + (1-d)P(1-Tc)(1-Tg)

(7)

Again, the after-tax position of the shareholder will vary according to the
success of the evasion decision made by the corporation's managers. If evasion is successful, and the same proportion of undeclared profits is distributed
as declared profits, the after-tax position of the shareholder is:
I = dD(1-Tc) + (1-d)D(l-Tc)(l-Tg) + d(P-D) + (1-d)(P-D)(1-Tg)

(8)

If the corporation's evasion is detected, the after-tax return to the shareholder adjusted for unpaid tax, interest and penalty is:
I = dD(1-Tc)+(1-d)D(l-Tc)(1-Tg)+d(P-D) +
(1-d)(P-D)(1-Tc(l+f)(1+r*)t-d)(1-Tg)
(1-d)

(9)

Again, as in the discussion of the classical system, this treatment assumes that
distributions from undeclared profits will be made to the shareholder currently, and dealt with in the shareholder's return before the corporation is
audited. In this case, no further tax is then collected from the shareholder
because of the dividend received deduction. The retained profits bear the tax
on all undeclared corporate profits.

Equation (9) is explained in the same manner as earlier versions: the first
two terms state the combined corporate and shareholder tax rate on declared
profits; the third term represents the rate on undeclared but distributed profits; and the fourth term shows the rate on all undeclared earnings if evasion
is unsuccessful.
The same result can also occur where there is an imputation system
which operates automatically at the shareholder level. In most imputation
systems, as under the classical system, the corporate tax survives-the corporation still pays tax according to its profits, and the shareholder pays income
tax at marginal rates on the portion of after-tax profits distributed by the
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corporation as dividends and on retained earnings under the capital gains tax.
The difference from the classical system is that an imputation mechanism
gives credit to the shareholder for payments of corporate tax on distributions
of taxed income received from the corporation. But under some imputation
systems, the amount of tax credited to the individual shareholder may not
reflect the total tax paid by the corporation. At one extreme, the Canadian
system simply increases the amount of any distribution by a constant amount
to represent corporate tax assumed to be paid, and then gives to the shareholder a credit for a portion of the grossed-up amount. This gross-up and
credit occurs whether or not tax has actually been paid at the corporate levelit is apparently simply assumed that the corporation has paid tax at the appropriate rate and so the credit should be given. 98 Where the corporate tax attributed to the shareholder has not been paid by the corporation, the effect of the
exemption at the shareholder is the same as a dividend received deduction
system. 99
98. Corporate-PersonalTax Integration, supra note 10, at 236 ("as in Belgium, Italy and
Denmark, the amount of the dividend tax credit is completely independent of the whether any
tax was paid at the corporate level at all"); INTEGRATION, supra note 15, at 164 ("because the
shareholder credit is not dependent on the actual payment of corporate tax, the Canadian
system does not require rules allocating credits to dividends"). So also France and Germany
give a credit to shareholders (for supposed payments of corporate tax) which is calculated by
reference to the corporate tax rate rather than the corporation's actual tax payment. TIRARD,
supra note 64.
99. Under the Canadian system as currently enacted, the corporation pays tax on its taxable
profits, whether distributed or retained, at the corporate tax rate. See Income Tax Act, §
123(l)(1971) (Can.) [hereinafter ITA]. The shareholder must include in income the amount
of distributed profits increased by a multiple representing the corporate tax assumed to be
paid on the distribution. ITA § 12(1)(j). The section requires an individual shareholder
resident in Canada to include in income any "dividend paid by a corporation resident in
Canada on a share of its capital stock", and § 82(1) requires the shareholder to include:
(a)(ii) the aggregate of ... all amounts received by the taxpayer in the year from
corporations resident in Canada as, on account of, in lieu of, payment of, or in
satisfaction of, taxable dividends ...

plus

(b) where the taxpayer is an individual

, . .

. one-quarter of the amount determined

under subparagraph (a)(ii) in respect of the taxpayer for the year.
This effectively requires the shareholder to include 125% of the amount of any dividend in
income. The factor by which the dividend is increased is set at a constant rate, currently 25
per cent. The shareholder then pays personal tax on the amount of increased distribution but
is given a tax credit against this liability which is a proportion (currently 66%) of the grossup
amount. Section 121 provides a credit against tax on the increased dividend of "two-thirds of
any amount that is required by paragraph 82(l)(b) to be included in computing his income for
the year." Retained earnings are taxed to the corporation and the balance after corporate tax
is taxable to the shareholder as capital gain (although there is a real possibility that the
capital gain may also escape tax under Canada's rather unusual lifetime $100,000 capital
gain exemption. ITA § 110.6.
Given a current corporate tax rate in Canada of 38% with a multitude of further tax
adjustments, and personal marginal rates approaching 50%, it is clear that something less
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D. Adjustment at ShareholderLevel: Imputation Systems
The next interaction systems to be modelled are two versions of the wide
variety of imputation systems. In an imputation system, the corporation still
pays tax according to its own circumstances, and the shareholder pays income
tax at marginal rates on the portion of after-tax profits distributed by the
corporation as dividends and on retained earnings under the capital gains tax.
The difference from the classical system is that an imputation mechanism
gives credit to the shareholder for payments of corporate tax on distributions
of taxed income received from the corporation. Unlike the shareholder exemption or dividend-received deduction systems, which also reduce the shareholder tax on distributions, these systems are apparently intended to have the
effect of taxing corporate earnings at the higher of the corporate or personal
rate.
These systems should not be confused with simple withholding systems
where the corporation is obliged to withhold tax on distributions, and the tax
withheld is credited to the shareholder. The difference between imputation
and withholding systems is that the payment of the withholding tax by the
corporation is in addition to the corporation's own corporate tax liability, and
does not discharge the corporation's own tax obligation (except for England's
Advanced Corporation Tax system). In other words, a pure withholding system is simply a collection mechanism on behalf of the shareholder, not an
attempt to overcome the defects of the classical system. For example, most
European jurisdictions see the need to impose both a withholding tax at a
constant rate on corporate distributions and to have some other interaction
mechanism, such as an imputation system that attributes payments of the
corporation's own tax liability to the shareholders'0 0 or a dividend deduction
system' 0 1 that operates in conjunction with the withholding tax. Even The
Netherlands, which retains the classical system, has a withholding system
collecting tax from the corporation on distributions which is creditable to the
shareholder, but which creates no further reduction in total tax payable by
02
either the corporation or shareholder.1
than full integration of the corporate and personal income tax is achieved by this system.
Instead, the generally accepted view is that the system is intended to achieve close to full
integration for the corporate tax on distributions from small corporations engaged in active
business and controlled by Canadian citizens, referred to in the legislation as "Canadian
controlled private corporations" (CCPCs). ITA § 125(1). Corporate-PersonalTax
Integration,supra note 10, at 236 ("What Canada ended up with is a system which provides
full dividend relief., for small companies and partial dividend relief for others.").

100. Variations on this system are employed in France, Germany and Italy. See TIRARD,
supra note 64.
101. This system is used in Greece. See TIRARD, supra note 64.
102. See TIRARD, supra note 64.
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Although there are common elements to all imputation systems, there are
also many differences within this broad framework. Common to all systems
is the survival of the separate corporate tax, the attribution to shareholders of
some corporate tax paid on distributed profits, and the denial of a credit for
corporate tax paid on retained profits. Differences arise, for example, where
imputation systems operate with more or less accuracy in the attribution of
corporate tax payments. 03 In some systems, the amount of the tax collected
at the corporate level may not be entirely reflective of the tax actually payable
by the corporation. Under others, the amount of tax credited to the individual
shareholder may not reflect the total tax paid by the corporation. As mentioned above, the Canadian system simply increases the amount of any distribution by a constant amount to represent corporate tax paid, and then gives the
shareholder a credit for a portion of the grossed-up amount.104 This gross-up
and credit occurs whether or not tax has actually been paid at the corporate
level. The United Kingdom's Advanced Corporation Tax (hereinafter
"ACT") system is more careful to ensure that the tax has been paid, but occasionally is also at the expense of collecting payments of ACT which exceed
the company's own corporate tax liability. 0 5 Of the two systems modelled,
the system which attempts to be the most accurate is that used in Australia and
New Zealand. It attempts to trace (and verify) the tax actually paid by the
corporation on its profits, and attribute only those verified payments of corporate tax to the shareholders.
Which system is in place will depend upon many factors, but probably
the most important choices involve issues about the size and distribution of
tax preferences; the treatment of exempt shareholders; the importance of
equity concerns; the treatment of foreign income; administrative convenience;
and so on. Corporate tax preferences (and credits for tax paid on f6reign
income) are an issue under an imputation system which traces actual payments
of corporate tax because the value of the preference (or credits for payments
of foreign tax) will be recaptured if (untaxed) profits are distributed and even,
to a lesser extent, for taxed profits if they are retained. The value of the pref103. Avi-Yonah, supra note 71.
104. The Canadian version of the imputation system appears to be the least accurate of the
imputation systems examined, although as will be seen, except in some unusual circumstances,
the advantages of some of the imputation systems in their alleged accuracy may be more
apparent than real. See INTEGRATION, supra note 15, at Appendix B.2.
105. The ACT is payable at a flat rate on a distribution regardless of whether the profits
out of which the distribution is made have already borne tax, and of the actual rate of tax
which will be imposed upon the company. The payment of ACT discharges the corporation's
primary tax liability to the extent of the ACT payment and the individual shareholder is
credited with the ACT payment against the shareholder's tax liability on the dividend received.
See generally RICHARD BRAMWELL ET AL., TAXATION OF COMPANIES AND COMPANY
RECONSTRUCTIONS ch. 9 (3d ed. 1985).
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erence under such a system is reduced from a tax exemption to a tax deferral,
which may not be consistent with the level of subsidy intended by the government. " 6 The problem could possibly be solved by specific adjustments to the
tax credits offered to shareholders, either to gross-up the tax actually paid by
the corporation by an amount to represent tax not paid but attributable to
preference items or foreign income, or to perform a similar gross-up to the
shareholder's tax credits.
The purpose in raising these problems in the context of this paper is to
observe that the effects of a corporate tax preference resemble those of corporate tax evasion-either may account for the existence of untaxed corporate profits. Indeed, corporate managers keen to conceal the existence of
evasion would probably try to explain the difference between the size of the
profits reported variously to the revenue authority on the one hand, and shareholders on the other, in part by pointing to the value of tax preferences. If the
imputation system tries to recapture corporate tax preferences, it may also
have the desirable but unintended consequence of recapturing the benefits of
successful corporate tax evasion.
(1) Advanced Corporation Tax System
The United Kingdom's ACT system uses a withholding tax on distributions as both the collection mechanism and the interaction mechanism between the corporate tax system and the personal income tax. 0 7 The essence
of the ACT is that a withholding tax is imposed on corporate distributions and
credited against the corporation's liability for corporate tax payable on its
taxable income. Because an imputation system also operates, the ACT is effectively also collected on behalf of the shareholder's liability for tax on the
distribution. The ACT is perhaps better described as an imputed withholding
tax for both the corporate tax and personal income tax rather than simply an
imputation system. But because the ACT is collected on the gross amount of
any corporate distributions, it changes both the returns and costs of evasion.
Under the ACT, each qualifying distribution by a corporation is subject
to ACT at a nominal rate, set at a level equal to the basic personal income tax
106. Avi-Yonah, supra note 71. See, for example, the adjustment made in Australia to the
tax liability on trust distributions where part of the distribution represents untaxed profits,
reduced because of the building depreciation deduction. ITAA § 160ZM. This same adjustment
is not made to distributions from companies with similar deductions.
Even for retained profits, the value of the tax preference is reduced but in this case by less.
The value of the preference will possibly be recaptured when profits on the sale of the shares
are taxed as capital gain. The size of the recapture depends upon the length of time until
redemption, the interest discount factor and the tax rate applicable to capital gains. In the
right circumstances, it is possible for the amount of recapture to approach 0.
107. See generally SIMON JAMES & CHRISTOPHER NOBES, THE ECONOMICS OF TAXATION
287 (3d ed. 1988); INTEGRATION, supra note 15, at Appendix B.6.
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rate.108 This rate is also approximately the same as the rate charged on taxable
corporate profits under the corporation tax. °9 Because the tax is imposed
upon a distribution, it is collected whether or not the source of corporate profits from which the distribution has been paid has borne tax, or even is taxable.
The corporation is able to credit the ACT payment against its own liability for
corporate tax on its profits.' 10 The balance payable after the credit is usually
referred to as the "mainstream corporation tax" (hereinafter "MCT") liability. Where the corporation retains profits, there is no ACT payment, and thus
no change to the classical system's consequences for the corporation and
shareholder.
The reduction in the corporation's tax liability for payments of ACT
cannot generate a refund of corporate tax if the corporation distributes more
than its current-year taxable profits, or if it is taxable at less than the ACT rate
on its profits."' Effectively, tax is collected from the corporation at the higher
of the ACT rate or the corporate tax rate on distributed profits and at the
corporate tax rate on retentions. An ACT system can thus result in the consequence that all distributions are reduced by an amount of ACT, while some
will be reduced by the corporate tax rate if that is higher. The after-tax corporate profit is, therefore:
108. Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988 (Eng.) § 14(1) [hereinafter ICTA] provides
that "where a company ... makes a qualifying distribution it shall be liable to pay an amount
of corporation tax in accordance with subsection (3)." Id. Section 14(3) formally expresses
the ACT rate in the form:
I
100-I
"I"being "the percentage at which income tax at the basic rate is charged .. " Since, at
present, the UK has only two rates of personal income tax (25% and 40%), this ACT rate is
currently becomes 25/75 or 33%.
The reference to a "qualifying distribution" is the way that returns of capital and certain
other distributions are excluded from tax. Distributions from corporations are not subject to
further tax as ACT is only collected on the excess of distributions made over distributions
received. ICTA § 241.
109. The UK currently imposes tax at 25% on corporations with profits less than £150,000
and 35% for other corporations.
110. ICTA § 239(1) provides:
Advance corporation tax paid by a company ... in respect of any distribution made
by it in an accounting period shall be set against its liability to corporation tax on
any profits charged to corporation tax for that accounting period and shall accordingly
discharge a corresponding amount of that liability.
111. This consequence is dealt with in the variety of provisions dealing with "surplus
advance corporation tax." If the corporation has insufficient tax liability, it can carry the
credit back and recover tax paid in prior years or forward to use against the tax liability of
future years, the liability of other companies in the group or controlled foreign corporations.
ICTA §§ 239, 240. This complication will be ignored.
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dP[1-Ta-(Tc-Ta)] + (1-d)P(1-Tc)
where:
Ta = the rate of ACT (where Tc >Ta).
With respect to distributed profits, the shareholder is treated in the same
way as underother imputation systems. The shareholder is taxed on the net
distribution increased by the amount of ACT presumed withheld, and then
receives a credit for that amount as in any other withholding system." 2 The
ACT credit is refundable to the shareholder if the credit exceeds the
shareholder's tax liability."I3 But if the corporation has paid more in ACT than
its own MCT liability, the excess is not refundable to the corporation and,
unless they can be utilized in some other way," 4 its profits are effectively
taxable at [Ta] rather than [Tc].
If the corporation's managers report its full profits, the shareholder includes in income:
dP[(1-Ta-(Tc-Ta)] + dP[(1-Ta-(Tc-Ta)] x Ta
+ (1-d)P(1-Tc)
1-Ta

Where [Ta] is set at a lower rate than [Tc], the position for distributions is equal
to:
dP(1-Te)

x

[ I+

Ta

I

1-Ta
and the shareholder receives a credit equal to the amount of ACT [dPTa].
Since [Ta] is set at the same rate as [Ti],"' the after-tax position of the shareholder becomes:
I = dP(1-Tc) + (1-d)P(l-Tc)(1-Tc)

(10)

Where [Tc] is set at the same rate as [Ti], distributed declared earnings are
effectively taxed at [Ti]. But where the corporate tax rate is higher than [Ti],
the distributed earnings are taxed at the higher rate [Tc].
112. ICTA § 20(1), Schedule F. The amount taxed is "the aggregate of the amount or

value of [any] distribution and the amount of [any] credit". The credit is provided in ICTA §
231 which states that,
where a company resident in the United Kingdom makes a qualifying distribution
and the person receiving the distribution is . . . a person resident in the United
Kingdom .... the recipient of the distribution shall be entitled to a tax credit equal
to such proportion of the amount or value of the distribution as corresponds to the
rate of advance corporation tax ....
113. ICTA § 231(3).
114. See supra note 111.
115. It will be the same rate if Ti is a marginal rate rather than an average rate since
income is subject to reliefs, progressive rates, losses etc while Ta is set at a gross rate.
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If the corporation successfully engages in evasion of its primary corporation tax liability, the after-tax position of the shareholder remains the same
for distributions of declared earnings. But successful evasion means that the
corporation's managers can attribute the ACT payment on distributions of
undeclared earnings toward the mainstream corporate tax liability on declared
earnings. So, although ACT will be collected on distributions of undeclared
income, it is assumed that the same overall corporate tax is collected. Distributions are taxed at [Ta], and a corresponding credit will be given to the shareholder.
The gross-up and credit procedures occur automatically, as in the Canadian system, but they do so on the basis that ACT has actually been collected
on distributions. No corporate tax will be collected on retained earnings
where evasion has been successful, and no ACT will be collected because
profits have been retained. Consequently, only capital gains tax will be collected on the sale of the shares. The position of the shareholder becomes:
I = dD(1-Tc) + (1-d)D(l-Tc)(1-Tg) + d(P-D) + (1-d)(P-D)(1-Tg)

(11)

It is important to observe that, in this formula, the ACT does not actually ensure that the correct corporate tax is actually paid, even where the
corporation evades but distributes. Rather, the ACT simply permits the
corporation's managers to reduce the amount of any final MCT to be paid on
declared profits, assuming that the MCT obligation on declared profits exceeds the ACT payments. In other words, there is the potential for the "leakage" of tax credits from the corporation's ACT liability on undeclared but
distributed profits to reduce its liability on declared but retained profits. The
only circumstance where the ACT mechanism will ensure that more corporate
tax is paid than would otherwise occur is where the corporation proposes to
report less taxable profits than the amount of profits (both taxed and untaxed)
that it proposes to distribute. It is assumed that the corporation's managers
are able to manage the amounts distributed and declared to ensure that no
additional ACT liability is created to eliminate the benefits of evading the
MCT liability.
Where the evasion is unsuccessful, the shareholder faces an after-tax
return under an ACT system of:
I = dD(1-Tc) + (1-d)D(l-Tc)(l-Tg) + d(P-D) +
(1 -d)(P-D)[( 1-Tc( 1+f)( 1+r*) t -d] (1 -Tg)
(l-d)
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(2) Australian Imputation System
The other imputation system to be modelled is the type in place in Australia and New Zealand.'"' Of the other systems discussed, it is perhaps the
system which tries most accurately to measure the interaction of the corporate
and personal income tax on at least distributed income. Unlike the Canadian
system mentioned above, which assumes that corporate tax has been paid on
all distributions, or the ACT system that enforces payments of tax in excess
of the corporate tax liability, this system traces the tax actually paid by the
corporation on its profits, and attributes only tax actually paid to the profits
distributed. The consequence of this is that corporate tax preferences or foreign tax credits are recaptured at the shareholder level and also, if properly
constructed, that the benefits of corporate tax evasion might also be recovered
from the shareholder.
The corporation still pays tax on its taxable income whether distributed
or retained. A shareholder who is a resident pays income tax at marginal rates
on the portion of after-tax profits distributed by the corporation as dividends.
The same gross-up procedure is used as in the other systems, so that an additional amount is included in the shareholder's income representing tax paid
by the corporation," 7 and this shareholder receives a tax credit for this
amount.' Retained profits are still taxed as capital gain to the shareholder
when the shares are sold, with no explicit credit against capital gains tax given
for the corporate tax already paid on retained profits. That is, the tax paid on
reported profits which are retained is not available to the shareholder.' 19 In
this respect, the Australian imputation system, like the other imputation systems discussed, operates in a similar way to the classical system for retained
profits.
The means for delivering the tax credit and the amount of tax credit
differ from the system employed in the United Kingdom. The Australian
system tries to trace tax payments actually made by the corporation and to
attribute tax credits for those payments to individual shareholders to the extent only that verified tax payments have been made by the corporation. In
other words, the Canadian system disregards the possibility that profits being
116. RICHARD J. VANN, COMPANY TAX REFORM (1988); Richard Krever, Companies,
Shareholders and Capital Gains Taxation, 3 AUST. TAX F. 267 (1986); R. RICHARDS & R.
DOHERTY, THE IMPUTATION SYSTEM (1987); Officer, supra note 84; INTEGRATION, supra
note 15, at Appendix B.1.
117. ITAA § 160AQT.
118. ITAA § 160AQU.
119. It was assumed above that tax involuntarily paid would not be credited. These
assumptions would not be in doubt if the unreported income were retained, as was assumed
above, since no tax credits are attached to retentions. Some minor exceptions to the proposition
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distributed might not have been taxed; the system used in the United Kingdom
forces the payment of tax on all distributions; and the Australian system permits untaxed profits to be distributed but identifies them as such in the hands
of the shareholder.
Where the corporation reports all of its profits, the corporation will pay
corporate tax of [PTc], and the balance available for distribution is [P(1-Tc)].
The net amount distributed to the shareholder [dP(1-Tc)] is increased by the
gross-up representing corporate tax, effected by multiplying a fraction of the
net dividend 2 ° by a factor, [Tc/1-Tc] and adding this amount to the net dividend. The gross-up and credit procedure are effected through a process referred to as "franking". Under this process, taxed profits are identified, with
the gross-up and credit procedure operating in respect of declared and taxed
profits only.
The franking procedure operates in several steps. Each step is verified
by entries in a notional account, the corporation's "franking account", that
traces corporate tax payments. First, when the corporation discloses to the
revenue authority the amount of its taxable profits and pays tax on these profits, the corporation enters a credit in its franking account. 2 ' The amount of
the credit is calculated by adjusting the amount of tax paid to express the
amount of dividend which can be distributed tax free upon a tax payment of
this size. 2 2 In other words, if the corporation discloses its full taxable profits [P], and pays tax of [PTc], the entry is:
PTc x 1-Tc = P(1-Tc)

Tc
The corporation can then "frank" a dividend of up to [P(1-Tc)] to one hundred
percent, meaning that it can attach a full tax credit [PTc] to a dividend of this
amount. When the corporation declares a dividend of some portion of the
after-tax profits [dP(1-Tc)], it also reduces its franking account in the same
amount, so as to leave a balance of [(1-d)p(l-Tc)].12 3 In contrast to the ACT
that tax on retained corporate profits is not credited to shareholders, arise in the case of share
buy-back arrangements and the attributed income of controlled foreign corporations. See
respectively ITAA Division 16J of Part III, § 461. These exceptions will not be discussed
further here.
120. ITAA § 160AQT requires the shareholder to include in income the "franked amount"
of the dividend increased by this factor.
121. ITAA §§ 160APMA - 160APMD.
122. ITAA §§ 160APMA - 160APMD refer to the amount of the credit being the "adjusted
amount" in relation to the payment. Section 160APA defines the adjusted amount to be the
amount multiplied in the manner indicated in the text.
123. ITAA § 160AQB prescribes a reduction to the franking account of "the franked amount
of the dividend" paid by the corporation.
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system, none of these steps affect the corporation's own tax liability. They
24
merely serve as a record for the purpose of subsequent calculations.
The shareholder goes through similar procedures to calculate the tax
liability on the net dividend distributed. Where all profits are reported and
taxed, the shareholder reports the portion distributed increased by the grossup for corporate tax.' 25 This gross-up does not occur as a simple increase of
the net dividend by a constant rate. Rather, the gross-up is calculated on the
amount that has been debited to the corporation's franking account, which, as
will be later shown, may or may not correspond to the net amount of dividend
distributed. Where the full taxable profits have been declared, this step becomes:
dP(1-Tc) + [dP(1-Tc)

x

Tc
(1-Tc)

]

dP

]

This amount is then subject to personal income tax [dPTi], and the shareholder
is entitled to a credit against the personal income tax liability of the same
amount that was included by the gross-up procedure [dPTc]. 2 6 Thus, the net
tax at the shareholder level on distributed dividends is [dPTi - dPTc]. The
after-tax return to the shareholder is:
I = dP(1-Ti) + (1-d)P(1-Tc)(1-Tg)

(13)

with [dPTc] collected from the corporation and any deficiency collected from
the shareholder.' 2 7 This achieves the desired result that the shareholder pays
tax on distributions at the higher of the corporate or personal income tax rates.
Where the corporation's managers engage in evasion (or for some other
reason such as the existence of foreign tax credits or corporate preferences),
and all 'ofthe profits distributed have not borne tax at the full corporate rate,
the franking system will operate rather differently both at the corporate and
shareholder level. If the corporation pays tax of [DTc], the entry in the
corporation's franking account will be: 2 8

124. Although if it is found that the corporation has over-franked the dividend, it must pay
"franking additional tax to balance the franking account. This payment is treated as a prepayment of the corporation's tax for the ensuing year.
125. ITAA § 160AQT.
126. ITAA § 160AQU.
127. Any excess, where dPTc is greater than dPTi can be used as a credit against the
shareholder's other tax liabilities but is not refundable.
128. ITAA § 160APMA.
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DTc

x 1-T c = D1-Tc),

Tc
which will permit the corporation's managers to distribute profits up to
[D(l-Tc)] tax-free through the process just described.
The assumption has been previously made that the corporation distributes a portion of the undeclared profits. The treatment of the portion of undeclared profits distributed as dividends [d(P-D)] will depend crucially on the
way that the franking account is debited and tax credits attached to dividends.
This is an issue similar to that raised in the ACT system. It is clear that the
franking account balance would be insufficient to permit the corporation's
managers to fully frank a dividend greater than [D(1-Tc)]. But if the
corporation's managers retain a portion of the declared and taxed profits
[(1-d)D(l-Tc)], can the unused credits in the franking account (representing
tax on these declared but retained profits) be applied against the undeclared
but distributed profits? If so, the distributed portion of the undeclared profits might also be distributed tax-free to shareholders.
The answer depends in part upon the dividend policy of the corporation's
managers,'an'd in part upon their compliance or disregardof other rules.
Sections 160AQF and 160AQG try to ensure that all dividends are franked to
the same proportion where there are insufficient credits to cover all dividends
to be declared in a year." 9 But if the corporation's managers plan to distribute from undeclared profits up to the amount of retained declared profits, this
rule would not apply-that is; if the total distribution is less than [D(1-Tc)].
This would mean that all dividends, whether out of declared or undeclared
profits, could effectively be distributed tax free -toshareholders. If, however,
the corporation's managers were planning to distribute all of the declared
profits [D(1-Tc)], and some portion of the undeclared profits, the rule would
apply, and all dividends would carry only fractional credits. 30 Thus, the
129. Section 160AQF provides that all dividends paid under a resolution of the company
are taken be franked to the percentage specified in a declaration made in relation to the
dividend. The declaration cannot be varied or revoked. Section 160AQG treats all dividends
paid during the year on the same class of shares as being frankel to the same percentage
declared for the first dividend.
The purpose of these sections is to prevent "streaming" of distributions so that distributions

carrying tax credits are paid to taxpaying entities while taxable distributions (if any) are
directed to tax exempt bodies. Streaming of this kind would permit the corporation to increase
the after-tax return to both gropps of shareholder. The section tries to prevent this practice
by insisting on a pro rata attaching of credits rather than a "first-in-first-out" rule.
INTEGRATION, supra note 15 (which recommends a first-in-first-out rule).
130. The Act also offers to the corporation's managers the choice of franking the distribution
of untaxed profits to 100% but the corporation will be obliged at the end of the year to pay
additional tax to restore a credit balance in the franking account. That is, the corporation
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corporation's managers can effectively attach tax credits to a distribution up
to the amount of [D(1-Tc)] whether or not some portion of the amount distributed has actually been declared and borne tax.
If there are insufficient credits to frank a distribution to one hundred
percent (that is, the corporation's managers distribute more than [D(1-Tc)])
the gross-up and credit procedure will still operate in respect of the declared
profits, but not for undeclared profits. If the profits are not declared, they
carry no tax credit, and the shareholder simply includes the distributed portion of untaxed profits in income [d(P-D)] with no gross-up or credit and is
taxed in the same way as under a classical system.
An issue arises under this system similar to that implicitly raised under
the ACT-why it is not assumed that the corporation's managers simply
falsely represent to the shareholders that the distributed undeclared profits
have been declared and carry a tax credit? Why, in other words, is it assumed
that the corporation's managers are dishonest about the amount of corporate
income earned and corporate tax payable, but honest about the amount of ACT
or corporate tax actually paid? The reason that this assumption is made is
because the revenue authority is the other party to the corporation's tax payment. Hence, it is assumed that the revenue authority can cheaply and quickly
verify the amount of tax paid by the corporation from its own records and does
need to accept the representations of the corporation's managers nor engage
in costly audits of the corporation's records in order to ascertain the amount
of corporate tax paid. Expressed another way, it is assumed that detection for
misrepresenting the amount of ACT or corporate tax paid is certain."'
If the corporation's managers are to make the most use of their evasion,
they will need to retain sufficient declared profits to ensure that the undeclared
but distributed profits can be franked fully. If they do this, the after tax position of the shareholder becomes:
I = dD(!-Ti) + (1-d)D(l-Tc)(l-Tg) + d(P-D) + (1-d)(P-D)(1-Tg)
(14)
If the corporation's evasion is detected, the position of the shareholder
changes again. The corporation must pay back tax on the undisclosed profits, interest on the tax, and a penalty to the revenue authority. It has previously
been assumed that the payment of interest on detection does not affect the
corporation's own tax liability, but the payment of back tax raises the additional issue under an imputation system whether payment of evaded tax will
effectively pre-pays the next year's corporate tax. See supra note 124.
131. This might not happen if the corporation is claiming credit for foreign corporate tax
paid, but the revenue authority will usually require documentary evidence of payment before
a credit is given. But the issue does not arise in dealing with the Canadian-style imputation
system discussed above since no attempt it made to verify payments of corporate tax before
giving credit to the corporation's shareholders for the corporate tax.
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give rise to a tax credit to the shareholder. It will be assumed that the credit
for corporate tax is limited to the tax paid on profits voluntarily disclosed, but
it is not entirely obvious that a credit is (or should be) denied for enforced tax
payments. 132 But it will be assumed that the enforced tax payment gives rise
1 33
to no tax credit for the shareholder.
Where evasion is detected, the after-tax return to the shareholder becomes:
I = dD( 1-Ti)+( 1-d)D( 1-Tc)( -Tg) + d(P-D) +( 1-d)(P-D)[( 1-Tc( 1+f)( 1+r*)t-d)] (1-Tg)
(1-d)

(15)

The first two terms describes the combined corporate and shareholder tax rate
on declared profits; the third term shows the rate on undeclared but distributed
profits; the fourth term represents the rate calculated on all undeclared earnings (but collected from retained earnings) if evasion is unsuccessful.
E. Integration System
Integration systems, of which there are two varieties, are intended to
offset the effect of the corporate income tax entirely, so that all corporate
profits are ultimately taxed at individual marginal rates in the current year,
regardless of whether the profits are distributed. This system promises the
model treatment to which the other systems aspire, because all profits are
taxed at exactly the shareholder's personal income tax rate (although portions
of the total tax might be collected from each of the corporation and share-

132. The position in Australia is that credit is available for the amount of unpaid tax in the
year that it is paid (ITAA § 160APMD) but probably that no credit is available for the amount

of the penalty (nor interest) imposed under Part VII. The doubt arises from the reference to
the penalty as "Penalty tax" and in Section 227 to "additional tax" which might be sufficient
for the franking provisions which require simply a payment of "company tax" (§ 160APMD)
defined to be "tax assessed on the taxable income of the company" (§ 160APA). The specific
provisions imposing the penalty, however, impose "a penalty" for making false statements. It
is suggested that the probable treatment is that a credit will arise for the payment of unpaid
tax but not for the penalty.
133. The benefit of such a rule is that it would serve as a cheap (from the revenue authority's

point of view) supplement to the penalty system, denying to shareholders a valuable benefit at
no cost to the revenue authority. But if the shares have been sold by the time the evasion is
detected, the tax and fine will be a cost to the current owner which might suggest attributing
the credit to the current owner as well, since the purchaser has paid to the vendor a higher
price for the corporate profits (unreduced by corporate tax) presumably unaware of the potential
liability for the evasion. To deny the tax credit penalises the purchaser beyond the apparent
size of the fine with no obvious cost to a hasty vendor. Perhaps in the long run, once this
position becomes known the price of securities may be adjusted downward to reflect the
potential diminution in value of the purchaser's interest or cautious purchasers may try to
bargain for collateral guarantees.
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holder), and there is no gain to the taxpayer from deferring the recognition of
134
income by retaining profits within the corporation.
One form of integration system-the so-called "partnership-style" system- achieves this result by eliminating the corporate tax altogether, and
taxing the shareholders in the corporation as if they were numbers of a partnership. Under this system, no tax is imposed upon the corporation and all
corporate profits are included in the individual's taxable income. The United
States permits shareholders to elect this treatment under Subchapter S of the
Internal Revenue Code for domestically controlled corporations with few
shareholders and little foreign source or passive income.3 The consequence
of the election is that the corporation is not taxed on its income; shareholders
are taxable on all income whether or not distributed; and the benefit of corporate losses and tax preference items are passed through to the shareholders.' 36 This style of integration will not be considered further in this paper
because it achieves integration by eliminating the corporate tax and makes the
study of corporate tax evasion irrelevant.
With this exception and for the reasons stated earlier, integration systems have not been adopted by any country for the taxation of domestic companies and their resident shareholders, despite the support of many commentators and several government reports. 37 But somewhat surprisingly, a second style of integration system is more common in the taxation of non-resident companies controlled by resident shareholders, where the system is usually referred to as a controlled foreign corporation (hereinafter "CFC") tax
system. In this context, the system is used not because it approximates the
economist's ideal of eliminating the double taxation of corporate profits, but
rather as an anti-avoidance mechanism to prevent the accumulation of untaxed
profits offshore.' 3 8

134. Cnossen, supra note 8, at 98; Corporate-PersonalTax Integration, supra note 10, at
235.
135. See generally BORIS I. BITTKER & JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS ch.

6 (5th ed. 1987).

136. I.R.C. § 1372(b)(1) (1994) (corporation not taxable); I.R.C. § 1373(b) (1994)
(shareholders taxable on all income); I.R.C. § 1374 (1994) (corporate losses deductible to
shareholders). In this model the corporation effectively ceases to exist as either a separate
taxable entity or withholding point and it is, for that reason, not relevant to the present
analysis of the behaviour of the corporation's managers and will not be discussed further.
137. See supra note 80.
138. I.R.C. Subpart F; ITAA Part X. In the international context, these systems are referred
to as controlled foreign corporation (CFC) regimes and are evident in the tax systems of the
United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, France, Germany and Japan.
See BRIAN J. ARNOLD, THE TAXATION OF CONTROLLED FOREIGN CORPORATIONS: AN
INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON (1986).

Even more curiously, while CFC systems were

originally developed as a means of eliminating the gain from accumulating lightly-taxed
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This section considers a theoretical CFC-type system for domestic corporations. 3 9 It should be noted that such a system is not in use in any domestic
tax system, but the system suggested here would achieve the central element
of an integration system, taxing shareholders currently on all declared corporate profits, but with the innovation of retaining the corporate tax as a quasiwithholding mechanism. Because of this continued legal obligation of the
corporation to pay tax, it is assumed that penalties remain on the corporation
where any failure to disclose full taxable profits is detected.
In modelling this fictitious integration system, it is assumed that the
corporation would still pay tax on its disclosed profits, and the individual
shareholder would pay income tax at marginal rates on all the disclosed taxable profits of the corporation whether or not they are distributed, with a tax
credit then given to the shareholder for the entire amount of corporate tax
voluntarily paid. Again, it is assumed that the crediting mechanism traces
actual payments of corporate tax, is limited to payments of tax rather than
interest or fine, and is limited to corporate tax paid voluntarily. Any retained
profits have been taxed to the individual at the appropriate personal rate when
they were earned (and appropriate credits were also attributed), so that retained earnings are not taxed if the shares are sold (generating a capital gain)
up to the amount of the attributed retained earnings. This is achieved by stepping up the shareholder's cost in the shares by a factor to reflect the amount
already taxed.140 Any further capital gain beyond the value of attributed earnings is taxed in the usual way.
If the corporation's managers report the corporation's full taxable income, the after-tax position of the shareholder is:
I = P(1-Ti)
(16)

income offshore, the substantial income tax rate reductions of the 1980s have now meant that
there may even be gains to be made from deliberately creating a CFC. See PAUL R. MCDANIEL
& HUGH J. AULT, INTRODUCTION TO UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 118-20 (3d
ed. 1989).
139. PECHMAN, supra note 11, at 178-81. It is one of the prototypes suggested by the U.S.
Treasury. INTEGRATION, supra note 15.
140. In fact, the result might be prevented in several ways, including, for example, a further
grossup and credit procedure which increased the basis in the shares by [Tg/1-Tg] and gave
to the shareholder a credit against capital gains tax for the same amount which could be
carried forward and used when the shares were sold. Instead, the procedure described here is
the one used in the U.S. to reconcile the capital gains tax and personal income tax on
shareholders in Subchapter S corporations, with appropriate modifications to reflect the fact
that the corporate tax has been retained in this discussion. See also BLUEPRINTS, supra note
16, at 64. An alternative procedure is used in Australia for the attributed profits of CFCs
which writes down the proceeds of sale by amounts already attributed, permitting shareholders
to sell retentions of previously taxed income without further tax. ITAA § 461.
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This result would be achieved in several steps. First, corporate tax [PTc] is
collected from the corporation. The amount of any distribution is included in
the shareholder's income together with the usual gross-up for corporate tax:
dP(1-Tc) + dP(1-Tc)

x

Tc

=

dP

(1-Tc).
This generates a tax liability of [dPTi], and the shareholder receives a credit
of [dPTc] against this tax liability. The retained earnings and a further grossup are also included in the taxpayer's current assessable income:
(1-d)P(1-Tc) + (1-d)P x Tc

=

(1-d)P

(1-Tc).
This creates a tax liability of [(1-d)P Ti], and a credit of [(1-d)PTc] is set off
against this tax liability.
It would be possible under such as regime simply to exempt sales of
shares from the capital gains tax, but the capital gains tax is retained to capture other items not taxed on a current basis such as unrealized corporate
profits, tax preferences, or evasion. 4 ' This necessitates a further adjustment
to reflect the fact that some of the retained profits reflected in the price of the
shares will already have been taxed. This is achieved by annually increasing
the shareholder's basis in the retained earnings by the amount of retained
earnings taxed in that year.' 42 If the taxpayer realizes only the accumulated
value of retained taxed profits, the shareholder's basis equals this amount and
no capital gain arises.
141. INTEGRATION, supra note 15, at 82 ("not all capital gains from increases in the value
of corporate equity arise from accumulated retained earnings. Gains from other sources may
imply different tax consequences than those applicable solely to gains from fully-taxed
retained earnings"); Head & Bird, supra note 13, at 15 n.22 ("a capital gains tax at the
personal level would still be needed to tax "goodwill gains"-those arising from such factors
as improved market position, technological developments, and natural resource discoveries").
This is necessary because the attribution process is a tax procedure only-no corporate funds
need actually be distributed to shareholders.
142. In the U.S. this process occurs in two steps. I.R.C. § 1367(a)(1)(A) increases the
shareholder's basis in the shareholding by the "items of income described in subparagraph
(A) of section 1366(a)(1)." This is the provision which includes in the shareholder's taxable
income "the shareholder's pro rata share of the corporation's items of income (including tax
exempt income)." I.R.C. § 1366(a)(l)(A). A subsequent provision states that this increase
in basis occurs "only to the extent such amount is included in the shareholder's gross income
on his return". I.R.C. § 1367(b)(1). The shareholder's basis is then reduced by "distributions
by the corporation which were not includible in the income of the shareholder by reason of
section 1368". I.R.C. § 1367(a)(2). Section 1368 exempts distributions by a Subchapter S
corporation up to the lower of the shareholder's basis in the shares or the balance in the
"accumulated adjustments account." The result of these provisions is that the shareholder

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akrontaxjournal/vol12/iss1/1

52

Cooper: The Return to Corporate Tax Evasion

1996]

THE RETURN TO CORPORATE TAX EVASION

If the corporation's managers decide to evade tax, the corporation will
initially pay tax only on declared profits, and the shareholders will be attributed with only the reported income and tax credits on that income. If the
evasion is successful, the exact position of the shareholder will again depend
upon the method of effecting the adjustments between the corporate tax and
the personal income tax. If a tracing procedure is used to follow actual payments of corporate tax, the shareholder will include in income all after-tax
profits [D(1-Tc)] together with a gross-up for the corporate tax paid [DTc],
and will receive a credit for the amount of the corporate tax against the personal tax liability [DTi].
The treatment of the undeclared corporate profits comes about in a series of steps.143 Since the corporation's managers have distributed some declared profits [dD(1-Tc)] and undeclared profits [d(P-D)], the corporation
still retains a portion of the after-tax declared profits [(1-d)D(l-Tc)] and
undeclared profits [(1-d)(P-D)], with corporate tax having already been paid
on [(1-d)D]. The shareholder's basis in the total retained earnings is increased by the amount of declared profits remaining after corporate tax
[D(1-Tc)] and reduced by the amount of profits which have been distributed
and reported by the shareholder without further personal income tax
[dD(1-Tc) + d(P-D)] up to the amount of the declared profits. Thus the
taxpayer's basis in the earnings is increased by only the declared and distributed profits and the undeclared distributed profits [(1-d)D(1-Tc)-d(P-D)]
-that is, undeclared but distributed profits effectively reduce the increase in
basis by the amount distributed. This means that the capital gains tax calculation becomes:
{(1-d)D(I1-Tc)+( 1-d)(P-D)-[( 1-d)D(I1-Tc)-d(P-D)] } (1l-Tg)
which becomes [(P-D)(1-Tg)]. The eventual after-tax position of the shareholder becomes:
I = D(1-Ti) + (P-D)(1-Tg)

(17)

If, however, the corporation's tax evasion is detected, the corporation
will again pay interest, penalties, and tax on the unreported income. But,
unlike the imputation system, it is assumed that the unreported income will
44
then have to be attributed to the shareholder for further tax at personal rates.'
will increase his or her basis in the shares by the net of the income actually disclosed by the
corporation and distributions up to the amount actually disclosed.
143. These steps have been modified from those described above because the corporate tax
still remains in operation unlike the position in the U.S. for Subchapter S corporations.
144. It is assumed that the detected evasion by the corporation of its tax will not generate
further penalties at the shareholder level. This position is not entirely clear since the
shareholder has failed to report some income by virtue of the managers' evasion but for the
purposes of this paper it will be assumed that detection creates penalties only at the corporate
level.
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Since the discovered income will be attributed and taxed to the shareholder,
it is again necessary to resolve the question of whether the additional tax on
the unreported income paid after detection is also credited to the shareholder.
Even though the essence of the system is to impute both retained earnings and
tax to the shareholder, it is assumed that the shareholder does not receive a tax
credit for the further tax paid where corporate evasion is detected, nor for
interest and penalties. This treatment is like that assumed for the imputation
system and operates as an additional penalty for failed evasion.
In addition, with respect to the operation of the capital gains tax, it is
assumed that the increase in the shareholder's basis is only for retained declared earnings, occurring in the manner described above. The corporation
has retained profits of [(1-d)D(1-Tc)] and [(P-D)(1-Tc(l+f)-d)]. The
shareholder's basis in the retained earnings will be increased by [D(1-Tc)] and
reduced by [dD(1-Tc)], leaving a net increase of [(1-d)D(1-Tc)]. If the balance of the retained profits [(P-D)(1-Tc(l+f)-d)] is a negative figure, it is
assumed that the shareholder's basis is reduced only to zero and cannot be a
negative figure.
Under these assumptions, the position of the shareholder after payment
of tax is:
I = D(1-Ti) +(P-D) (1-Tc(l+f)-Ti).
(18)
The first term describes the combined corporate and shareholder tax rate on
declared profits; the second term shows the rate calculated on undeclared
earnings if evasion is unsuccessful. The logic of the equation is simple, if draconian. Declared profits are always taxed at the personal income tax rate but
undeclared profits are subject to tax at the corporate tax rate and a fine. And
since neither the tax nor fine is creditable against the shareholder's tax, the
shareholder pays personal income tax again on the full amount of the undeclared profits.
F. InteractionSystems for Non-Resident Shareholders
The prior discussion has set out to describe the expected returns to resident shareholders from investment in domestic corporations. But there are
also international dimensions to the interaction between the corporate and
personal income tax systems which will bear upon corporate tax evasion. It
is not proposed to elaborate the effects of the possible combinations of interaction mechanisms in an international context, but rather to describe the regimes briefly and then to identify the comparable domestic system, so far as
corporate tax evasion is concerned, from those described above.
A shareholder who is not a resident in the same country as the corporation paying the dividend (hereinafter "the country of source") will face issues
in the interaction of the corporate and personal tax systems similar to those
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facing a resident shareholder, but with additional complications. The country of source will usually vary the personal income tax rules for taxing income
from corporate profits where the shares are held by non-residents. For example, it is common for a different personal income tax rate to be imposed on
distributions to a non-resident shareholder, and for the tax imposed upon distributions to non-resident shareholders to be a withholding tax calculated on
gross amounts with no deduction for interest or other costs. Capital gains
made on the disposal of interests in domestic companies may, on some occasions, be taxed in the country of source but, on others, are also often exempted
from tax.
Secondly, the treatment by the tax system in the shareholder's country
of residence of income earned abroad will also have to be considered at least
by the shareholder and also perhaps by the corporation's managers. This
second point is somewhat more conjectural than the first, in so far as the
behavior of the corporation's managers is concerned. While it is likely that
the corporation's managers will consider the effects of the domestic tax regime on their non-resident shareholders, it might be thought that the
corporation's managers are unlikely to be influenced in their evasion decisions by the effects of the tax system of some foreign jurisdiction-or more
probably, several foreign jurisdictions. 145 But the same arguments which
suggest that corporate managers will consider the effects of the domestic
personal income tax regime (in its application to both resident and non-resident shareholders) apply also to the tax system of the foreign country, although perhaps with less vigor. 146 Further, there may be special circumstances
which encourage attention by the corporation's managers to the interaction of
the tax rules of the country of source and those of a particular foreign jurisdiction. For example, a predominance of shareholders residing in one foreign
jurisdiction (a situation which may occur where the corporations are part of
a larger group) or where the corporation is resident in a substantially capital
importing country proximate to a large developed economy, or there is otherwise a shortage of capital in the country of residence, may direct the attention of the corporation's managers to the tax system of another country. Indeed, these two ideas may coalesce so that, for example, the managers of a
corporation resident in Canada (or New Zealand) may find the majority shareholder in the corporation is another corporation whose shareholders are primarily resident in the U.S. (or Australia).
This section will examine these two issues: first, the interaction mecha145. See Cnossen, supra note 8, at 101-02.
146. That is, that it is the express or implied desires of the shareholders that principally
create the incentives for corporate managers to evade corporate tax. Even where the incentives
for evasion arise, for example, in the market for corporate managers, the meritorious manager
is likely to be the one who can claim the highest return for shareholders.
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nisms between the corporate tax system of the country of source and its personal income tax system in the treatment of distributions to non-resident
shareholders, and next, the treatment that these shareholders can expect in
their country of residence for dividends and capital gains received from
abroad. Again, these descriptions are stylized although reference to current
national practice will be made.
1. Tax System of Country of Source
While classical, deduction, imputation, or integration systems may be
employed by the country of source for resident shareholders, the interaction
of corporate and personal tax systems in an international context tends to be
less sophisticated and follow fewer models. Almost without exception, the
country of source subjects shareholders to the treatment of the classical system, perhaps slightly complicated by the overlay of international treaty provisions negotiated between the respective countries. Under a classical system
in an international context, the country of source collects further tax on dividends paid to non-resident shareholders and capital gains tax on the sale by
the non-resident shareholders of retained earnings. 47 Where the government
of the country of source decides to use an interaction mechanism between the
corporate tax and personal income tax, the only procedure commonly used is
to grant an exemption from further tax at the shareholder level for the benefit
of non-resident shareholders.
The reason for not employing more sophisticated interaction mechanisms for non-resident shareholders stems usually from policy judgments
about the extent to which credits afforded to resident shareholders to offset
corporate tax should also be available for non-residents. 4 8 Occasionally,
international treaties provide specifically for the benefit of tax credits to be
extended to the residents of the other country on the basis of reciprocity. 49
But, apart from these treaty provisions, shareholders who are not residents are
50
usually not included within the domestic imputation system.
147. Some countries choose not to impose capital gains tax on portfolio investments by
foreign nationals. See, e.g., ITAA § 160T(d) (imposing capital gains tax only on shareholdings
which exceed 10 percent of the issued capital of publicly traded companies).
148. See Cnossen, supra note 8, at 95 ("no country permits foreign shareholders to share
automatically in the [dividend] relief"); Corporate-PersonalTax Integration, supra note 10,
at 236 n.9; INTEGRATION, supra note 15; MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 62.
149. Some of the French and English treaties permit access to credits for non-resident
shareholders but always on a specific and reciprocal basis. See Cnossen, supra note 8, at 95;
INTEGRATION, supra note 15.
150. One reason is that the credits offered for corporate tax would probably exceed any
personal income tax liability since the corporate tax rate will often be greater than the personal
income tax rate for non-resident shareholders dictated either by the domestic law of the source
country or by bilateral tax treaties. If the tax credits were refundable or could be accumulated
and applied against the capital gains tax on disposal, there would effectively be no tax for
non-resident shareholders either on the receipt of distributions or the disposal of shares. The
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Further, the country of source is often under little pressure to change its
tax treatment to permit non-resident shareholders to have access to credits
where the country of residence of the shareholder operates a foreign tax credit
system. Where such a system operates, any effective reduction in the amount
of corporate tax collected by the country of source either on distributions from
the company or on the underlying profits of the corporation paying the dividend, would simply mean a higher rate of tax collected by the residence country.'5 1 In other words, where the effective tax rates and tax base of both countries are similar, the issue becomes one of distribution to be negotiated be5

tween the two countries.

2

In an international context, an integration system is even more difficult
to operate for domestic corporations because it attempts to currently tax nonresident shareholders on retained and distributed earnings. This is entirely at
odds with the prevailing model of corporate taxation adopted in the bilateral
tax treaties of most developed and developing nations which are based on
either the O.E.C.D. or U.N. models.' Both of these models assume that nonresident shareholders are taxed only on distributions, and not attributions, of
corporate profits, and operate to impose a maximum rate of tax that the country of source can collect from non-resident shareholders. Integration systems
may, however, be applied to the treatment of resident shareholders who control non-resident corporations in ways discussed below.
Where a classical system operates for non-resident shareholders, the
corporation continues to pay corporate tax, but the rate nominally charged by
the country of source on distributions of after-tax corporate profits to nonresident shareholders will often be limited in many cases by a bilateral tax
treaty to a maximum constant rate on the gross amount of any distribution,
usually fifteen percent. 5 4 The tax on distributed profits is usually collected
total tax collected on income paid to non-resident investors would be at a low level which
may accord with the desire of the government but need not. Many governments apparently

wish to collect some capital gains tax from non-resident shareholders or to recoup the value
of tax preferences given to the corporation in order not to prefer non-resident shareholders to
their own citizens.
151. Indeed, the pressure from shareholders usually operates in other direction with nonresident shareholders seeking to have their country of residence give credit for tax incentives
offered in the source country-tax sparing.
152. MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 62.
153. O.E.C.D. COMMITTEE ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME
AND ON CAPITAL ART. 10 1 40-58 (1992); DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND
SOCIAL AFFAIRS, UNITED NATIONS MODEL DOUBLE TAXATION CONVENTION BETWEEN
DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES ART. 10 (1980).

154. Since it is not assumed in any of these models that the shareholder is leveraged, this
last qualification is not important. The constant 15% rate may, however, be higher or lower
than the marginal or average rate payable by resident individuals.
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by requiring the corporation to withhold tax at a constant rate on the gross
amount of the dividend.' 55 One important feature of this treatment is that the
size of the rates imposed upon retained and distributed earnings for non-resident shareholders are usually inverted from those assumed to apply to resident
shareholders. 56 Retained earnings are taxed as capital gain on the disposition
of the shares, again at marginal rates applicable to non-residents, but without
the benefit of the treaty-imposed rate ceiling on distributions.'57
In the context of corporate tax evasion, the consequences of a classical
system for non-resident shareholders are the same as the result for resident
shareholders-some of the tax unpaid at the corporate level can be recaptured
from the shareholder in higher (withholding) tax payments on dividends and
from increased capital gains tax payments.
Many governments have accepted that, even in an international context,
the same objections to the classical system which led to the variety of domestic interaction mechanisms remain. 51 8 Consequently, some form of interaction
mechanism for non-resident shareholders is often provided, but rarely is it the
same mechanism adopted for resident shareholders. If the classical system is
to be abandoned, one solution to the interaction of corporate tax and personal
income tax in the international context is to exempt distributions of taxed
profits to non-resident shareholders from any further personal income tax.
This system is the international analogue to the domestic dividend-received
deduction and exemption systems since it operates at the shareholder level.
One layer of tax is collected at the corporate level.
An exemption system simply relieves distributions from any tax collected by assessment or by withholding tax but, while distributions may be
exempt from further tax, retentions might still be taxed at capital gain rates
applicable to non-resident owners without credit for prior corporate tax. For
corporate tax evasion, such an outcome would be similar to the domestic
dividend-received exemption system.
155. It may be asked why the corporation's managers do not evade the withholding tax on
distributed corporate profits paid to non-resident shareholders. The reason, like the reason
for not trying to mislead shareholders about the amount of corporate tax actually paid, is
because it is assumed detection would be too easy for the revenue authority.
156. This often means that the presumption that the classical system encourages the retention
of earnings-one of the common criticisms of the system-does not apply to non-resident
shareholders who often face higher rates on retained rather than distributed earnings. Although
these preferences, even for resident shareholders, may be harder to discern than is often
alleged since all shareholders suffer differing marginal rates. See James M. Poterba, Comment,
in DEBT, TAXES AND CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING 127 (John B. Shoven & Joel Waldfogel
eds., 1990).
157. This discussion assumes that capital gains tax is imposed upon the shareholder and
either that there is no exemption for portfolio interests or it is not triggered.
158. This view has, however been queried. For example, the van den Tempel report to the
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However, many countries are unwilling to permit distributions to nonresident shareholders to be entirely free of further tax at the shareholder level
as a matter of course. Australia, for example, uses an exemption system for
non-resident shareholders in lieu of the imputation system used for residents,
but one that is subject to several qualifications. Rather than impose personal
tax on distributions to non-resident shareholders and then attribute verified
payments of corporate tax, or simply exempt distributions from further tax in
the hands of the shareholder, the Australian solution has been to exempt distributions of dividends only to the extent that they arise from taxed corporate
profits. 5 9 In a way similar to the tracing of tax payments undertaken in the
imputation, the exemption system also traces payments out of taxed corporate
profits and provides an exemption only for these distributions. As under a
classical system, distributions which are not from taxed profits are subject to
further tax.
If the non-resident shareholder had other tax liabilities in the country of
source, this treatment accords a less favorable result to the non-resident shareholder than giving credit for payments of corporate tax where the corporate
tax is levied at a higher rate than that applicable to distributions to non-resident shareholders. Where the profits out of which the distribution is made
have not been subject to corporate tax, a withholding tax is imposed, again
limited by treaty to a constant rate on the gross amount of distributions.
Hence, each distribution must now be divided into two parts-an exempt
portion and a remainder which is taxable at the treaty rate. Retentions are still
taxed at capital gain rates applicable to non-resident owners without credit for
prior corporate tax. 160 The outcome of such a qualification would be that some
of the benefits of even successful evasion could be recaptured using the withholding tax. In other words, successful corporate tax evasion reintroduces the
classical system for distributions. The result of this treatment is analogous to
that offered under the Australian imputation system: distributions from taxed
profits are exempt, but distributions from untaxed profits are taxed as they
would be under the classical system.
It has already been mentioned that integration systems are generally
regarded as impractical, except, somewhat paradoxically, in an international
context, and then only for non-resident companies controlled by resident

European Community concluded that the classical system provided the best reconciliation of
claims to tax in an international context. A. VAN DEN TEMPEL, CORPORATION TAX AND THE
(1970). See Corporate-Personal
Tax Integration, supra note 10, at 93-94; Cnossen, supra note 8, at 232-33; MUSGRAVE &
MUSGRAVE, supra note 62.
INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES

159. See, e.g., ITAA § 128B.
160. See Cnossen, supra note 8, at 94;
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shareholders. 1 6' Where an individual or small group of resident shareholders
control a non-resident corporation, many countries have now instituted systems which effectively attribute all of the corporation's income to its shareholders, whether or not it is distributed, giving them credit for certain taxes
paid by the corporation or the shareholders.
Many countries such as the United States, United Kingdom, Canada,
Germany, Japan and Australia now operate Controlled Foreign Corporation
(hereinafter "CFC") systems, 162 but because a CFC system is exceedingly
complex to administer, the application of these systems is usually limited by
a collection of cumulative criteria common to most of these countries: control of the foreign corporation must be contained within a small group of
domestic shareholders and shares in publicly-traded companies are often
excluded;' 63 the foreign corporation must be resident in or derive a substantial amount of its income from various tax haven countries or for some other
reason suffer a low effective rate of corporate tax; 1 64 the non-resident corporation must derive income from investment activities rather than from active
conduct of a business in the foreign country; 65 the nonresident corporation
must retain a substantial proportion of its profits; 66 the amount of corporate
profit derived by the corporation must exceed some de minimis figure; 167 and
so on.
Where the relevant conditions are met, the CFC system operates as an
overlay imposed by the country of residence on the tax system of the foreign
country. So far as corporate tax evasion is concerned, a CFC system approximates an integration system employed by the country of residence for its
resident shareholders who hold controlling interests in non-resident corporations. That is, all profits of the foreign company, regardless of whether the
profits are distributed, are attributed to the shareholders in the country of
residence and the attributed profits are taxed to the shareholders in the current
year at individual marginal rates.' 68 Successful evasion allows undeclared
161. ARNOLD, supra note 138; Richard L. Kaplan, Perspectives on International Tax
Compliance and Enforcement: Transfer Pricing in the United States, 6 AUST. TAX F. 423
(1989). The rules governing CFCs are found in I.R.C. Subpart F; ITAA Part X.
162. See ARNOLD, supra note 138.
163. I.R.C. § 957 (1994); ITAA § 340; ARNOLD, supra note 138, at 414-24, 489.
164. I.R.C. § 954 (1994); ITAA § 320 and Schedule 10, Reg. 152J, Income Tax Regulations
(Aust.); ARNOLD, supra note 138, at 427-44.
165. I.R.C. § 951 (1994) (which adopts a tainted income approach but contains no automatic
exemption if the foreign subsidiary is engaged in active business); ITAA §§ 317, 432; ARNOLD,
supra note 138, at 444-69.
166. I.R.C. § 951 (1994); ARNOLD, supra note 138, at 484-91.
167. I.R.C. § 954 (1994); ARNOLD, supra note 138, at 489-91.
168. Other aspects of the CFC system are, however, usually dependent upon the structures
of the taxation system of the country of residence. For example, if the country of residence
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retained profits to be taxed as capital gains, but success in this case generally
requires that the evasion escapes detection by the revenue authority of both
the country of source and the country of residence. The domestic integration
system provides an analogue.
2. Tax System of Country of Residence
The return to the shareholder will ultimately be determined by both the
country of source's rules for taxing non-residents and by any final layer of tax
collected in the country of residence of the shareholder on his or her foreign
source income. This section describes the ways in which the tax system of the
shareholder's country of residence may be expected to operate on the income
from the shareholder's investment abroad.
Specifically, the operation of any exemption or credit system for shareholders to recognize tax already paid to the country of source either by the
169
shareholder directly, or by the corporation on its income, will be important.
It is not universally the case in taxing international transactions that a country will give credit to its citizens for taxes paid to the revenue authority of
another country. 70 But where some form of recognition is given, it is necessary to see whether the credit or exemption treatment depends upon proof of
actual payment of tax or assumes payment of the tax.
The tax system in the shareholder's country of residence may grant an
exemption from further tax on distributions of income already taxed in the
country of source. An exemption might be granted where the resident shareholder satisfies the revenue authority in the country of residence that the
shareholder has paid tax on the amount of the distribution, paid capital gains
tax on profits made from the sale of the investment (in this case representing
retained earnings), or that tax on the corporation's underlying profit has been
paid by the corporation to the country of source. An exemption system may
be employed without procedures for estimating and tracing the amount of tax
paid to the foreign jurisdiction-once it is established that the shareholder
otherwise operates a classical system domestically, it is unlikely to have an indirect foreign
tax credit system for resident individual shareholders and only corporate shareholders will be
given a credit for underlying corporate tax paid by the CFC. But if the domestic regime
employs an imputation system, some credit for underlying corporate tax on distributed profits
may be offered. In many jurisdictions, while the purpose of a CFC system is to require the
shareholder to include all of the corporation's profits in the current income of the shareholder,
this can be achieved by attributing only the retained profits of the CFC. ARNOLD, supra note
138, at 470-71. Currently distributed profits need not be attributed because they are included

in the shareholder's assessable income without the need for the attribution process.

169. ELISABETH A. OWENS, THE FOREIGN TAX CREDIT (1961); ELISABETH A. OWENS &
GERALD T. BALL, THE INDIRECT CREDIT (1975).
170. Treaties'will usually require credit to be given for tax paid by a taxpayer to the revenue
authority of the other country where the power to tax is allocated to that country.
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paid tax (of some amount) on the dividend or sale of the shares, that may be
sufficient to render the entire distribution or capital gain exempt in the country
of residence. Without this type of verification system, an exemption system
for shareholders becomes the same as an exemption, full dividend-received
deduction, or automatic imputation system where corporate tax evasion is not
detected.
More common than exemption systems, however, are foreign tax credit
systems (hereinafter "FTCS") operated by the country of residence for its
citizens who derive income abroad. Credit systems usually operate for distributed corporate profits and occasionally for retained profits. The direct
FTCS is necessary where the country of residence retains the further tax on
distributions or retentions of already taxed corporate profit to give to resident
taxpayers a credit against this tax liability for tax paid to the country of source.
A direct credit permits the shareholder to claim, for example, credit for withholding tax on dividends paid by the corporation to the country in which the
corporation is resident. The indirect FTCS is also relevant. This system gives
to the resident shareholder a further credit against the tax liability on dividends in the country of residence for some of the corporate tax paid by the
company making the distribution to the country of source. Where the indirect
FTCS system operates, it permits the shareholder to reduce the tax payable on
dividends to the country of residence by both the tax paid by the shareholder
on the distribution and by a portion of the tax paid by the corporation to the
country of source. This additional credit is usually available only against the
tax payable in the country of residence on distributions. No credit is available
for the underlying corporate tax paid on retained earnings. Access to the
indirect FTCS is also usually subject to substantial qualification. 71
Either FTCS usually operates against verified payments of tax by the
taxpayer on dividends and the corporation on its income, although in the case
of withholding tax, verification is probably not a matter of concern since
withholding taxes are usually imposed at flat rates on gross amounts and are
not easily subject to dissemblance.
The direct credit system operates in the same way as the imputation
systems described above: the shareholder includes in income the net dividend
received increased by the amount of tax withheld in the country of source; the
domestic tax on this gross amount is calculated; and the shareholder is obliged
171. It is common, for example, for the country of residence to offer credit, especially for
indirect taxes, only to shareholders with a substantial interest in the foreign corporation,
excluding shareholders with portfolio interests. Most countries also limit the indirect credit
only to corporate shareholders. ITAA § 160AFC; I.R.C. § 902 (1994). Such a restriction is
understandable in a jurisdiction which retains a classical system, where interaction mechanisms
are usually limited to inter-corporate distributions. It makes much less sense in the system of
a country like Australia which operates an imputation system domestically.
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to pay the balance, if any, of the domestic tax after subtracting the amount of
tax already withheld and paid to the foreign revenue authority.172 This process ensures that distributed corporate profits are subject to tax at the higher
of the foreign corporate rate or the domestic shareholder rate. But unlike
domestic imputation systems, a direct FTCS can also provide credit to the
shareholder for capital gains tax paid to the foreign revenue authority. Again,
the same process operates, by increasing the capital gain by the amount of
verified capital gains tax paid to the foreign country and by giving credit for
this amount. This has the effect of taxing retained earnings at the higher of
the two rates. 73 But unless an indirect FTCS also operates in the country of
residence, the direct credit operates as an overlay on a classical system imposed by the country of source on the corporation and its non-resident shareholders.
The combination of the interaction mechanism for non-resident shareholders used by the country of source with the tax system of the country of
residence of the income derived by its residents offshore admits a wide variety of possibilities. For example, the country of source may use a classical
system (albeit with a low formal rate on distributions) and the country of
residence might employ a foreign tax credit system; or the country of source
may employ an exemption system and the country of residence might also use
an exemption system of its own. Further, different systems may be employed
for different kinds of income from corporations. For example, distributions
may be exempt from tax in one country and taxed in the other, while retentions
of taxed corporate income may be subject to capital gains tax in one country
which gives rise to a credit in the other. As was mentioned at various points,
most of these combinations can be viewed as replicated by various domestic
solutions, albeit in combination and in more circuitous stages. One major
difference needs to be mentioned before leaving this brief description of the
international implications. Because two countries are involved, it makes little
sense for the revenue authority of the country of source to rely upon the personal income tax and interaction mechanism to recapture the benefits of corporate tax evasion if these shareholder taxes are imposed by the government
of another country.
172. If the foreign tax rate exceeds the domestic rate (or, in some systems, if the foreign
tax rate on this income type exceeds the domestic tax) the excess is usually lost. In general, a
FTCS will often provide that credit for foreign tax will only be available to reduce the domestic
tax on this income from this country. In other words, if the foreign tax rate exceeds the
domestic rate, the excess may not be used to reduce the domestic tax on other income from
domestic sources, although some systems permit the taxpayer to use the credit against the tax
on income of this kind if derived from a third country (so-called "baskets" approach).
173. Another common alternative is a foreign tax deduction system for foreign capital
gains tax-that is, the foreign tax is treated as a subtraction in calculating the proceeds of
sale of the investment for the purposes of the domestic capital gains tax. I.R.C. § 164(a)
(1994).
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V. IMPLICATIONS OF THE PERSONAL INCOME TAX SYSTEM
This section analyzes how the various interaction mechanisms between
the corporate tax and the personal income tax developed in Section IV might
be expected to affect the decision of the corporation's managers whether to
evade corporate tax. The emphasis here is on the effect of evasion on the
expected return to the corporation's shareholders either as dividends or capital
gains, since this is where the impact of the personal income tax is felt. It was
argued that if the effect of the interaction mechanism raised the expected tax
rate and reduced the expected return on the shareholder's investment, the
shareholder would prefer that the corporation's managers comply with the
corporate tax. Hence this analysis will focus on the actual and expected returns to shareholders. This section seeks answers to two questions. First, will
the interaction mechanism change the benefits and costs of evasion so that it
is more or less desirable? Second, what consequences will follow if the
corporation's managers change other aspects of their behaviour as a result of
the evasion decision? The discussion will proceed in three stages. It will first
analyze the expected returns to shareholders under each system for honesty
and evasion. Next, it will consider the further effects of the managers' decision to distribute some profits, the remaining elements of the interaction
mechanisms, and the effects of time. Finally, it will evaluate the potential
effects of consequential changes to the managers' behaviour.
A. Corporate Tax Evasion Under the Interaction Systems
1. After-tax Returns Under Each Interaction System
The average tax rates and average after-tax returns that would accrue
to a shareholder under each interaction system are set out in Table 1.174
Table 1 assumes a constant corporate rate and personal income tax rate of
35% (which is also the ACT rate), and a capital gains tax rate of 25%' 17 which
is also the rate on distributed profits in a split rate system. A fine of 75% of
the unpaid tax is imposed where evasion is detected, but no interest is charged
on unpaid tax, describing the result where the evasion and detection occur in
the same year. The after-tax return is shown for the distributed and retained
profits under each of three results: honest reporting by the corporation's managers of the corporation's tax liability (column (b)); successful evasion (column (c)); and unsuccessful evasion detected in the same year as the corporation makes its tax report (column (d)).
The Table shows the average after-tax return that would actually occur
174. Table 1 consolidates Tables Al - A6 in the Appendix to this paper.
175. An effective rate of 25% for taxing capital gains is equivalent to a nominal rate of
35% but with payment deferred for just over 3 years, where interest is 10% per annum
compounded annually.

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akrontaxjournal/vol12/iss1/1

64

Cooper: The Return to Corporate Tax Evasion

19961

THE RETURN TO CORPORATE TAX EVASION

under each interaction mechanism for the same amount of taxable profit,
whether distributed or retained. The comparison .ofthe position of the shareholder where the corporation evades is expressed as a percentage increase
(column (e)), or decrease in the case of failure (column (f)), compared to the
,position where the corporation reports honestly.176 Table 1 also shows the
expected return to a shareholder where the probability of detection by the
revenue authority is 50% (column (g)), as well as the probabilityof detection
that would be necessary to make the expected nominal return to the shareholder the same as the return to honesty (column (h)). 1 77 It is important to note
that the comparisons in Table 1 proceed from a constant amount of pre-tax
corporate profit, and not constant revenue or after-tax returns in the case of
management honesty. This has the effect that the after-tax returns are not
uniform, but the object of comparison is the deviation from the return to
honesty, whatever that may be for each system. Note that Table 1 does not
consider some of the assumptions that were made in deriving the equations in
Section IV. For example, it does not show the differences that will arise where
the corporation's managers report some fraction of the corporation's profits
rather than report or evade tax on all profits; it does not show the complication where profit may be either retained or distributed at the direction of the
corporation's managers in different proportions; 7 1 it does not show in the case
of unsuccessful evasion, the effect of a distribution of some profits by the
corporation prior to audit and detection by the revenue authority; and no attempt is made to incorporate the effects of transferring tax credits within some
of the imputation systems from taxed to untaxed corporate profits. The effect
of these complexities will be incorporated later.
Not surprisingly, the Table shows that in all systems the shareholder will
176. This procedure is used to eliminate the effect of the interaction mechanism on the
shareholder's tax rate, since each mechanism will change the return to honesty as well as the
returns after evasion. ,Comparing the percentage increase or decrease will isolate the way
that each interaction mechanism changes the shareholder's return in cases of evasion from
.the way that the mechanism changes all shareholders' after-tax returns. The same goal might
have been achieved by varying the nominal corporate tax rate to ensure equal after tax returns

to the shareholder under each mechanism in cases of honesty and then comparing the return

under evasion.
t 177. No attempt is made in this discussion to explore the consequence of the higher risk
attaching to the expected return where the corporation's managers evade at this stage. The
Table merely sets out the required rate of detection in order for the expected (but more risky)
return from evasion to be the same as the certain return from honesty. The following discussion
will use the term "nominal return" to refer to the return to shareholders unadjusted for the

increased risk. But it .is clear that the effect of corporate tax evasion to enhance the risk
attaching to the expected return may be the cause of a further diminution in the return to the

shareholders by a decline in the market value of the shares.
178; The combined tax rates (expressed as a percentage) are the average of the after-tax
returns on both distributed and retained earnings in each system for each hypothesis-honesty,

success, and failure.
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be better off if the corporation successfully evades its tax liability than if its
evasion is detected, which simply means in each system there is some threat
of a penalty for failure. Further, in each case successful evasion is more profitable than compliance. That is, there is a potential gain to be made from
successful evasion, the smallest of which arises in the case of the integration
system which most closely approximates the pure withholding tax described
in Section III.
What does the Table suggest about the incentives for corporate managers to evade corporate tax? It has been argued that the incentive for the
corporation's managers to deviate from honesty is a function of the effect of
dishonesty on the expected return to shareholders: the potential cost of unsuccessful evasion and the gain to be made from successful evasion, as well as
the likelihood of the occurrence of each. It is clear from inspection that,
holding the other elements constant, the size of the gains and losses to successful and unsuccessful evasion will differ under each interaction mechanism.
Hence, assuming a uniform probability of detection for all systems, the expected returns will not be uniformly distributed around the return to honesty
in all systems. If they were, there might be little further to be said about the
complication represented by the personal income tax. This is because the
incentive for corporate tax evasion would be a function determined primarily
by other factors, and would not be seriously influenced by the personal income tax nor the interaction mechanism with the corporate tax. If the returns
and costs to evasion were uniformly distributed around the return to honesty,
the principal effect of corporate tax evasion would be to increase the risk
attached to the expected return, while leaving the size of the expected return
untouched. Nevertheless, despite the deviation in costs and benefits after the
effect of the personal income tax is introduced, it is striking that only two of
the systems show any marked diminution in the return to honesty.
ClassicalSystem. The managers of a corporation in the classical system
know that if they report the corporation's full income and distribute 50% of
after-tax profits, the return to shareholders will be 45.5%. Successful evasion
will increase the expected after-tax return to the individual shareholder on
retained and distributed earnings by about 54% when compared to honest
reporting, while unsuccessful evasion will reduce the expected return to the
shareholder by only 40% of the certain return to honesty. If the managers
thought that evasion and detection were equally likely, the expected return to
evasion would be about 48.5%, which is only 3 points higher than the certain
return to honesty. The implication for the revenue authority is that unless the
corporation"s managers perceive the probability of detection to be more than
57%, evasion will not reduce the nominal expected return to shareholders.
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Dividend-paid Deduction. The dividend-paid deduction system offers
an expected gain from evasion of only 23% and a loss of about 17% of the after-tax return to honesty. This is with a variance of about the same degree as
that of the classical system, so that a probability of detection of about 57% is
necessary before the evasion offers the same expected return as honesty.
Again, the rates on evaded income combine to an average rate (58%) only
slightly lower than the certain rate paid on declared income (56.8%).
Dividend-receivedDeduction. The full dividend-received deduction
system maintains the same degree of variance, which again necessitates a
detection rate of about 57% before the revenue authority will replicate the
same return as honesty. Evasion offers a potential increase of about 4 points
(60.7%) over the return to honesty (56.8%). The return to evasion under a
partial dividend-received deduction system is obviously determined by the
amount of deduction offered. Thus, the principal insight observed from Table
6 is that the effect of a constant deduction (such as the $20 modelled) is to
effect a constant shift of the returns to honesty, success and failure by an
amount which is the product of the tax rate and the amount of the deduction.
It can be seen from Table 6 that the returns are simply shifted by 3.5, which
is the product of the amount of the deduction (20) and the personal income tax
rate (0.35). The same degree of variance of the returns is displayed.
Imputation Systems. The effect of the imputation systems differ noticeably. As a general observation, the Australian imputation system changes the
incentive to evade, while the ACT changes the opportunity to evade. The
ACT and Australian imputation systems offer a much smaller reward to evasion even if successful than does the classical system because in both cases the
loss of the tax credit increases the cost of successful evasion. In the ACT
system, evasion offers a reward to the corporation only for the tax liability on
retained profits; while in the Australian tax system, the tax unpaid will be
collected from the shareholder. In other words, in each case, the tax credit is
a valuable asset (either to the corporation or the shareholder) which arises
only when the corporation reports a tax liability. But the cost structures of the
ACT and Australian systems are different. If it is assumed that the corporation cannot evade the ACT liability, the ACT system admits of evasion only
on retentions. Thus, failed evasion represents a cost which decreases the
return by only 15% when compared to honesty, while successful evasion
offers a gain of 23%. Assuming a 50% chance of detection, the ACT system
offers only an increase of 2 points over the return to honesty. The ACT system does not reduce the rate of detection required of the revenue authority
from the 57% established under the other systems.
The Australian system offers a much greater cost to failed evasion (a loss
of 52%), while maintaining the same return to successful evasion (about 23%)
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asACT. Thus, at a 50% probability of detection, evasion no longer offers a
positive return. The first major variance in the detection rate required of the
revenue authority also appears here-a probability of detection of only about
31% is necessary before the evasion offers the same return as honesty. In
other words, this system gives the revenue authority the ability to reduce the
probability of detection without substantial diminution in the deterrent effect
of penalties for evasion when compared to the ACT and other systems.
Integration. Not surprisingly, the- integration system offers the most
assistance to the revenue authority, given the assumption that the shareholders will report truthfully. Because the integration system operates as an accurate withholding where shareholders are honest, and all (and only verified)
payments of corporate tax can be credited, corporate tax evasion offers an
increase in the return that the corporation's managers can offer, limited to the
difference between the personal income tax and capital gains tax rates. Since
successful evasion offers only this gain even where the shareholder is honest,
and the cost to evasion is substantial, reducing the return by 61%, corporate
tax evasion offers only the prospect of a small gain. The revenue authority
would need only to threaten a 12% chance. of detection.
All of these results are summarized in Table I below:
TABLE 1

AFTER-TAX RETURNS UNDER INTERACTION MECHANISMS
WITH CONSTANT PRE-TAX PROFITS
(a)
System

(b)
Honesty

*

(c)
Evasion

(d)
Failure

(e)
(f)
Increase Decrease
from
from
Success
Failure
(%)
.(%)

(g)
(h)
Increase Probability
in
of detection
Expected
. for
Return Indifference
(points)
(%)
3.8
57

Classical

45.5

70

27.1

54

(40)

Dividend
-Paid

56.8

70

47

23

(17)

1.7

57

Dividend
-Received

56.8

87.5

33.9

54

(41)

3.8

57

ACT
System

.56.8

-70

47

23

(17)

1.7

57

Australian
Imputation

56.8

70

27

23

(52)

(8.3)

31

Integration

65

75

25

7

(61)

(20)
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2. Expected Returns to Shareholders and Expected Gains From
Evasion
The previous section expresses the differing returns to a uniform investment by the corporation's managers allocated totally to honesty., evasion, or
failure, with detection occurring in the same year if at all.. But the equations
deriyed in Section IV also include other relevant effects: the behavior of the
corporation's managers distributing a portion of both declared and undeclared
profits; distributing some portion of profit before. audit; the prospect that the
audit of the corporation's affairs -may.occur. after a period of time has passed,..
subjecting the corporation to interest charges and changing the probability of
success; and the potential "leakage" in imputation systems of tax credits from
.
.
.
. ,
taxed to untaxed profits.
The purpose of this section is to-explore the effects of these complica-.
tions and to see how they alter the after-tax return to the shareholder under.
each interaction mechanism. The directions in which these complicating
effects could be anticipated moving the expected return will often conflict and
cannot easily be predicted ex ante. For example, distributing. untaxed profits will increase the total amount of tax collected if the corporation's evasion
is later detected, but, may reduce total tax (by reducing shareholder tax in
systems which favor distribution of profits) if evasion is successful. Similarly, shifting the balance from full retention or distribution of profits may
either increase or reduce the total amount of tax collected according to the size
of the relative tax burden borne by distributed or retained profits. Also, the
effective reduction in the cost of failed evasion offered by the capital gains tax
will offset the increased tax cost initially caused by the personal income tax.
Where these effects contradict, the direction .in which they move the expected
return will depend upon the strength of the competing influences, which will
differ at various times and for the different interaction mechanisms. It will be
seen that at some points the personal income tax is a clear penalty, while at
others i6perates as a. subsidy to evasion.
The analysis will. consider a hypothetical example using.the same corporate and personal tax rates, interest, and fine rates previously assumed. It
is assumed that the corporation has earned $100,000 in taxable profits, the
corporation's managers are considering not reporting $20,000 of that sum, and
that they will distribute 50% of the profits remaining after payment of corporatetax in the current year-that.is, before any unpaidtax, fine or interest is
collected from the company. The distribution is assumed to occur prior to the
audit of the corporation. Interest and fines accumulate commencing in the
first'year at a rate of 15%, per annumcormpounded annually. The corporation's
discount rate,'which is assumed to be 10%, is used because the fine and back
tax may not have-to be paid by the corporation until a future period. It is
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assumed that the strategy of the revenue authority leads the corporation's
managers to believe that there is a 10% probability in each year that their
evasion will be detected. For those interaction mechanisms where it is relevant, the leakage of tax credits from taxed to untaxed profits occurs in the
ways described in Section IV.
Figures 1 to 6179 show the size of the expected return to the shareholder
from a profit of $100,000 (of which $20,000 is not disclosed) and compare the
size of the expected return to the certain return from honest reporting for each
of the six interaction mechanisms described above.' 80 The comparison shows
that in all cases honesty has a lower actual return in the short term than the
expected return to evasion which persists in the long term for most mechanisms, but honesty promises a higher return if the corporation's evasion might
still be detected after several years. The effect of the passage of time is eventually to reduce the expected return to evasion to a level below the certain
return from honesty (the point at which the expected gain from evasion for
shareholders becomes negative) but the length of time before the expected
return falls below the return to honest reporting depends upon the interaction
mechanism.
The Figures show a further element-a comparison of the size of the
expected gain from evasion when the corporate tax alone is considered and
when the effect of the personal income tax is added. This comparison, which
appears in the Tables under the headings "Expected Gain/Loss to Shareholder" and "Expected Gain/Loss to Corporation", attempts to draw out implications about how the personal income tax will influence the behavior of
the corporation's managers by focussing on changes to marginal gains and
losses.' The "Expected Return" to the shareholder is the amount which the
shareholder can expect to receive should the corporation's managers decide
179. These Figures consolidate the positions described in Tables A7 to A12 in the Appendix.
180. The expected return is based on a probability function which is the same as that
discussed in Section II for the corporation considered alone. That is, the corporation only
succeeds if its evasion is detected in none of the ensuing [t] years. The probability of success
is, therefore, (1-p) t and the likelihood of failure is:

n=t
p1

(l-p)

n- I

n=
The expected return to evasion under a classical system, therefore, is calculated using this
probability function and equation (2) (successful evasion in a classical system) and equation

(3)(unsuccessful evasion in a classical system) from Section IV.

181. In most cases, since the adjustment caused by the interaction mechanism occurs at the
shareholder level, the expected gain or loss from evasion will be the same when calculated at
the corporate level, if managers ignore the personal income tax. The two exceptions are the

split rate and dividend-paid deduction systems where the adjustment procedure occurs at the

corporate level.
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to evade the corporate tax discounted according to the probability of each
outcome. The "Expected Gain/Loss" is the marginal increase or decrease in
the expected return when compared to the certain return to honesty calculated
for the shareholder using the equations in Section IV and, for the corporation,
using the equation in Section II.
Comparing the expected gain to the corporation in isolation from its
shareholders, with the expected gain to the shareholder when the effect of the
personal income tax is added, shows several interesting features and suggests
that the effect of the personal income tax on the expected return and the behavior of corporate managers may be quite complex. The differences appear
in the size of the expected gains from evasion and the time period over which
evasion is profitable. First, as discussed above, it is apparent that the expected
gain to the shareholder is initially reduced when the personal income tax is
added, suggesting that the personal income tax will discourage corporate tax
evasion. In other words, a decision about the investment in corporate tax
evasion based solely on the elements in the model in Section II would, in the
short term at least, overstate the expected gains from evasion. However, in
some of the cases modelled, the personal income tax also has a subsidy effect.
While the capital gains tax reduces the size of the loss caused by failed evasion, both it, and the penalties for failure are not uniform, suggesting that the
personal income tax is not a consistent disincentive to evasion. In other
words, depending on the interaction mechanism, the operation of the personal
income tax can both increase and diminish the size of the expected gain to
shareholders, and it can have different results at different points in time.
The personal income tax may also produce a timing effect which, in
general, diminishes the duration of the period during which corporate tax
evasion promises a positive expected gain to the shareholder. Thus, if the
corporation's managers had performed an assessment of the return to corporate tax evasion (using the values for the variables), but without considering
the effect of the personal income tax, they would have observed that corporate tax evasion only offered negative returns after more than seven years.
But, if the effect of many of the modelled interaction mechanisms is added,
the corporation's managers would face a positive expected gain from corporate tax evasion only after five, or perhaps six years have expired. In some of
these simulations, however, the subsidy effect of the personal income tax
overtakes the decrease in expected return caused by the tax, so that, paradoxically, the effect of the personal income tax is actually to enhance the expected
return (or reduce the size of the expected loss) from corporate tax evasion in
the medium and long term.
The full dividend-received deduction system most clearly displays the
subsidy effects of the personal income tax. This comes about because of the
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complete elimination of tax on distributed undeclared profits in thissystem.
Under this system, the shareholder will commence with a higher expected
return than under a classical system because there is no shareholder tax. Thus,
the personal income tax causes no initial -reduction of the expected gain.
When combined with the slower decrease in the expected gain caused by the
personal income tax, the expected gain from evasion becomes higher with the
personal income tax than without it, and the corporation's managers would
under-estimate the size of the increased expe.ctedreturn to shareholders if they
failed to include the effect of the personal income tax. The differences between the expected gains are not large at these rates and on these amounts, but
the system would show greater returns. to evasion, and greater longevity for,
success, if there were more disparity between the corporate tax and personal
income tax rates.
Neither of the two imputation systems-the ACT and Australian imputation systems-seriously enhances the effect of the personal income tax to
deter evasion that was already observed for the classical system. They both
display lower returns from the outset when the operation of the personal income tax is added and-a reduced period during which the expected gain is
positive. interestingly, however, they do-display at these values a slight subsidy effect from the personal income tax after an extended period.. That is,
corporate tax evasion offers a larger return with the personal income tax than
without it, provided that evasion may extend for a sufficiently long period.
This effect is presumably due to the "leakage" of tax credits from retained
declared earnings. These reduce the tax on shareholder's distributed undeclared profits so that they are effectively untaxed at the shareholder level.
The effects of the personal income tax are different in at least three different time periods. In the short term, the operation of the personal income
tax will diminish the return to shareholders, suggesting that the personal income tax will discourage corporate tax evasion. In the medium term, the
effect of the personal income tax is to enhance the expected return that the
corporation's managers can offer to shareholders. The personal income tax"
also prolongs the period during which corporate tax evasion shows a positive
return, suggesting that-it may encourage rather than discourage corporate tax
evasion, especially if the period during which the revenue authority may be
expected to pursue the corporation is relatively short. But in the long term,
the personal income tax cannot prevent evasion from turning negative.
While, using these values, the outcome of the ACT and Australian imputation systems are identical, there would be differences in the outcome if
the tax rates differed. The difference in outcome would come about from the
allocation of the tax credit to different participants. In the ACT system, the
tax collected on distributions is set off against the corporation's tax liability
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to the effect .that distributed declared profits will be taxed at the higher of the
corporate tax rate [Tc] or the ACT rate [Ta]. However, in the Australian imputation system, the tax credit is allocated to the shareholder so that declared
distributed corporate profits are taxed at the higher of the corporate tax rate
and the personal income tax rate [Ti].
The effect of the dividend-paid deduction system resembles those of the
ACT and Australian imputation systems, with the personal income tax reducing the potentiai cost of corporate tax evasion. However, under this system
the effects are smaller and not as obvious as with systems just discussed. The
effect of the personal income tax is preceded by the reduced benefit available
to the corporation for evading corporate tax on distributed profits. Thus, the
corporate tax on distributed profits is lower (zero in the case of the dividendpaid deduction system) than on retained profits. The size of the expected gain
from evasion is initially lower under this system than under the classical
system, and this is so for both the corporation and the shareholder. With regard to timing, the subsidy effect takes longer to appear in dividend-paid deduction systems than under the imputation systems, and more closely resembles the profile of the classical system.
The only major deviation from the pattern is the integration system. The
reason for this departure is that under an integration system, all reported income, whether distributed or not, is taxed to the corporation and then to the
shareholders as ordinary income with credit for all corporate tax voluntarily
paid. When corporate evasion is successful, the unreported income is not
subject to corporate tax and, in the hands of the shareholder, is subjected only
to capital gains tax which is levied at a lesser rate than the personal income
tax on distributions. In other words, the benefit derived from corporate tax
evasion under an integration system is simply that of being taxed on undeclared income under the capital gains tax, and not the income tax. The penalties, however, are the same as under the classical system for the corporation,
and this effectively translates into an enhanced penalty for the shareholder.
Over the period shown, the expected gain from corporate tax evasion
commences substantially lower when the effect of the personal income tax is
added. When the position of the corporation is considered in isolation, corporate tax evasion offers the same expected returns as under the classical
system. But when the effect of the personal income tax is added, because the
gain from successful evasion is small compared to the cost, the expected gain
also becomes small and the corporation's managers would substantially overestimate the benefits of corporate tax evasion if they ignored the personal
income tax. The expected gain remains lower than if the corporate tax were
considered alone, although it is interesting to observe that the difference
between the two expected gains is diminishing, and the pattern established by
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the other systems would eventually re-appear. The timing effect is also unlike the usual pattern that has been seen where a reduction in cost gradually
emerges. In the integration system, the effect of the personal income tax is to
confirm and then extend the immediate negative expected gain from the position that would be estimated if the personal income tax were ignored.
In summary, the pattern of these results does not vary substantially except in the case of the integration system. In the short term, the operation of
the personal income tax will diminish the return to shareholders under all of
the interaction mechanisms, suggesting that the personal income tax will
discourage corporate tax evasion. This result, that the expected gain is initially less when the personal income tax is considered, occurs in all the interaction mechanisms except those that reduce the gross benefits of evasion by
reducing the amount of tax available to be avoided, and the imputation systems which reduce the total cost of distribution. In these cases, the
shareholder's potential losses are reduced as time proceeds from the operation of the personal income tax in the context of evasion. This effect may,
therefore, lead the corporation's managers not to be so discouraged by the
additional complication of the personal income tax, but only if they can afford
to take on a long-enduring gamble.
These results occur in all the systems except for the integration system.
In that system, the almost pure'withholding operation of the corporate tax
means that there is little gain to the shareholder even from successful evasion,
while the large cost from failure survives.
Figure 1 - Expected Return Under Classical System
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Figure 2 - Expected Return Under Dividend-Paid Deduction System
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Figure 3 - Expected Return Under Dividend-Received Deduction System
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Figure.4
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Figure 5 - Expected Return Under Australian Imputation System
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Figure 6 - Expected Return Under Integration System
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B. Effects of Changes to Management Behavior
The previous discussion considered the expected return to the shareholder from corporate tax evasion assuming certain behavior by the
corporation's managers. However, this discussion did not address how the
corporation's managers might then adjust other behavior to change the initial
consecuences of their evasion decision. For example, the corporation's
managers decide not Only whether to evade tax but also how much to evade,
and whether to retain or distribute declared and undeclared income and in
what proportions. This section asks whether, if the corporation's managers
do decide to evade, they can alleviate some of the problems that evasion might
cause (or enhance the potential benefits) by changing other behavior. If so,
the corporation's managers may be able to enhance (or restore) the desired
higher after-tax return by a combination of steps of which corporate tax evasion is one.
Before doing so, however, it is important to observe that there may be
significant constraints upon the ability of the corporation's managers to adjust other behavior to compensate for their evasion decision. For example, the
market may not permit the percentage of profits distributed to vary too markedly before the variance is seen as evidence of some underlying reduction in
the viability of the corporation. If it were viewed in this way, the price of the
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shares may fall, removing or reducing the desired benefits flowing from
higher expected returns to shareholders.
Even if some adjustments are possible, there may be other internal conflicts between shareholders created by their making. For example, taxable
domestic shareholders are assumed to prefer the retention of corporate profits to distribution, tax exempt shareholders are assumed to be indifferent,
while non-resident shareholders may prefer distribution to retention. These
preferences are assumed to follow from the rates at which distributions and
retentions are taxed. 8 2 A decision by managers to shift the balance between
the distribution and retention of profits will benefit some shareholders and
cause losses to others at least in respect of the value of the income stream that
the shares generate.
There may also be effective constraints upon the decision of how much
income to report. It is assumed for the purposes of this paper that the probability of detection is independent of the amount of income reported. Clearly,
however, that assumption simplifies reality. Revenue authorities develop
sophisticated profiles of individual taxpayers and industries so that marked
deviation from industry norms or the reports of prior years may increase the
probability of detection seriously. The description offered here might, nevertheless, be considered as a more accurate description of the probability of
detection within income bands where the probability of detection is more
likely to be uniform and random.
1. Distribution and Retention Rates
Figures 7 to 12 show the effect of distributing more or less of the
183
corporation's profit, which includes both declared and undeclared profits.
The effect of this decision is felt mostly at the shareholder level, changing the
balance between the personal income and capital gain taxes. But other effects
occur at the corporate level under the dividend deduction and ACT systems
reducing (or increasing) the amount of corporate tax to be evaded. Also, again
at the shareholder level, the level of tax credits will increase (or decrease)
where credits or exemptions are attached to distributions only.
It will be seen that no pattern clearly emerges describing the effects of
changes to the level of distributions. Under the classical and ACT systems,
182. In some cases, the nominal tax rates for non-resident shareholders will be higher for
retained than distributed earnings (although some countries choose to exempt portfolio
dividends and capital gains from tax entirely).
183. The distinction between declared and undeclared profits made for the purposes of
discussion may be somewhat misleading in this context. The behaviour being modelled is the
decision to distribute more of the corporation's profits after payment of corporate tax on
declared income. The level of return for honesty, successful and failed evasion are for the
50% distribution of after-tax profit described in the previous section, and are retained for
comparison.
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the effect of retaining more profits is to increase the expected return to shareholders. Conversely, under the dividend-paid, full dividend received, and
Australian imputation systems, a higher expected return will be generated by
increased distribution of profits. Under an integration system, there is no
change to the size of the expected return caused by distribution. It appears to
be possible, therefore, for the corporation's managers to manage the distribution pattern to alter the costs and benefits of evasion. However, whether this
mandates increased or reduced distribution depends upon the interaction
mechanism.
While most of these results would be expected from the different way
that each interaction mechanism treats distributed or retained profits, a comparison of the results in these Figures with the position described in Tables A l
to A6 in the Appendix suggests that some of these results differ from the
expected effect of the interaction mechanism. For example, Table A 1 shows
that under a classical system, the shareholder always receives a higher return
from the retention of profits and a lower return from the distribution of profits, while the dividend-received deduction system always promises shareholders a higher return for distributed profits and a lower return from retention.
Those positions are maintained when the effect of evasion is considered.
Figures 7 and 9 show that the preference for retention or distribution is
unaffected by the evasion decision. The incentive to distribute or retain as
determined by the interaction mechanism, is not challenged in the presence
1 84
of evasion.
In contrast, there are a number of interaction mechanisms which show
no clear result in Tables Al to A6, but nevertheless display trends in the following Figures. The results occur for the dividend-paid deduction, ACT, and
Australian imputation systems. For this group, an ambiguous preference for
distribution created by the interaction mechanism is enhanced in the presence
of evasion to the effect that higher distribution increases the expected return
to shareholders. The ambiguous preference comes from the potential benefit
from retaining undeclared profits-the profits will be taxed once only and at
the capital gains tax rate, the lowest of the three postulated rates.
Table A2 shows that the dividend-paid deduction system offers a higher
teturn to distributed profits except for the case of successful evasion. When
the expected return to evasion is assessed, Figure 8 shows that greater distri184. One slight qualification in this regard arises for the partial dividend received deduction

system. If too little of the corporation's profits are distributed, the honest shareholder (with a

small shareholding) will not have full benefit of the interaction mechanism if the distribution

received does not reach the maximum amount of the permitted deduction [$K]. This issue
does not arise, however, for the inter-corporate partial dividend received deduction actually
used in the U.S. since it is expressed as a percentage of the amount any dividend received.

I.R.C.. § 243 (1994).
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bution will always offer a higher expected return than greater retention. The
explanation for this result is that the effect of the exclusion of dividends from
the corporate tax ba'se means that distribution is an effective substitute for
evasion. The reason for the preference for retention of profits where the
corporate tax is evaded is that it permits the shareholder to pay the lower rate
of capital gains tax rather than income tax where evasion is successful. But,
using these values, if the corporation's managers increase their distribution,
this potential benefit is relatively small and is soon more than outweighed by
the corresponding decrease in the potential penalty. In short, increasing distribution increases the expected return to shareholders because it has the same
return as evasion but none of the cost.
The Australian imputation system (Table A5) shows higher returns for
distributed rather than retained profits because shareholders receive tax credits for corporate tax paid. But this result occurs only where the corporation
reports truthfully, so that lower.returns otherwise apply to distributions taxed
in the shareholders' hands at the higher personal income tax rate. If the
corporation's managers evade and increase their distribution rate, the expected return also increases. This result occurs because of defects in "franking", the tax tracing procedure discussed in Section IV. This process limits
the benefit of credits on corporate distributions to the gross amount of corporate tax paid, so that if the corporation's managers proposed to distribute an
amount greater than the amount on which tax had been paid, dividends beyond
that amount would be taxed as if the classical system applied, restoring the
bias toward retention of profits. In Figure 11, the issue does not arise because
the corporation has declared and paid tax on 80% of its profits, and is not
proposing to distribute more than 75% of after-tax profits. Unless the tax
tracing procedure can identify untaxed profits and quarantine tax credits from
undeclared distributed profits, higher distributions will enhance the-benefits
of evasion. The ACT system in Figure 10 also shows a higher expected return
arising from higher distribution. The effect of distributing untaxed corporate
profits is simply the leakage of the ACT payments incurred here to reduce the
MCT liability on declared but retained profits.
This discussion suggests that there is no single answer to the question of
whether changing the amount of corporate profit distributed will enhance the
expected return of the shareholder. In all of the systems (except the integration system), the corporation's managers can change the benefits of evasion
by greater or less distribution, and on some occasions, the decision for or
against increased distribution conforms with the preferences apparently established by the interaction mechanism.
In all of the cases, the apparent preferences are undoubtedly significantly
influenced by the particular values attached to the variables in these simula-
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tions. Different values may well lead to other results. No clear conclusion can
confidently be given beyond the proposition that careful management of the
level of distribution will permit the corporation's managers some flexibility
to enhance the benefits of evasion.
Figure 7 - Effect of Changed Distribution Rates in Classical System
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Figure 8 - Effect of Changed Distribution Rates in Dividend-Paid Deduction System
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Figure 9 - Effect of Changed Distribution Rates in Dividend-Received Deduction System
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Figure 10 - Effect of Changed Distribution Rates in ACT System
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Figure 11 - Effect of Changed Distribution Rates in Australian Imputation System
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Figure 12 - Effect of Changed Distribution Rates in Integration System
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2. Percentage Reported and Unreported
In contrast to the effect of increased retention of profits, a clear pattern
of the effect of greater evasion emerges from the description in Figures 13-18.
In all cases except the integration system, assuming a constant probability of
detection over the income range, lowering the amount of income reported
initially increases the expected return to shareholders. And even in the integration system, there is some benefit from reporting less income, but it is a
function of the difference between the income and capital gains tax rates at the
shareholder level. The result under the Australian imputation system and the
integration system requires some explanation because they contain a special
penalty for reporting lower levels of income. Not only is there an increase in
the formal penalty, but the available tax credits also decline as a result of
lower reporting, so that the "excess" tax credits from declared undistributed
profits may be insufficient to cover the shareholder's tax liability on undeclared but distributed profits.
But reporting lower levels of income also increases the cost of failure in
all the interaction mechanisms. This is apparent in all of the systems where
the expected return more rapidly declines the lower the amount of income
reported, and the more time passes.
Given that reporting lower levels of income changes both the benefits
and costs of corporate tax evasion, it is not inevitable that corporate managers would reduce the levels of reporting to increase the expected return to
shareholders. Such a strategy would also increase risk over the long term.
Figure 13 - Effect of Changed Declared Income in Classical System
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Figure 14 - Effect of Changed Declared Income in Dividend-Paid Deduction System
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Figure 15 - Effect of Changed Declared Income in Dividend-Received Deduction System
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Figure 16 - Effect of Changed Declared Income in ACT System
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Figure 17 - Effect of Changed Income in Australian Imputation System
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Figure 18 - Effect of Changed Income in Integration System
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VI. CONCLUSIONS: CORPORATE TAX EVASION AND EFFECTIVE
INTERACTION MECHANISMS

The descriptions of the interaction mechanisms in Section IV and the
analysis of their effects in Section V have shown how the actual and expected
returns to shareholders are affected by evasion of the corporate tax and the
operation of the personal income tax. In most cases, the interaction mechanism changed the classical system only for the treatment of distributions. In
the case of the integration system, however, it also changed the treatment of
retained corporate earnings. In many cases, the personal income tax reduces
both the expected costs and benefits of evasion, although this result is not
uniform and can be varied by other action within the control of the
corporation's managers. In some senses, it should be easier for the revenue
authority to detect evasion of the corporate income tax than evasion of the
personal income tax. There are several reasons for this supposition. First,
corporate income is subject to additional reporting and scrutiny not applied
to individual income. For example, corporations are usually required to report annually to corporate regulators, stock exchanges, and shareholders.
Further, the central dilemma of corporate tax evasion, the obscure incentives
for managers to risk personal liability, suggest that corporate tax evasion may
be less apparent in the conduct of large corporations. In such corporations,
the separation of the benefits and costs of evasion are most pronounced, un-

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1996

87

Akron Tax Journal, Vol. 12 [1996], Art. 1

AKRON TAX JOURNAL

[Vol. 12

less particular mechanisms are evident, such as remuneration of managers by
share option, which have the effect of aligning the interests of managers with
those of shareholders. Finally, there are structural reasons-while it may be
difficult to follow the corporation's trading activities closely, it is much easier
to observe returns to shareholders leaving the corporation especially as dividends but even as retained earnings. And, even prior to observing returns to
shareholders, the revenue authority can rely upon the incentive for corporate
managers to report the highest profits to shareholders in ways to which the
revenue authority has some access.
The present strategies of revenue authorities to control evasion are three.
First, they have lessened the opportunity for evasion by intercepting incomea strategy which is not really feasible for many kinds of corporate trading
income. Second, they have acquired more information by requiring independent reports from both parties to the transaction. Third, they have attempted
to eliminate the benefits of evasion by changing returns to evasion.
The third strategy of eliminating potential gains will involve various
combinations of sub-strategies, most usually changing the expectation of
detection and increasing the size of interest and fines. A further possibility,
which this paper has focused on, is to institutionalize the lack of a real benefit to evasion, even successful evasion, through the corporate and personal
income tax interaction mechanism.
The attractiveness of the third option stems in part from the difficulties
with implementing the others. Information production, collection, reporting,
and analysis are obviously costly. Further, there are practical limitations to
the severity of the punishment that can be imposed for evasion. Even if there
were not solvency limitations to the severity of the penalties that could be
imposed for evasion, the prospect of severe punishment will generate costs
even for honest taxpayers trying to avoid an erroneous accusation of evasion.
In theory at least, reliance on the effects of the interaction mechanism also has
the potential of operating as a self-implementing procedure where it is not
actually necessary to be able to identify the untaxed profits in order to be able
to tax them. But the lesson drawn from the previous sections is that it is
possible to use the personal income tax to influence managers' incentives
away from corporate tax evasion by changing its potential costs and benefits.
However, this method is not straightforward, and its :success will depend significantly on the means adopted.
A. Effective InteractionMechanismsfor CorporateDistributions
By carefully designing the interaction between the corporate and personal income tax, the mechanism may be able to eliminate any gain from
evasion without necessarily identifying it. Ideally, under a well constructed
interaction mechanism, evasion of the corporate tax would not be a significant
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problem where the shareholder is honest because the unpaid corporate tax
would be collected from the shareholder. Corporate tax evasion would simply represent a failure to withhold, and carry with it only the benefit of deferral. Of course, the difficulties of implementing this ideal are legion, and this
explains why none of the systems described in Section IV are able to achieve
this goal.
From the perspective of both equity and efficiency, if the corporate tax
is retained, the ideal interaction mechanism would approach a pure withholding tax system, collecting tax on income derived through corporations ultimately at the shareholder's marginal rate in the current year with no distortion to the rates of tax and return caused through retention or distribution
decisions.' 85 The corporate tax and the personal income tax would simply
afford two occasions to collect the same total amount of tax from shareholders, either at the corporate or shareholder level. While the interaction mechanisms described in Section IV approach this ideal with varying degrees of
success, it is clear that, in so far as one goal of the interaction mechanism is
eliminating the benefits of corporate noncompliance, there are reasons for
preferring some mechanisms to others and for remedying some of the defects
highlighted in the previous discussion.
One consequence of interaction mechanisms, such as the dividend-paid
deduction system, is the effective abandonment of any serious attempt to
collect the desired amount of tax at the corporation level on distributed profits.
Where the likelihood of shareholder evasion of tax on distributions is small,
interaction mechanisms operating at the corporate level might in practice
prove just as effective as those operating at the shareholder level. But if shareholder evasion is a serious problem, they may be inappropriate solutions.
If the interaction mechanism is to operate at the shareholder level as a
dividend relief mechanism, such as the Oividend-received deduction systems,
it is preferable that the mechanism notbe automatic 186
The analysis in Section V showed that the dividend-received deduction
system promises the highest reward to corporate tax evasion, since, successful evasion completely eliminates any tax being collected on corporate income, even assuming honest reporting by the shareholders.
If an automatic adjustment mechanism is not to be used, some type of
185. There is, however, an emerging opinion that unless interaction mechanisms can create
the ideal of the integration system, they are not be desirable. In other words, any of the
second best solutions are really detractions rather than improvements. See Corporate-Personal
Tax Integration, supra note 10, at 242; Prest, supra note 13, at 212; Alworth, supra note 15.

Cnossen refers to these systems as "third best" solutions. Cnossen, supra note 8, at 97.
186. As some commentators have put it, " there is little to be said ...

for giving credits

even for taxes not paid as Canada does." Head & Bird, supra note 13, at 15 n.21.
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imputation system which either forces payment of corporate tax (such as the
ACT system) or tracks actual payment of corporate tax (such as the Australian imputation system) seems to be preferable. Each of these systems has its
own drawbacks, however. For the ACT system, one problem is the manner
in which it can force payments of excess corporate tax where the corporation
is in tax loss. There is also the "leakage" of ACT payments incurred on distributing untaxed profits to reduce the mainstream corporate tax liability on
declared retained profits. For the Australian imputation system, the tax tracing procedures do not effectively prevent a similar "leakage" of tax credits,
this time from declared retained profits to distributed undeclared profits.
Partial solutions to these problems are possible. The ACT system permits transfers of excess ACT credits within corporate groups and carrying
credits forward to future periods, albeit with a consequent reduction in their
value. The problem for the tax tracing procedure of the ACT and Australian
imputation systems is more difficult to resolve although it is also a smaller
problem than it may appear. Each mechanism does ensure that the corporation can make tax-free distributions only up to the amount on which the
corporation has paid tax. In other words, under the Australian system, the
corporation has paid tax on the declared but undistributed profits used to provide credits for undeclared profits. If corporate managers wish to have sufficient credits to permit distributions of undeclared profits to have credits
attached to them, it is still necessary to declare, pay tax on, and retain at least
that amount of profits. Under the ACT system, the corporation has paid ACT
on the undeclared distributed profits which is used to provide credits against
the tax on declared retained profits, and if the corporation's managers wish to
use these credits, it is still necessary to declare and retain an amount of profit.
A more complete solution, one that quarantined tax credits to declared profits only, would require several additional ordering rules to track not only corporate tax payments, but also taxed corporate income.'8 7
B. Dealing With Retained CorporateEarnings
One major deficiency in the use of interaction mechanisms on distributions to solve the problem of corporate tax evasion is that none can solve the
problem of deferral. If the corporation's managers successfully evade the
corporate tax, none of these systems will automatically collect tax on undeclared retained earnings, even assuming shareholder honesty. Instead, collection is deferred until sale of the shareholder's interest in the corporation, and
even then only at capital gains tax rates.
While the problem of deferral (whether or not accompanied by evasion)
would ideally be solved by attributing and taxing profits in the current period,
187. Cnossen, supra note 8, at 94.
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the perceived problems with the attribution process have prevented serious
attempts to implement it. 8 Moreover, it is doubtful whether the systems
which attempt to achieve this result-the integration system in a domestic
context and the CFC systems internationally-could ever provide an automatic solution to the particular problem of evasion. These systems attribute
to shareholders only reported retained income and lack the added check on
managers' behavior, as well as a taxing point of a visible flow of funds from
the corporation to the shareholder. Undeclared retained earnings are explained as non-taxable earnings and, unless the corporation's evasion is actually detected, corporate managers can represent to both the revenue authority and shareholders that the higher profits reported to shareholders are not
taxable to them and thus need not be reported as the taxable income of either
the corporation or the shareholders. If these systems are to be able to effect
current taxation of all corporate income, governments would be required not
only to insist on the attribution of corporate profits, but also to meet the challenge of removing corporate tax preferences and the other sources of nontaxable earnings.
Solutions such as increased tax rates on retained earnings would not
address the central issue if the base for the increased tax were, as inevitably
it would be, retained but reported profits. The tax surcharge on retentions
would simply create a split rate system and not solve the problem of the increased return to evasion of the tax on retentions.18 9
Neither would the problem of deferral of tax on undeclared retained
earnings be solved through a second best device such as an interest charge on
retentions collected on disposal of the shares. 90 The interest solution does
have some realism to it in this context since deferral is effectively equal to an
interest free loan of the corporate tax. But exactly the same difficulty arises
imposing an interest surcharge to represent unpaid personal tax on retained
corporate earnings that arises with increased tax rates on retained earnings.
That problem is to define the principal on which interest is to be paid, and the
period for which interest is payable. It is possible to identify the amount of
declared retained earnings to bear interest and the period over which the earnings have been retained, but unless the corporation's undeclared earnings
were actually detected, these calculations would not identify the undeclared
retained corporate profits to be assessed. The interest charge would simply
be a substitute impost for corporate manager's evasion.
Probably the only interaction mechanism capable of dealing with unde188. See generally supra note 80 and accompanying text.
189. For a discussion of the problems of undistributed profits taxes, see Vickrey, supra

note 10, at 126-28.
190. Cf. Vickrey, supra note 10, at 128-29.
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clared retained corporate earnings would be a shareholder tax on the market
value (not the amount) of corporate retentions.' 9' This would approach the
heart of the problem, which is the inability of any interaction mechanism to
tax undeclared profits on a current basis without necessarily being able to
identify them. 192 The system would depend upon the assumption that the
value of retained earnings, both declared and undeclared, was reflected in the
share price. But the difficulties with such a system are legion. It could only
be realistically applied to interests in publicly traded corporations where a
market value for corporate shares could be readily established. This is obviously a major limitation. It would create great difficulty for corporate groups
or where chains of interlocking share ownership operate with potential cascading of unremitted tax. Not only would it fundamentally change the ability to defer shareholder tax on retained earnings (declared or undeclared), but
it would also render the corporate tax base subject on a current basis to all the
other causes of market fluctuation which, at present, are reflected only once
when the market value is fixed by sale of the shareholding.' 93
One final caveat to these observations is appropriate. It is not clear that
governments always want to collect the tax not paid at the corporate level.
The reason for differences between reported income and distributed profit
may be due to many causes: corporate tax incentives; credits for taxes paid to
foreign governments; differences in accounting procedures for tax and corporation law purposes (such as different depreciation rates); capitalized retained
earnings; and corporate tax avoidance and evasion. If governments wish to
191. Vickrey, supra note 10, at 126. This system has been introduced in Australia, where
it is referred to as the Foreign Investment Fund system, as one system for taxing the income
of portfolio investments in nonresident corporations. ITAA Part XI. Again, like the CFC
system, its primary purpose was to prevent deferral of domestic tax by retaining income
offshore. The solution reached was to attribute increases in value to the Australian resident
shareholder and tax these changes as income.
192. Under such a system, the corporation would be taxed on declared earnings and the
shareholder would be assessed on the amount of the current year's distributions with credit
for the corporate tax. The shareholder would also be taxed on the increase in the value of the
share over the current period with credit for the remaining corporate tax not attributed to
distributions. If the personal income tax on distributed and retained earnings exceeded the
amount of corporate tax paid (and credited to the shareholder), the difference would be taxable
to the shareholder.
193. Additional accuracy could be introduced if the system operated as an accumulating
"life-time" holding tax. This would require all payments of personal income tax on both
distributions and retentions being treated as prepayments (carrying interest from the time of
payment at appropriate rates) against an accumulating total tax liability on both distributions
and capital gains assessed from the time of acquisition until the shareholder disposed of the
shares. As Vickrey noted, "in this way any deferment of the reporting of income results

merely in borrowing the amount of the deferred tax at a suitable rate of interest." Vickrey,
supra note 10, at 126. That result would be even more true if the source of deferral were
evasion.
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93

address differences caused by evasion only, it will be necessary to do so in
ways that do not conflict with these other goals.
The result of this analysis, so far as the revenue authority is concerned,
gives cause for some caution. While every interaction mechanism will reduce
to some extent the potential benefits of corporate tax evasion, none that is
presently employed will remove them entirely, and reliance on the interaction
mechanism to do so will be misguided. Yet there is scope for the interaction
mechanism to be a valuable tool to assist in reducing the benefits of evasion,
if the design problems such as the leakage and non-denial of credits can be
eliminated.
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TABLE Al
CLASSICAL SYSTEM
Successful
Honesty
Evasion
Corporation
Profit
Deductions
Tax
ACT
Fine
Net

100.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

65.00

100.00
0.00
35.00
0.00
0.00
65.00

Shareholder
Received

65.00

Gross-up
Deductions
Total
Tax
Credit
Net tax
Return

Failed
Evasion
d

1-d
100.00
0.00
35.00
0.00
26.25
38.75

0.00

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

100.00

100.00

100.00
0.00
35.00
0.00
26.25
38.75

65.00

100.00

100.00

38.75

38.75

0.00
0.00
65.00
22.75
0.00
22.75
42.75

0.00
0.00
65.00
16.25
0.00
16.25
48.75

0.00
0.00
100.00
35.00
0.00
35.00
65.00

0.00
0.00
100.00
25.00
0.00
25.00
75.00

0.00
0.00
38.75
13.56
0.00
13.56
25.19

0.00
0.00
38.75
9.69
0.00
9.69
29.06

Rates (%)
Tax + Fine
After-tax

57.75
42.25

51.25
48.75

35.00
65.00

25.00
75.00

74.81
25.19

70.94
29.06

Totals (%)
Tax Rate
Return

54.50
45.50

100.00

0.00
35.00

0.00
0.00
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70.00
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72.88
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TABLE A2
DIVIDEND-PAID DEDUCTION SYSTEM

Failed
Evasion

Successful
Evasion

Honesty
d

1-d

d

1-d

Corporation
Profit
Deductions
Tax
ACT
Fine
Net

100.00
100.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
100.00

100.00
0.00
35.00
0.00
0.00
65.00

100.00
100.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
100.00

100.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
100.00

100.00
100.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
100.00

100.00
0.00
35.00
0.00
26.25
38.75

Shareholder
Received

100.00

65.00

100.00

100.00

100.00

38.75

Gross-up
Deductions
Total
Tax
Credit
Net tax
Return

0.00
0.00
100.00
35.00
0.00
35.00
65.00

0.00
0.00
65.00
16.25
0.00
16.25
48.75

0.00
0.00
100.00
35.00
0.00
35.00
65.00

0.00
0.00
100.00
25.00
0.00
25.00
75.00

0.00
0.00
100.00
35.00
0.00
35.00
65.00

0.00
0.00
38.75
9.69
0.00
9.69
29.06

Rates (%)
Tax + Fine
After-tax

35.00
65.00

51.25
48.75

35.00
65.00

25.00
75.00

35.00
65.00

70.94
29.06

Totals (%)
Tax Rate
Return

43.13
56.88
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TABLE A3
DIVIDEND-RECEIVED DECUCTION SYSTEM
Honesty

Successful
Evasion
d

1-d

Failed
Evasion
d
1-d

Corporation
Profit
Deductions
Tax
ACT
Fine
Net

100.00
0.00
35.00
0.00
0.00
65.00

100.00
0.00
35.00
0.00
0.00
65.00

100.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
100.00

100.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
100.00

100.00
0.00
35.00
0.00
26.25
38.75

35.00
0.00
26.25
38.75

Shareholder
Received

65.00

65.00

100.00

100.00

38.75

38.75

Gross-up
Deductions
Total
Tax
Credit
Net tax
Return

0.00
65.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
65.00

0.00
0.00

0.00
0.00
100.00

0.00
38.75

65.00
16.25
0.00
16.25
48.75

0.00
100.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
100.00

25.00
0.00
25.00
75.00

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
38.75

0.00
0.00
38.75
9.69
0.00

Rates (%)
Tax + Fine
After-tax

35.00
65.00

51.25
48.75

0.00
100.00

25.00
75.00

61.25
38.75

Totals (%)
Tax Rate
Return

43.13
56.88
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12.50
87.50

100.00
0.00

9.69

29-.06
70.94
29.06

66.09
33.91
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TABLE A4
ADVANCED CORPORATION TAX SYSTEM
Honesty

Successful
Evasion

Failed
Evasion

d

1-d

d

1-d

Corporation
Profit
Deductions
Tax
ACT
Fine
Net

100.00
0.00
0.00
35.00
0.00
65.00

100.00
0.00
35.00
0.00
0.00
65.00

100.00
0.00
0.00
35.00
0.00
65.00

100.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
100.00

100.00 100.00
0.00
0.00
0.00 35.00
35.00
0.00
0.00 26.25
65.00 38.75

Shareholder
Received
Gross-up
Deductions
Total
Tax
Credit
Net tax
Return

65.00
35.00
0.00
100.00
35.00
35.00
0.00
65.00

65.00
0.00
0.00
65.00
16.25
0.00
16.25
48.75

65.00
35.00
0.00
100.00
35.00
'35.00
0.00
65.00

100.00
0.00
0.00
100.00
25.00
0.00
25.00
75.00

65.00
35.00
0.00
100.00
35.00
35.00
0.00
65.00

38.75
0.00
0.00
38.75
9.69
0.00
9.69
29.06

Rates (%)
Tax + Fine
After-tax

35.00
65.00

51.25
48.75

35.00
65.00

25.00
75.00

35.00
65.00

70.94
29.06

Totals (%)
Tax Rate
Return

43.13
56.88

30.00
70.00

d

Notes

1-d

(1)

52.97
47.03

NOTE
(1) It is assumed that the corporation does not avoid ACT but avoids the mainstream corporate tax.
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TABLE A5

AUSTRALIAN IMPUTATION SYSTEM
Honesty

Failed
Evasion

Successful
Evasion
d

1-d

d

1-d

d

1-d

Corporation
Profit
Deductions
Tax
ACT
Fine
Net

100.00
0.00
35.00
0.00
0.00
65.00

100.00
0.00
35.00
0.00
0.00
65.00

100.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
100.00

100.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
100.00

Shareholder
Received
Gross-up
Deductions
Total
Tax
Credit
Net tax
Return

65.00
35.00
0.00
100.00
35.00
35.00
0.00
65.00

65.00
0.00
0.00
65.00
16.25
0.00
16.25
48.75

100.00
0.00
0.00
100.00
35.00
0.00
35.00
65.00

100.00
0.00
0.00
100.00
25.00
0.00
25.00
75.00

38.75
0.00
0.00
38.75
13.56
0.00
13.56
25.19

38.75
0.00
0.00
38.75
9.69
0.00
9.69
29.06

Rates (%)
Tax + Fine
After-tax

35.00
65.00

51.25
48.75

35.00
65.00

25.00
75.00

74.81
25.19

70.94
29.06

Totals (%)
Tax Rate
Return

43.13
56.88

30.00
70.00

Notes

100.00 100.00
0.00
0.00
35.00 35.00
0.00
0.00
26.25 26.25
38.75 38.75

(1)

(1)

72.88
27.13

NOTE
(1) It is assumed that the shareholder does not gross-up (and cannot credit)
corporate tax unless payment of tax was made voluntarily and can be verified.
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TABLE A6
INTEGRATION SYSTEM
Honesty
Successful
Evasion

Failed
Evasion
d

1-d

d

1-d

d

1-d

Corporation
Profit
Deductions
Tax
ACT
Fine
Net

100.00
0.00
35.00
0.00
0.00
65.00

100.00
0.00
35.00
0.00
0.00
65.00

100.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
100.00

100.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
100.00

Shareholder
Received
Gross-up
Deductions
Total
Tax
Credit
Net tax
Return

65.00
35.00
0.00
100.00
35.00
35.00
0.00
65.00

65.00
35.00
0.00
100.00
35.00
35.00
0.00
65.00

100.00
0.00
0.00
100.00
25.00
0.00
25.00
75.00

100.00
0.00
0.00
100.00
25.00
0.00
25.00
75.00

38.75
0.00
0.00
38.75
13.56
0.00
13.56
25.19

38.75
0.00
0.00
38.75
13.56
0.00
13.56
25.19

Rates (%)
Tax + Fine
After-tax

35.00
65.00

35.00
65.00

25.00
75.00

25.00
75.00

74.81
25.19

74.81
25.19

Totals (%)
Tax Rate
Return

35.00
65.00

25.00
75.00

Notes

100.00 100.00
0.00
0.00
35.00 35.00
0.00
0.00
26.25 26.25
38.75 38.75

(1)

(2,3)
(1)

74.81
25.19

NOTES
(1) It is assumed that the shareholder does not gross-up (and cannot credit)
payments of corporate tax unless paid voluntarily and they can be verified.
(2) It is assumed that all declared earnings are attributed to the shareholder
and taxed at dividend rates rather than capital gains tax rates.
(3) Undeclared earnings are taxed as capital gain even if distributed where
evasion is successful.
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TABLE A7
EXPECTED RETURNS UNDER CLASSICAL SYSTEM

Tg
f
r*
r
p

50%
100000
80000
35%
35%

25%
75%
15%
10%
10%

ACTUAL RETURN TO SHAREHOLDERS .

Honesty
Success
Failure
Year

dD
21125
16900
16900

(1-d)D
24375
19500
19500

d(P-D)
0
6500
6500

(1-d)P-D
0
7500
-2105
-2542
-2998
-3475
-3974
-4496
-5041
-5611
-6207
-6830

Post Tax
Return
45500
50400
40795
40358
39902
39425
38926
38404
37859
37289
36693
36070

Gain
(loss) v.
Honesty
4900
-4705
-5142
-5598
-6075
-6574
-7096
-7641
-8211
-8807
-9430

EXPECTED RETURN TO SHAREHOLDERS

Years
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

(-p)
45360
40824
36742
33067
29761
26785
24106
21696
19526
17573
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p
4079
7712
10944
13818
16372
18639
20651
22435
24015
25412

Total
49439
48536
47685
46885
46132
45424
44758
44131
43540
42985
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EXPECTED GAIN/LOSS TO SHAREHOLDERS

Years
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

(l-p)
4410
3969
3572
3215
2893
2604
2344
2109
1898
1709

p
-471
-933
-1387
-1830
-2261
-2680
-3086
-3479
-3858
-4223

Total
3939
3036
2185
1385
632
-76
-742
-1369
-1960
-2515

EXPECTED GAIN/LOSS TO CORPORATION

Years
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

(I-p)
6300
5670
5103
4593
4133
3720
3348
3013
2712
2441
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p
-549
-1065
-1551
-2008
-2439
-2843
-3224
-3583
-3920
-4237

Total
5751
4605
3552
2584
1695
877
124
-569
-1208
-1796
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TABLE A8
EXPECTED RETURN UNDER DIVIDEND-PAID DEDUCTION SYSTEM
d
50%
Tg
25%
P
100000
f
75%
D
80000
r*
15%
Tc
35%
r
10%
Ti
35%
p
10%
ACTUAL RETURN TO SHAREHOLDERS

Honesty
Success
Failure
1
Year
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

dD
32500
26000
26000

(1-d)D
24375
19500
19500

d(P-D)
0
6500
6500

(1-d)P-D
0
7500
2697
2479
2251
2012
1763
1502
1229
944
646
335

Post Tax
Return
56875
59500
54697
54479
54251
54012
53763
53502
53229
52944
52646
52335

Gain
(loss) v.
Honesty
2625
-2178
-2396
-2624
-2863
-3112
-3373
-3646
-3931
-4229
-4540

EXPECTED RETURN TO SHAREHOLDERS
Years
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

(l-p)
53550
48195
43375
39038
35134
31621
28459
25613
23052
20746
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p
5470
10373
14767
18705
22232
25391
28220
30752
33019
35046

Total
59020
58568
58143
57743
57366
57012
56679.
56365
56070
55793
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EXPECTED GAIN/LOSS TO SHAREHOLDERS

Years
1
2
3
4

5
6

7
8
9
10

(1-p)
2363
2126
1914
1722
1550
1395
1256
1130
1017
915

p
-218
-433
-646
-855
-1059
-1258
-1452
-1640
-1822
-1998

Total
2145
1693
1268
868
491
137
-196
-510
-805
-1082

EXPECTED GAIN/LOSS TO CORPORATION

Years
1
2
3
4

5
6
7
8
9
10

(1-p)
3150
2835
2551
2296
2067
1860
1674
1507
1356
1220
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p
-274
-533
-776
-1004
-1219
-1422
-1612
-1791
-1960
-2118

Total
2876
2302
1776
1292
847
438
62
-285
-604
-898
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TABLE A9
EXPECTED RETURN UNDER
FULL DIVIDEND-RECEIVED DEDUCTION SYSTEM
50%
Tg
25%
100000
f
75%
80000
r*
15%
35%
r
10%
35%
p
10%
ACTUAL RETURN TO SHAREHOLDERS

Honesty
Success
Failure
1
Year
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

dD •(1-d)D
32500 24375
26000
19500
26000. 19500

d(P-D)
0
10000
10000

(1-d)P-D
0
7500
-2105
-2542
-2998
-3475
-3974
-4496
-5041
-5611
-6207
-6830

Post Tax
Return
56875
63000
53395
52958
52502
52025
51526
51004
50459
49889
49293
48670

Gain
(loss) v.
Honesty
6125
-3480
-3917
-4373
-4850
-5349
-5871
-6416
-6986
-7582
-8205

EXPECTED RETURN TO SHAREHOLDERS
Years
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

(l-p)
56700
51030
45927
41334
37201
33481
30133
27119
24407
21967
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p
5339
10106
14358
18151
21532
24543
27225
29611
31733
33619

Total
62039
61136
60285
59485
58732
58024
57358
56731
56140
55585
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EXPECTED GAIN/LosS TO SHAREHOLDERS

Years
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

(I-p)
5513
4961
4465
4019
3617
3255
2930
2637
2373
2136

p
-348
-701
-1055
-1408
-1759
-2106
-2447
-2781
-3107
-3425

Total
5164
4261
3410
2610
1857
1149
483
-144
-735
-1290

EXPECTED GAIN/LOSS TO CORPORATION

Years
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

(-p)
6300
5670
5103
4593
4133
3720
3348
3013
2712
2441
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p
-549
-1065
-1551
-2008
-2439
-2843
-3224
-3583
-3920
-4237

Total
5751
4605
3552
2584
1695
877
124
-569
-1208
-1796
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TABLE A10
EXPECTED RETURN UNDER ACT SYSTEM
50%
100000
80000
35%
35%
35%

Tg
f
r*
r
p

25%
75%
15%
10%
10%

ACTUAL RETURN TO SHAREHOLDERS

Honesty
Success
Failure
Year

dD
32500
26000
26000

(1-d)D
24375
19500
19500

d(P-D)
0
10000
10000

(1-d)P-D
0
7500
-2105
-2542
--2998
-3475
-3974
-4496
-5041
-5611
-6207
-6830

Post Tax
Return
56875
63000
53395
52958
52502
52025
51526
51004
50459
49889
49293
48670

Gain

(loss) v.
Honesty
6125
-3480
-3917
-4373
-4850
-5349
-5871
-6416
-6986

-7582
-8205

EXPECTED RETURN TO SHAREHOLDERS

Years
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

(1-p)
56700
51030
45927
41334
37201
33481
30133
27119
24407
21967
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p
5339
10106
14358
18151
21532
24543
27225
29611
31733
33619

Total
62039
61136
60285
59485
58732
58024
57358
56731
56140
55585
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EXPECTED GAIN/LOSS TO SHAREHOLDERS

Years
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

(l-P)
5513
4961
4465
4019
3617
3255
2930
2637
2373
2136

P
-348
-701
-1055
-1408
-1759
-2106
-2447
-2781
-3107
-3425

Total
5164
4261
3410
2610
1857
1149
483
-144
-735
-1290

EXPECTED GAIN/LOSS TO CORPORATION

Years
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

(l-p)
6300
5670
5103
4593
4133
3720
3348
3013
2712
2441

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akrontaxjournal/vol12/iss1/1

p
-549
-1065
-1551
-2008
-2439
-2843
-3224
-3583
-3920
-4237

Total
5751
4605
3552
2584
1695
877
124
-569
-1208
-1796
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TABLE All
EXPECTED RETURN UNDER AUSTRALIAN IMPUTATION SYSTEM

50%
100000
80000
35%
35%

Tg
f
r*
r
p

25%
75%
15%
10%
10%

ACTUAL RETURN TO SHAREHOLDERS

Honesty
Success
Failure
Year

dD
32500
26000
26000

(1-d)D
24375
19500
19500

d(P-D)
0
10000
10000

(1-d)P-D
0
7500
-2105
-2542
-2998
-3475
-3974
-4496
-5041
-5611
-6207
-6830

Post Tax
Return
56875
63000
53395
52958
52502
52025
51526
51004
50459
49889
49293
48670

Gain
(loss) V.
Honesty
6125
-3480
-3917
-4373
-4850
-5349
-5871
-6416
-6986
-7582
-8205

EXPECTED RETURN TO SHAREHOLDERS

Years
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

(l-p)
56700
51030
45927
41334
37201
33481
30133
27119
24407
21967
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p
5339
9629
13456
16870
19912
22623
25036
27184
29094
30791

Total
62039
60659
59383
58204
57113
56104
55169
54303
53501
52757
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EXPECTED GAIN/LOSS TO SHAREHOLDERS

Years
1
2
3

(i-p
5513
4961
4465
4019
3617
3255
2930
2637
2373
2136

p
-348
-665
-984
-1302
-1618
-1930
-2237
-2538
-2832
-3118

Total
5164
4296
3481
2716
1999
1325
693
99
-459
-982

EXPECTED GAIN/LOSS TO CORPORATION

Years
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

(l-p)
6300
5670
5103
4593
4133
3720
3348
3103
2712
2441

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akrontaxjournal/vol12/iss1/1

p
-549
-1065
-1551
-2008
-2439
-2843
-3224
-3583
-3920
-4237

Total
5751
4605
3552
2584
1695
877
124
-569
-1208
-1796
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TABLE A12
EXPECTED RETURN UNDER INTEGRATION SYSTEM

d
P
D
Tc
Ti

50%
100000
80000
35%
35%

Tg
f
r*
r
p

25%
75%
15%
10%
10%

ACTUAL RETURN TO SHAREHOLDERS
D
65000
52000
52000

Honesty
Success
Failure 1
Year
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

P-D
0
15000
193
-389
-998
-1634
-2299
-2994
-3721
-4481
-5276
-6107

Post Tax
Return
65000
67000
52193
51611
51002
50366
49701
49006
48279
47519
46724
45893

Gain
(loss) v.
Honesty
2000
-12807
-13389
-13998
-14634
-15299
-15994
-16721
-17481
-18276
-19107

EXPECTED RETURN TO SHAREHOLDERS
Years
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

(l-p)
60300
54270
48843
43959
39563
35607
32046
28841
25957
23361

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1996

p
5219
9864
13996
17667
20928
23822
26388
28660
30672
32450

Total
65519
64134
62839
61626
60491
58428
58433
57502
56629
55811
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EXPECTED GAIN/LOSS TO SHAREHOLDERS
Years

( 1 -p)

1
2

1800
1620
1458
1312
1181
1063
957
861
775
697

3

4
5
6

7
8
9
10

p
-1281
-2486
-3619
-4686
-5690
-6635
-7523
-8359
-9146
-9886

Total
519
-866
-2161
-3374
-4509
-5572
-6567
-7498
-8371
-9189

EXPECTED GAIN/LOSS TO CORPORATION

Years
1

2
3
4
5
6

7
8
9
10

(l-p)
6300
5670
5103
4593
4133
3720
3348
3013
2712
2441

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akrontaxjournal/vol12/iss1/1

p
-549
-1065
-1551
-2008
-2439
-2843
-3224
-3583
-3920
-4237

Total
5751
4605
3552
2584
1695
877
124
-569
-1208
-1796
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TABLE A13
EFFECT OF CHANGED DISTRIBUTION RATES
IN CLASSICAL SYSTEM
P
D

100000
80000

Tc

f
r*

75%
15%

35%

r

10%

35%

p

10%

25%

Tg

EXPECTED RETURN WITH DISTRIBUTION
Distribute
Year

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

25%

50%

75%

51239
50336
49485
48685
47932
47224
46558
45931
45340
44785

49439
48536
47685
46885
46132
45424
44758
44131
43540
42985

47639
46736
45885
45085
44332
43624
42958
42331
41740
41185
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TABLE A14
EFFECT OF CHANGED DISTRIBUTION RATES
IN DIVIDEND-PAID DEDUCTION SYSTEM

P
D
Tc
Ti

100000
80000
35%
35%

Tg

25%

f
r*
r
p

75%
15%
10%
10%

EXPECTED RETURN WITH DISTRIBUTION

Distribute
Year

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

25%

50%

75%

56030
55352
54714
54114
53549
53018
52518
52048
51605
51189

59020
58568
58143
57743
57366
57012
56679
56365
56070
55793

62010
61784
61571
61371
61183
61006
60839
60683
60535
60396

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akrontaxjournal/vol12/iss1/1

114

Cooper: The Return to Corporate Tax Evasion

19961

THE RETURN TO CORPORATE TAX EVASION

TABLE A15
EFFECT OF CHANGED DISTRIBUTION RATES
IN DIVIDEND-RECEIVED DEDUCTION SYSTEM

P
D
Tc
Ti
Tg

f
r*
r
p

100000
80000
35%
35%
25%

75%
15%
10%
10%

EXPECTED RETURN WITH DISTRIBUTION

Distribute
Year

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

25%

50%

75%

57539
56636
55785
54985
54232
53524
52858
52231
51640
51085

62039
61136
60285
59485
58732
58024
57358
56731
56140
55585

66539
65636
64785
63985
63232
62524
61858
61231
60640
60085
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TABLE A16
EFFECT OF CHANGED DISTRIBUTION RATES
IN ADVANCED CORPORATE TAX SYSTEM
P
D
Ta
Tc
Ti
Tg

100000
80000
35%
35%
35%
25%

f
r*
r
p

75%
15%
10%
10%

EXPECTED RETURN WITH DISTRIBUTION
Distribute
Year

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

25%

50%

75%

57539
56636
55785
54985
54232
53524
52858
52231
51640
51085

62039
61136
60285
59485
58732
58024
57358
56731
56140
55585

66539
65636
64785
63985
63232
62524
61858
61231
60640
60085
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TABLE A17

EFFECT OF CHANGED DISTRIBUTION RATES
IN AUSTRALIAN IMPUTATION SYSTEM

P
D
Tc
Ti
Tg

100000
80000
35%
35%
25%

f
r*
r
p

75%
15%
10%
10%

EXPECTED RETURN WITH DISTRIBUTION

Distribute
Year

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

25%

50%

75%

57539
56200
54960
53814
52753
51770
50859
50015
49232
48506

62039
60659
59383
58204
57113
56104
55169
54303
53501
52757

66539
65119
63807
62594
61474
60438
59479
58592
57770
57009
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TABLE A18
EFFECT OF CHANGED DISTRIBUTION RATES
IN INTEGRATION SYSTEM
P
D
Tc

100000
80000
35%
35%

Tg

f
r*
r
p

75%
15%
10%
10%

25%
EXPECTED RETURN AT ALL DISTRIBUTION LEVELS

Year

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

65519
64134
62839
61626
60491
59428
58433
57502
56629
55811

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akrontaxjournal/vol12/iss1/1

118

Cooper: The Return to Corporate Tax Evasion

1996]

THE RETURN TO CORPORATE TAX EVASION

TABLE A19

EFFECT OF CHANGED DECLARED INCOME
IN CLASSICAL SYSTEM
d
P
Tc
Ti
Tg

50%
100000
35%
35%
25%

f
r*
r
p

75%
15%
10%
10%

EXPECTED RETURN WITH DISTRIBUTION
Declared
Year

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

20000

50000

80000

61258
57643
54242
51041
48030
45196
42531
40022
37662
35441

55349
53089
50963
48963
47081
45310
43644
42076
40601
39213

49439
48536
47685
46885
46132
45424
44758
44131
43540
42985

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1996

119

Akron Tax Journal, Vol. 12 [1996], Art. 1

[Vol. 12

AKRON TAX JOURNAL

TABLE A20
EFFECT OF CHANGED DECLARED INCOME
IN DIVIDEND-PAID DEDUCTION SYSTEM

d
P
Tc
Ti
Tg

50%
100000
35%
35%
25%

f
r*
r
p

75%
15%
10%
10%

EXPECTED RETURN WITH DECLARED INCOME
Declared
Year

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

20000

50000

80000

65454
63646
61946
60346
58840
57423
56090
54836
53656
52546

62237
61107
60044
59044
58103
57218
56385
55601
54863
54169

59020
58568
58143
57743
57366
57012
56679
56365
56070
55793
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TABLE A21
EFFECT OF CHANGE IN DECLARED INCOME
IN DIVIDEND-RECEIVED DEDUCTION SYSTEM

f
r*
r
p

50%
100000
35%
35%
25%

d
P
Tc
Ti
Tg

75%
15%
10%
10%

EXPECTED RETURN WITH DECLARED INCOME
Declared
Year

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

20000

50000

80000

77533
73918
70517
67316
64305
61471
58806
56297
53937
51716

69786
67527
65401
63401
61519
59748
58082
56514
55039
53651

62039
61136
60285
59485
58732
58024
57358
56731
56140
55585
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TABLE A22
EFFECT OF CHANGE IN DECLARED INCOME
IN ADVANCE CORPORATE TAX SYSTEM
50%
100000
35%
35%
35%
25%

d
P
Ta
Tc
Ti
Tg

f
r*
r
p

75%
15%
10%
10%

EXPECTED RETURN WITH DECLARED INCOME
Declared
Year

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

20000

50000

80000

61258
57643
54242
51041
48030
45196
42531
40022
37662
35441

55349
53089
50963
48963
47081
45310
43644
42076
40601
39213

49439
48536
47685
46885
46132
45424
44758
44131
43540
42985
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TABLE A23
EFFECT OF CHANGE IN DECLARED INCOME
IN AUSTRALIAN IMPUTATION SYSTEM"

d
p
Tc
Ti
Tg

50%
100000
35%
35%
25%

f
r*
r
p

75%
15%
10%
10%

EXPECTED RETURN WITH DECLARED INCOME

Declared
Year

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

20000

50000

80000

77533
73547
69827
66353
63109
60078
57247
54600
52125
49812

69786
67103
64605
62279
60111
58091
56208
55452
52813
51284

62039
60659
59383
58204
57113
56104
55169
54303
53501
52757
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TABLE A24
EFFECT OF CHANGED DECLARED INCOME
IN INTEGRATION SYSTEM

50%
100000
35%
35%
25%

f
r*
r
p

75%
15%
10%
10%

EXPECTED RETURN WITH DECLARED INCOME
Declared
Year

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

20000

50000

80000

67077
61537
56354
51504
46964
42714
38734
35007
31515
28244

66298
62836
59596
56565
53727
51071
48584
46254
44072
42028

65519
64134
62839
61626
60491
59428
58433
57502
56629
55811
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